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This thesis presents three studies on uncertainty spillovers and their effects on corporate 
sectors' investment and financing decisions. 
The second chapter examines the impact of international capital flows on the Chinese 
real economy during the Chinese Corporate Debt Crisis. It exploits an extensive dataset on 
Chinese firm-level characteristics and international cross-border flows between 2005 and 2016. 
It finds that capital inflows expand the capital availability of Chinese banks and result in more 
credit, especially to more risky firms – with lower profitability and a higher risk of insolvency. 
These results indicate a risk-taking channel originating from banks' greater liquidity during 
capital inflow surges. I recommend stricter supervision of Chinese banks in times of capital 
inflow surges and more targeted macroprudential policies.   
The third chapter, motivated by the sovereign debt crisis and based on a dataset 
including bilateral Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) holdings, investigates the implications of 
sovereign and bank-related risk on FDI in the Eurozone. In this chapter, strikingly, I discover 
that only banking risk in the country of origin impacts FDI choices. On the contrary, sovereign 
risk in both origin and host countries appears to have effects. These results suggest that 
although poor financial discipline by host governments has been widely blamed as the primary 
factor likely to frighten off overseas investors, it is amongst FDI supplying nations that the 
effects of sovereign yields seem most pronounced.  
The fourth chapter, building on Wright et al. (2016), explores the effect of uncertainty 
spillovers of Brexit on UK PE activity and the channels that transmit uncertainty to the PE 
market. In this chapter, employing a novel dataset on PE targets and non-targets over the 2010–
2019 period, I find that uncertainty, especially Brexit-related uncertainty, negatively affects the 
UK's PE activity. Moreover, the transmission of such uncertainty occurs primarily through the 
real-options channel and tension arising from prolonged interim periods of PE deals. These 
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results imply that ongoing uncertainty in Brexit policy will continue to depress PE activity and, 
by extension, investment and growth in the UK. 
This thesis proposes that the domestic real economy is very "fragile" and sensitive to 
the global economic condition and uncertainty in geographies far from the domestic borders. 
Therefore, identifying better ways to support economic resilience and prevent cross-country 
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Uncertainty plays a vital role in shaping political decisions and discourses, everyday choices, 
and the global economic conjecture and outlook. Particularly in the period when I am writing 
this thesis, uncertainty about the severity of epidemiological factors related to the Covid-19 
pandemic has vastly shaped political, academic and press debates about the determinants of 
uncertainty, its associated costs and the impact of policymakers' inaction vs reaction to it. 
Despite the peculiarity of these circumstances, some important questions posed in this context 
of Covid-19 uncertainty are innately similar to those arising in most uncertainty settings (see 
Baker et al., 2016). These questions relate to uncertainty on who will make (is entitled to make) 
decisions, what decisions will be taken and when, or, of course, until when this uncertainty 
(and policies) will last, and the effects of policy action, or inaction.  
Nevertheless, arguably uncertainty takes various forms in different circumstances. 
Therefore, the prevalence of one or more of these questions might affect the 'type' of 
uncertainty in consideration and, therefore, how it propagates to the economic agents in 
question. Understanding the type of uncertainty in consideration is indeed essential to be able 
to answer the previously mentioned questions.  
Several studies tried to get a better understanding of uncertainty in its various forms. 
Early work from Rowe (1994) provides a broad definition of uncertainty and the variability of 
information that it embeds. The author documents four broad categories of uncertainty: (i) 
temporal (i.e., about future or past states); (ii) structural (i.e., that arises from models/reality 
complexity); (iii) metrical (i.e., in the measurement of uncertainty itself or variables in a 
particular state); and (iv) translational (i.e., uncertainty in explaining/translating its effects).  
These categories of uncertainty are independent up to a certain extent. In a particular 
context, one or more (even all of them) might co-exist at a given point in time, in the same 
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context (economy) or different ones (e.g., in other countries). However, each of them will have 
various causal factors and propagation mechanisms.  
Rowe (1994) suggests that temporal uncertainty about the future, typically pending 
events, causes anxiety that often leads to a greater propensity to gamble in the agents affected 
by it. Differently, uncertainty about the past arising from a perceived information loss can cause 
recrimination and different forms of denial (ibid.). Similarly, he proposes that the information 
overload of structural uncertainty can lead to bewilderment and undue conservative responses. 
Metrical uncertainty arising from measurement difficulties can bring frustration and result in 
the forced estimation of its outcomes (ibid.). As opposed to situations of translational 
uncertainty, whereby policymakers cannot estimate its effects because of the diversity of the 
economic agents it affects, which might lead to favouring one party over another (ibid.). 
During the Covid-19 pandemic, we experienced several if not all these forms of 
uncertainty. At the start of the pandemic, temporal uncertainty was at its peak since nobody 
could anticipate how long it would last or the extent of the economic costs it would bring. 
Policymakers of several countries expressed concerns over measuring the Covid-19 patients 
and, on several occasions, suggested the under-reporting of many nations (i.e., some degree of 
temporal uncertainty about the past). Still, today, differences in the reporting of cases between 
different countries exist as well as concerns over countries' previous calculations and 
adaptations in the reporting schemes.  
Therefore, I would argue that, to some extent, we observed all these forms of 
uncertainty and many of its predicted effects over the past several months.  These categories 
and features, however, are not characteristic of the Covid-19 pandemic alone. On the contrary, 
they also appear relevant in several other uncertain events we have observed in the past decade. 
In this Section (and thesis), we consider uncertainty propagation in the context of three major 
recent uncertainty events. 
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In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), most advanced economies central 
banks adopted unconventional monetary policies to facilitate their domestic economic 
recovery. In this context, the low interest rate environment and elevated uncertainty about the 
length of these easing policies led to significant spillovers to emerging market countries. That 
caused a considerable growth in corporate debt, which eventually resulted in the case of China 
in the so-called Corporate Debt Crisis (i.e., uncertainty about the future created risk-taking 
incentives).  
In Europe instead, this same uncertainty, combined with the vast central bank purchase 
of government bonds, encouraged banks to reduce credit and substantially increase their 
exposure to their domestic economy sovereign bonds (i.e., "flight to quality" in response to 
structural uncertainty). This exposure of banks led to severe consequences once the Sovereign 
Debt Crisis unfolded, sovereign bonds depreciated, and their balance sheets suddenly shrunk. 
In this context, we might argue that, to a certain extent, also temporal uncertainty about the 
past and metric uncertainty played a crucial role. That is because of the role of the "smoking 
gun" of this crisis, typically associated with the discovery of the Greek government under-
reporting of debt and deficit level in October 2009. 
Not surprisingly, once structural and metrical uncertainty arose, these ultimately caused 
severe austerity policy in the periphery of the Euro Area (EA), strong under-investment, and 
an instead much quicker recovery of the EA's core countries (i.e., they resulted in a 
conservative response).  
Ultimately, uncertainty related to the 2016 UK Brexit Referendum led to an 
unprecedented and controversial Brexit vote in June 2016. At least to some extent, this result 
has been affected by the complexity of the referendum implications, the vast diversity of needs 
of different agents and British citizens involved in the vote. After the referendum result, 
uncertainty about the future negotiations between Britain and the EU and the outcome of these 
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negotiations had an even more devasting effect on British and EU businesses, which resulted 
in a substantial reduction in investment in the UK (both from companies and institutional 
investors).  
Bringing these few important uncertainty events into Rowe (1994) uncertainty 
frameworks, these seem to do a "good job" in providing a qualitative description of the 
consequences of uncertainty for companies and policymakers. However, the model remains 
silent on the transmission channels of this uncertainty, its duration and its effects on the real 
economy. This thesis aims to fill these gaps by focusing on uncertainty propagation 
mechanisms or, in economic terms, on the transmission channels of uncertainty. By studying 
its propagation, of course, it also provides an assessment of its effects (i.e., an estimation), 
explains its duration, and tries to shed light on policies that can mitigate it. In particular, 
focusing on the three previously mentioned uncertainty events (i.e., Chinese Corporate Debt 
Crisis, Sovereign Debt Crisis and Brexit Referendum), this thesis analyses the impact of 
uncertainty on the financing behaviour of banks and the investment decisions of firms affected 
by these uncertainty types. 
In Chapter 2, I analyse the impact of cross-country investment in China on the real 
economy and find that this results in increases in Chinese firms’ corporate debt levels.  
The unprecedented nature of monetary policies adopted after the GFC, the slow growth 
of many advanced economies after the crisis, and the unclear length of time for which these 
policies would remain in place created strong capital flight incentives that led to a substantial 
increase in investment in emerging markets. Spillovers of advanced economies financial 
conditions had the effect of constraining emerging markets monetary policy choices (and 
independence), leading to the build-up of vulnerabilities. In the case of China, its record growth 
observed in the aftermath of the GFC made it one of the leading emerging market recipients of 
capital inflows from advanced economies.  
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Many scholars and policymakers argued that in China, among other emerging 
countries, monetary policy and financial spillovers caused a rapid and vast increase in debt. In 
more detail, the BIS and the IMF estimated that Chinese corporate debt increased from 80 per 
cent of its GDP in 2008 to 175 per cent in 2015, posing an unprecedented threat to financial 
stability (Maliszewski et al., 2016) when spillovers vulnerabilities spillback to their countries 
of origin.  
This chapter inspects the transmission of international capital flows to the Chinese real 
economy and the resulting increase in corporate debt. Its methodology leverages the idea that 
capital inflows, like loosening monetary policies, expand domestic liquidity and drive banks' 
risk-taking. Several studies find non-trivial evidence of resources misallocation during capital 
inflow regimes (Dinger and te Kaat, 2015; Disyatat and Rungcharoenkitkul, 2017; BIS, 2015; 
Bruno and Shin, 2017). To investigate this phenomenon for China and contextualise it with 
existing evidence on growth in private sector debt, I look at firms' leverage and their 
fundamentals. In particular, I try to understand whether having a healthier balance sheet 
increases (or decreases) their likelihood of receiving a loan during periods of high capital 
inflows. 
Moreover, I split firms according to their industry and size, as they hugely matter during 
expanded liquidity regimes. I argue that mining, construction, and real estate industries are 
more heavily reliant on debt and more capital intensive; hence, they will ask for more credit. 
Likewise, small firms tend to have a much more robust synchronisation with the domestic 
business cycle because of their more significant funding constraints. Hence, they have a 
stronger incentive to exploit cheaper and more accessible financing (Begenau and Salomao, 
2018; Gertler and Glichrist, 1994).  
I find a positive relationship between capital inflows and credit growth in China in all 
regression models. In particular, a 1 percent increase in capital inflows-over-GDP leads to a 
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more than double growth in firms' leverage ratio. Secondly, I observe that capital inflows are 
associated with increased banks' lending to less profitable firms. For the overall period, I find 
that the geometric mean of debt financing (scaled by assets) of less profitable firms' is about 
32 per cent higher than that of profitable ones (using the industry median as the benchmark). 
Moreover, the marginal effect of a 1 percent increase in capital inflows is an additional 4 
percent lending to less profitable firms. Ultimately, I observe that the credit expansion arising 
from capital inflow surges has a significantly stronger effect on smaller firms and capital-
intensive industries due to their more challenging access to capital in normal times and their 
greater reliance on debt financing. 
In Chapter 3, instead, I focus on the Euro Area (EA) context and explore how 
uncertainty arising from the Sovereign Debt Crisis affected inward Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) in its member countries. The Euro Area has historically been a key recipient of FDI 
investments and an important FDI supplier. That has been attributed not only to the elimination 
of transaction costs and exchange risk in the reallocation of capital between members of the 
monetary union (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2008; Darvas et al., 2013) but also to an increase in 
international investors' confidence in its financial institutions and supervisory bodies (Shatz & 
Venables, 2000). In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), worries about fiscal 
sustainability in the EA intensified (Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012; Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 
2012; Bernoth & Erdogan, 2012; Afonso et al., 2014, 2018) as risks in the banking sector fed 
back to the sovereign position and vice versa, generating a detrimental cycle (De Bruyckere et 
al., 2013; Acharya et al., 2014; Delatte et al., 2017). As a result, in the run-up of the sovereign 
debt crisis, the EA experienced significant capital outflows. In this context, the chapter 
examines how sovereign and banking sector risks that accumulated during the crises affected 
FDI in the EA. More specifically, I dissect the effect of sovereign and banking risk in origin 
(foreign investors) and host countries (EA), which I consider as the main drivers of investors' 
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capital allocation in the analysis period. Therefore, this approach extends the empirical 
literature on FDI that typically considers domestic factors as drivers for foreign investment 
(e.g., Carril-Caccia & Pavlova, 2018; Dellis et al., 2016; Razin & Sadka, 2007). By 
contraposing banking and sovereign stress in the country where FDI originates (i.e., the origin 
country) with the corresponding recipient country of FDI (i.e., the host), the chapter isolates 
the impact that EA countries' sovereign and banking risk have on their ability to attract FDI 
from other factors, whilst also considering the relative importance of origin countries' domestic 
risk. 
Moreover, I provide evidence on cross-country spillovers arising from sovereign and 
banking sectors' stress and the transmission to the Euro Area through FDI. I argue that 
modelling the effects of FDI in the EA context constitutes per se an ideal setting for this 
empirical analysis. Since all countries in the European Monetary Union (EMU) have a common 
currency and monetary policy, that mutes the effect from the monetary transmission and allows 
for a cleaner identification of variations in the financial account of the Balance of Payments. 
The empirical analysis employs a large panel dataset from the IMF Coordinated Foreign Direct 
Investment Survey (IMF CDIS) on 112 countries FDI stock positions between 2009 and 2016, 
which I use to identify inward FDI in the EA. The chapter’s empirical work yields three main 
findings. Firstly, I observe that an increase in non-performing loans-over-total loans – widely 
employed in the banking literature (see Aiyar & Monaghan, 2015) to test banking sector 
stability – in the origin country leads to a decrease in FDI. However, importantly, changes in 
the corresponding bank risk in host countries leave inward-FDI unaffected. Secondly, I find 
that FDI responds negatively to upturns in sovereign yields both in origin as well as host 
countries, arguing that (i) an increase in origin country sovereign yield encourages corporate 
sector Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) to engage in less risk-taking, whilst (ii) an increase 
in host country yield implies that other destinations appear more attractive. 
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Additionally, when the EA sample is separated into subsamples of non-stressed and 
stressed (GIIPS: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) countries1, these findings are 
confirmed, reinforcing my confidence regarding the identified transmission channels. In a 
nutshell, I find that economic conditions – including financial stability – in origin countries 
particularly matters for FDI. A core achievement of this chapter is the identification of a 
spillover effect of risk in origin countries to the Euro Area through FDI. Finally, I re-affirm 
findings in the literature related to the importance of economic and financial ties in investment 
and financing decisions, embedded in standard gravity variables. 
In Chapter 4, I consider another well-known recent event of elevated uncertainty, the 
Brexit referendum. In particular, I examine the effects of uncertainty from the Brexit 
referendum results in June 2016 on private equity investment in the UK.  
Private equity (PE) is a very popular and economically relevant category of investment 
in the UK context. The size of its PE market is the largest in all the European continent, and 
leveraged buyouts (LBOs) account for three-quarters of the UK merger and acquisition (M&A) 
deals (CMBOR, 2016). Moreover, its economic relevance has been vastly documented by the 
relevant literature. Benefits arising from PE investment include enhancement in corporate 
governance practices (see, e.g., Jensen, 1989; Acharya et al., 2013); improvement in firms' 
efficiency (see, e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009) and productivity (see, e.g., Lerner et al., 
2011; Davis et al., 2019); and, employment opportunities of portfolio firms' workers (see, e.g., 
Kaplan, 1989; Davis et al., 2014; Agrawal and Tambe, 2015).  
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that many PE investors disinvested from the UK 
in the years of post-referendum negotiations between the UK and the EU because of the 
elevated uncertainty. In this context, many commentators also argued that uncertainty might 
 
1 Note that a vast body of literature identifies in the context of the sovereign debt crisis Euro Area GIIPS countries 
as stressed, and non-GIIPS countries as non-stressed (see, e.g., Acharya et al., 2018; Afonso et al., 2018). 
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have a persistent effect on the UK economic activity and strongly quested for a fast resolution 
of this uncertainty (Wright et al. 2016; Kadiric and Korus, 2019).  
Therefore, in Chapter 4, building on the work of Wright, co-authors, and other existing 
literature on PE (e.g., Leslie and Oyer, 2009; Lerner et al., 2011; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; 
Hotchkiss et al., 2011; Cumming et al., 2020; for an excellent review see Gilligan and Wright, 
2020), I investigate two associated research questions: firstly, what is the effect of uncertainty 
and, in particular, Brexit-related uncertainty, on PE activity in the UK? And secondly, what 
are the channels that operationalise the transmission of uncertainty to the PE market? In terms 
of measuring activity, I follow others (e.g., Wright et al., 2016) in defining PE as the 'risk 
capital employed to finance the acquisition of mature businesses via a leveraged buyout 
(LBO).' Less straightforward is identifying an appropriate analytical framework, given that the 
conceptualisation and measurement of uncertainty is a non-trivial task. To circumvent this, I 
employ a set of uncertainty measures, including the Bloom et al. (2019) Brexit Uncertainty 
Index (BUI) and the Baker et al. (2016) Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU). 
This chapter's analyses a novel dataset that I construct by conflating several data 
sources. I collect data on buyout investors and targets from S&P Market Intelligence and 
Capital IQ, identifying UK targets acquired by PE buyout firms over the 2010-2019 period and 
following standard deal classification criteria from the existing literature (see Axelson et al., 
2013; Faccio and Hsu, 2017). Subsequently, I employ Capital IQ, Compustat Global and Orbis 
databases to obtain data for the necessary accounting and financial fundamentals of the 
constructed sample targets. After matching targets to available accounting data, I obtain a 
sample of 765 UK targets. Moreover, to provide a suitable control group to these targets, I 
consider all UK firms with analogous size characteristics, generating a final dataset of 290,022 
firms.   
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To derive appropriate hypotheses, I follow Bonaime et al. (2018) and Adra et al. (2020) 
in drawing on related literature, including: work positing that uncertainty will increase the real 
option to delay investment (cf. Quigg, 1993; Gulen & Ion, 2015); notions of an interim risk 
channel of uncertainty (see Bhagwat et al., 2016), where periods of high uncertainty widen the 
interim period occurring between announcement and completion of an acquisition (or buyout 
deal); and principal-agent theory, whereby greater uncertainty can lead to increased moral 
hazard if limited partners (principals) ability to control general partners (agents) is impaired. 
In doing so, the investigation of this Chapter sheds light on the impact of uncertainty for PE 
and entrepreneurial finance (e.g., Wright et al., 2016; Cumming and Zahra, 2016; Brown et al., 
2019), the general economic and financial effects of uncertainty (e.g., Baker et al., 2016; Gulen 
and Ion, 2016; Drobetz et al., 2018; Bonaime et al., 2018), and related issues of effective policy 
for supporting investment during periods of higher uncertainty due to exogenous shocks.  
I find that Brexit uncertainty negatively affects UK PE activity, primarily arises from 
policy, FX and CFOs (firm-level) uncertainty and transmits through real-options and interim 
risk channels. These results imply that industries most deeply affected rely on fixed assets, 
durable goods, or are heavily exposed to the EU because of their export/import activities. I also 
find that the impact and transmission of uncertainty vary according to the different nature of 
uncertainty itself. Different types of uncertainty have different degrees of persistence or lead 
to longer deal interim periods, therefore "scaring off" potential PE investors. These 
considerations lead me to urge policymakers to address uncertainty arising from Brexit whilst 
encouraging a more holistic view of uncertainty 'types' and channels.   
1.1 Contribution to the extant literature 
The broad contribution of this thesis is in identifying the several, crucially important, 
channels through which uncertainty spillovers to the real economy. Our work starts by the 
consideration of some of the most dramatic uncertainty events of the last decade (at least before 
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the start of the Covid-19 pandemic) and, by exploring these events, tries to come up with a 
unified view of how uncertainty affects multinational enterprises (MNEs) through several 
financing and investment channels.  
Both Chapters 2 and 3 aim to provide a link between risk (and uncertainty from which 
it originates) on a global scale and its effect on MNEs financing conditions. Chapter 4 instead 
conceptualises uncertainty in its many forms and studies the impact of domestic uncertainty on 
(domestic and foreign) investors' behaviour. 
Chapter 2 contributes to a vast body of literature on the caveats of prologued liquidity 
easing and its destructive effects on financial stability (Minsky, 1992; Bernanke and Blinder, 
1992; Jiménez et al., 2012; Ioannidou et al., 2014). The findings of these studies, merely 
focusing on a domestic-induced liquidity easing, document greater banks' risk-taking in this 
context. The driver for this risk-taking channel pass through banks' capital availability and 
suggest that as banks' capital availability increases, banks reduce their lending standards, hence 
take more risk. Perhaps, surprisingly, we observe a similar bank behaviour once the liquidity 
injection comes from abroad. Larger capital availability of banks leads to greater risk-taking 
or more lending to firms with worse economic fundamentals. Following the Bernake and 
Gertler (1990) definition of financially fragile firms by looking at the borrowers "net worth" 
relative to the size of their investment "project". We hypothesise that firms with these 
characteristics of fragility (i.e., small firms or firms in capital intensive industries) would 
receive more credit if a risk-taking channel is in play. Our results sustain this hypothesis and 
confirm the existence of a 'leverage channel' through which banks' risk-taking incentives 
transmit more substantially to firms more heavily relying on external finance, hence increasing 
the corporate sector financial fragility. This finding contributes to fast-growing literature on 
the importance of credit cycles for the real economy (Bernanke & Gertler, 1990; Bordo & 
Jeanne, 2002; Chen et al., 2012) and the need of policymakers to tame them.   
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Chapter 3 makes then a "step forward" by linking financing conditions with investment 
patterns. Both chapters show that both foreign and domestic resilience matters for a "sound" 
domestic real economy. Interestingly, Chapter 3 emphasises how foreign risk factors affect the 
domestic real economy, to some extent, even more than the corresponding domestic ones. As 
investment dynamics, particularly those related to FDI, involve large capital expenditures (e.g., 
purchasing a large pull of shares in the target company or elevated costs associated with 
investment abroad), banks capital availability once more plays an important role. In other 
words, by determining the foreign MNEs ability to invest in the EA, in this chapter, we find 
evidence of how foreign economic (and financial) conditions transmit across the border 
through the 'leverage channel' channel previously discussed. This work contributes to a 
substantial body of work on FDI flows (Carril-Caccia & Pavlova, 2018; Dellis et al., 2016; 
Razin & Sadka, 2007; Damgaard et al., 2018; Haufler et al., 2018; Egger et al., 2018) that 
however focuses just on the domestic country risk factor by highlighting the role of global 
factors. 
Chapter 4 instead takes a slightly different approach. Without losing its specificity, it 
provides a unified view of uncertainty (including its estimation, duration, and propagation 
mechanisms) analysing a single event, Brexit. That aims to contribute to a substantial effort of 
the relevant literature exploring uncertainty and its transmission channels (see, e.g., Rowe, 
1994; Baker et al., 2016; Bloom et al., 2018; 2019; Bhagwat et al., 2016). Second, it assesses 
uncertainty propagation with a specific focus on investment dynamics. It suggests multiple 
transmission channels of uncertainty to the private equity industry, and by doing so, it adds a 
solid theoretical and empirical contribution to the findings of Chapter 3 as well as to the 
relevant literature on uncertainty's effects on the private equity industry (Ljungqvist et al., 
2020; Malenko and Malenko, 2015).  
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Ultimately, Chapter 5 concludes by drawing the policy-relevant implications of this 
thesis, some relevant take-aways for MNEs and indicating future research avenues for finance 
and economics scholars studying uncertainty spillovers.  
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2 International capital flows and corporate debt growth in China2 
 
2.1 Introduction 
After the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), there has been a significant increase in academic 
interest in capital market frictions and their connection to debt and financial crises (see Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2008; Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012; Dell'Ariccia et al., 2012; Broner et al., 
2013). Capital market frictions originating from Western countries (especially from the US) 
unconventional monetary policies (UMPs) have received particularly elevated academic and 
policy makers' attention (see, e.g., Obstfeld, 2019). That is because of the extensive evidence 
of global spillovers to emerging markets, resulting in tremendous boosts in asset prices 
(especially property prices) and credit, drastically increasing the risk of another event of global 
instability (see, e.g., Scheubel et al., 2019; Obstfeld, 2021). Particular concerns over monetary 
policy spillovers and their related risks were expressed for China, whose corporate debt levels 
increased from 80 percent of its GDP in 2008 to 175 percent in 2015 (Maliszewski et al., 2016), 
leading to the so-called Chinese Corporate Debt Crisis. Although the literature suggested 
several reasons to explain the extraordinary growth in Chinese corporate debt, such as credit-
based development in upstream industries such as steel and copper, its rapid growth in domestic 
infrastructure (Song and Xiong, 2018; Maliszewski et al., 2016), or the growing inefficiencies 
of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). This phenomenon has received vast press3, 
 
2 This Chapter benefits from the supervision and guidance of Michael Lamla, which I acknowledge by using the 
pronouns: “we”, “us”, “our”; rather than: “I”, “me”, “my”.   
3 Chinese debt has attracted significant newspapers attention, which defined it as a 'Lehman moment' (Reuters.com 
and FT.com). China's private sector debt has been growing significantly more than its GDP, and companies have 
been found unable to service their debt obligations in many cases. Among the several dangerous effects, the 
excessive corporate sector debt led to China's downgrade by Moody's on the 24th of May 2017 (Moody's investor's 
service, 2017). Real estate (with the highest credit risk), consumers, manufacturing and small businesses appear 
to be the most endangered industries (FT.com). Not surprisingly, also the housing market bubbled (see FT.com, 
FT.com, FT.com). 
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academic4, and policymakers' attention5 in the period of the crisis. Still, it receives extensive 
interest now that the Covid-19 pandemic seems to bring this debt bubble to a bust (see 
Bloomberg link). 
In this context, this paper explores how financial spillovers from advanced economies 
after the GFC enhanced China's corporate debt and build-up a less resilient Chinese corporate 
sector. In our analysis, we exploit firms demand for credit to scrutinise the effect of capital 
inflow surges in China on firm-level access to external finance. We build upon several strands 
of the relevant literature on the expansive effects of cross-country capital flows on host 
countries' economic fundaments (e.g., Shin, 2012; Rey, 2013; Blanchard et al., 2017; Obstfeld, 
2019; Banti and Bose, 2021), on firms' patterns of external financing over the business cycle 
(Korajcyk and Levy, 2003; Jermann and Quadrini, 2006; Covas and Den Haan, 2011; Begenau 
and Salomao, 2018), and banks' response to regimes of liquidity easing (Minsky, 1992; 
Acharya and Naqvi, 2012; Ioannidou et al., 2014). This approach extends substantially the 
findings of the relevant literature on international capital flows that typically focuses on the 
macroeconomic effects and financial assets responses (e.g., Fratzscher et al., 2017; 
MacDonald, 2017; Dedola et al., 2017; Ahmed et al., 2017; Anaya et al., 2017; Ayala et al., 
2017; Bowman et al., 2015; Lim et al., 2014; MacDonald, 2017; Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 
2011). By considering factors affecting Chinese firms' demand for credit and fundamentals 
(such as firms' industry, size, investment opportunities, profitability and solvency), and 
controlling for domestic credit-supply factors (such as the monetary policy stance, banks' 
characteristics) as well as time-varying effects, this paper isolates the impact of a foreign-
driven liquidity expansion on the domestic credit condition and its consequent effects on the 
corporate sector. 
 
4 E.g., see Ahamed and Mallick (2017); Ahmed et al. (2017); Dedola et al. (2017). 
5 E.g., see McCauley et al. (2015a,b); BIS Quarterly Review (2015); Kock (2015). 
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We depart from prior literature, studying the macroeconomic effects of international 
capital flows comparing several developed and emerging countries, as focusing on the Chinese 
context alone brings this study several advantages. First, despite several authors found common 
("push") factors as the main drivers of global capital flows, recent literature on emerging 
markets found country-specific, mainly institutional ("pull") factors, as highly significant in 
explaining countries' ability to attract foreign investment (see, e.g., Cerutti et al., 2015; 
Fratzscher, 2011). Since this paper aims to identify the real effects of capital flow propagation, 
rather than the drivers of foreign investors' capital allocation choices, focusing on one country 
allows keeping "pull" factors constant and have a cleaner identification of the relevant 
microeconomic effects. China not only is the second-largest economy globally, but also its 
elevated central government control the balance of payments make capital flow surges and 
their consequent amplification of credit substantially more unlikely than in other more liberal 
countries. Despite that, the relevant literature found China post-GFC as the country with the 
most incredible volume of capital inflows (see Maliszewski et al., 2016; MacDonald, 2017). 
Ultimately, the peculiarity of the Chinese institutional environment, dominated by state-owned 
firms and banks, allows this paper to answer important questions which would be harder to 
answer elsewhere. For example, considering that state-owned and politically connected firms' 
funding comes directly from China's government and its financial institutions, would a non-
domestic-driven liquidity expansion still result in a credit expansion? Is this expansion a value-
creating or destroying (considering the implicit bailout guarantee enjoyed by firms and banks)? 
And, what are the risks involved?6 Focusing on China offers a unique setting to address these 
 
6 Note that in China, governmental institutions are responsible for monitoring SOEs (Guo et al., 2017). Moreover, 
SOEs are encouraged to use their business operations to serve the public interest and promote social welfare. As 
such, the existence of strong “financial rigidities” imposed on SOEs (including the banking sector) could 
counteract the transmission of international capital flows (passing through state-owned banks), i.e. not resulting 
in a debt bubble, and/or create rather than destroy value for Chinese firms. 
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questions and observe a lower bound effect of spillovers of global financial imbalances on host 
countries' credit growth and the real economy. 
Our empirical approach employs a fixed-effect panel regression model à la Fazzari et 
al. (1988). It exploits quarterly consolidated data collected from Wind on 2968 Chinese listed 
firms between 2005 and 2016, supplemented by numerous macroeconomic control variables 
to isolate the effect of international capital flows from other potential drivers of firms' leverage 
(see Appendix A.3, for a more detailed description). This period coincides with the initial 
Chinese government effort to start opening the balance of payment, approximately the end of 
the crisis, but most importantly, the entire period of US government zero-interest rates 
monetary policies. These policies have been vastly blamed to be the main source of spillovers 
to EMEs (see, e.g., Rey, 2013). 
Our work yields three main findings. First, we find that a 1 percent increase in capital 
inflows (scaled by GDP) leads to about a 2.3 percent increase in corporate sector debt, a result 
which we find robust in several empirical settings (e.g., splitting the sample by size, industry, 
and age). Second, benchmarking our sample of Chinese firms to their industry or size peers 
(according to numerous risk and profitability measures), we also find that the least profitable 
firms are those receiving more credit during surges in capital inflows. In particular, we find 
that a one percent marginal increase in capital inflows leads to about 4 percent greater lending 
to less profitable (than the benchmark). That leads not only to a more significant domestic debt 
(as found by Rey, 2013; Shin, 2012; and many others), but also to higher risk-taking of banks 
(as proposed by Minsky, 1992; Acharya and Naqvi 2012; and Ioannidou et al., 2014). That 
suggests a loosening of banks' lending standards, typical of periods of expanded domestic 
liquidity (as proposed by Minsky, 1992; Acharya and Naqvi, 2012; and, Ioannidou et al., 2014).    
Ultimately, separating firms according to their size and industry, this effect becomes 
significantly stronger for smaller firms and capital-intensive industries. This phenomenon 
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suggests the existence of a 'leverage channel' through which cross-country capital flows 
transmit to the real economy. Whereby firms with either a low level of net worth in absolute 
terms (small firms) or relative to the value of their investment "project" (firms in capital-
intensive industries) have to borrow from banks to finance investment. Therefore, the industries 
most affected are those heavily relying on business cycle expansion for accessing banks' capital 
(i.e., small firms) or those that heavily rely on debt financing (i.e., operating in capital-intensive 
industries).  
 The main takeaway of this study is that it highlights the prominent role of advanced 
economies in causing financial vulnerabilities in China (that ultimately resulted in China's 
corporate debt crisis). On a broader level, it shows the easiness through which financial and 
economic imbalances transmit cross-border. This result finds vast support in the relevant 
literature (see, e.g. Shin, 2012; Rey, 2013; Ahmed et al., 2017; Anaya et al., 2017; Ayala et al., 
2017). In particular, this paper emphasises two important transmission channels through which 
international liquidity results in real economy vulnerabilities differently from the previously 
mentioned literature. First, we propose a risk-taking channel of banks, which lead not only to 
greater credit accumulation, as suggested by Rey (2013), Cerutti et al. (2015) and others but to 
more "toxic" credit. Second, we introduce a 'leverage channel' that results in industry-level 
asymmetries in international liquidity transmission. Most importantly, higher debt levels are 
reached by firms with lower net worth relative to their investment values – i.e., causing 
financial fragility (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1990).  
Our paper relates to four main strands of the literature. Firstly, our paper contributes to 
all the literature on the transmission of unconventional monetary policy (UMP) spillovers to 
Emerging Markets Economies (Bruno and Shin, 2014; Fratzscher et al., 2017; MacDonald, 
2017; Dedola et al., 2017; Ahmed et al., 2017; Anaya et al., 2017; Ayala et al., 2017; Bowman 
et al., 2015; Dahlhaus and Vasishtha, 2014; Eichengreen and Gupta, 2015; Forbes and 
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Warnock, 2012; Lim et al., 2014; MacDonald, 2017; Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011; Moore et 
al., 2013; Neely, 2015; Ghosh et al., 2014). Their identified macro-transmission, passing either 
through financial intermediaries (Dinger and te Kaat, 2015; Cerutti et al., 2015; Bowman et al., 
2015; Bruno and Shin, 2017; Cohen et al., 2016; Koch, 2015; Maliszewski et al., 2016; 
McCauley et al., 2015b; Baskaya et al., 2017) or financial markets (Bruno and Shin, 2014; 
Fratzscher et al., 2017; Ayala et al., 2017; Ahmed et al., 2017; Mizen et al., 2012; McCauley 
et al., 2015a) enable us to picture the cross-country transmission of global liquidity and to link 
it with the observed response of corporate sector fundamentals. Secondly, this paper 
contributes to the risk-taking channel literature, which identified a softening in banks' lending 
standards (i.e., an increase in risk-taking) during periods of low central bank rates (see Minsky, 
1992; Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Jiménez et al., 2012; Ioannidou et al., 2014). These studies 
identify the expansion in domestic liquidity as the main cause for the increase in risky loans 
observed after a loose monetary policy. Eventually, we contribute to the literature on firms' 
financing over the business cycle. That points to higher and heterogeneous risk-taking of firms 
during business cycle expansion, which results in higher debt financing (see Korajcyk and 
Levy, 2003; Jermann and Quadrini, 2006; Covas and Den Haan, 2011; Begenau and Salomao, 
2018), especially of small firms. Our paper finds indeed very similar results. 
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the hypotheses 
of this study; Section 3 explains our identification strategy and the empirical model used for 
the analysis. Section 4 analyses the composition of our dataset and describes the construction 
of the variables used in the empirical analysis. In Section 5, we provide detailed summary 
statistics. Section 6 discloses our empirical findings. Section 7 adds several robustness tests of 
baseline results. Eventually, Section 8 concludes by summarising the contribution of the paper 




Although access to international financial markets gives China numerous benefits (for instance, 
facilitating the funding of its fast-developing corporate sector, creating diversification 
opportunities and supporting the accumulation of foreign reserves to hedge its international 
positions). It also brings significant challenges and new risks for its macroeconomic stability. 
A vast body of literature on global capital flows suggest that these tend to amplify the business 
cycle (Aruajo et al., 2017; Disyatat and Rungcharoenkitkul, 2017), reinforcing the effect of 
government and monetary policy in the domestic economy. Rey (2013) argues that greater 
financial integration and the emerging markets greater reliance on the US dollar significantly 
amplified the effect of US monetary policy spillovers, causing ample capital inflows in these 
countries that led to fast credit growth and bank leverage. Shin (2013), in particular, examines 
the role of banking flows in the transmission of external vulnerabilities to open emerging 
economies. They find that banks play a major role in this transmission since international 
capital flows passing through banks lead to quick expansions (or contractions) of credit to the 
corporate sector of the countries where the banks are incorporated (c.f. Cerutti et al., 2015; for 
an excellent study on capital flows transmission through the banking system). In line with this 
literature, we develop the following hypothesis:  
 
HP 1: Foreign capital inflows in China expand its corporate sector leverage 
 
Academic and policymakers work have often connected expansions of domestic liquidity with 
substantial risk-taking incentives of banks. Previous studies on the risk-taking channel from 
Paligorova and Santos (2017), Dinger and te Kaat (2015), and te Kaat (2017), in particular, 
analyse the risk-taking incentives of banks by comparing the volume of bank lending received 
by safe firms, as opposed to unsafe ones. They find that during periods of expanded domestic 
 38 
liquidity (e.g., because of loosening monetary policies), banks lend to firms with worse 
accounting fundamentals, hence take a greater risk. Similarly, Dell'Ariccia and Marquez 
(2006), studying banks' risk-taking in times of liquidity expansions, find a reduction in banks' 
lending standards arising from an increased information asymmetry in these periods. In 
particular, they theorise that when liquidity eases, banks face an increase in demand from loans 
from unknown borrowers. As the portion of unknown borrowers increases, banks' screening 
costs significantly increase, making it more convenient for banks not to charge any collateral 
requirement. In other words, Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006) find that greater information 
asymmetries reduce the screening incentives of banks, hence, leading to a softening of their 
lending standards. In this study, we adopt a very similar argument to that of the relevant 
literature. As capital inflows increase, greater banks' capital availability substantially reduces 
their screening incentives and incite banks to maximise their earnings. As a result, that causes 
greater lending to firms with worse economic fundamentals than those observed in periods 
with lower capital inflows. The banking literature strongly supports this idea that credit 
becomes more "toxic" in times of expanded liquidity (see, e.g. Ioannidou et al., 2014). 
Therefore, our second hypothesis suggests that: 
 
HP 2: Higher capital inflows result in more significant corporate debt, particularly in the less 
creditworthy firms. 
 
In line with the literature on cross-country capital flows (Rey, 2013; Broner, 2013; Shin, 2012), 
capital inflows positively correlate with domestic country credit growth, but credit growth 
tends to be very heterogeneous across industries. Capital intensive industries and real estate are 
well-known for their greater procyclicality and sensitivity to capital inflows patterns (Borio, 
2014; Borio and Disyatat, 2015; Drehmann et al., 2012). Because of their higher reliance on 
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external funding and the higher associated risk of these industries (high debt-financed), their 
performance is highly correlated with the business cycle (Covas and Den Haan, 2011). As a 
result, we hypothesise that corporate debt in industries with greater procyclicality and capital 
intensity will experience a greater sensitivity to capital inflows if capital flows expand domestic 
credit. 
 
HP 3: Capital inflows expand corporate sector leverage, especially for firms in highly 
procyclical and capital-intensive industries. 
 
Alike capital-intensive industries, credit to small businesses is also significantly correlated with 
the domestic business cycle. Because of the lack of collateral of small firms (e.g., a start-up), 
the high uncertainty about their future cash flows, and in many cases, the lower financial 
sophistication, these firms’ financing ability highly depends on the state of the economy. In 
other words, small firms have their credit capacity significantly expanded (relative to normal 
times) when in times of economic boom and vice versa contracted in recessions. Because of 
the expansionary effect of capital inflows, we assume that small firms will experience greater 
access to credit, i.e., greater leverage, in times of more significant capital inflows. In line with 
this argument, we formalise our last hypothesis as follows:  
 
HP 4: Capital inflows expand corporate sector leverage, particularly for small firms. 
 
2.3 Empirical identification 
 The Chinese context 
While many studies argued the importance of capital inflows in stimulating credit growth (e.g., 
Rey, 2013; Cerutti et al., 2015; Banti and Bose, 2020), we know much less of their transmission 
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to the real economy, hence the micro-transmission of capital inflows. Because of the scarce 
availability of data on international positions of Chinese firms and the vast opacity (and under-
reporting) of Chinese authorities, the focus of previous studies has been primarily on the 
aggregate macroeconomics transmission and asset prices implications of capital flows (Horn 
et al., 2020). However, Song and Xiong (2018) suggest that commonly used approaches for 
assessing Western countries' financial risk might not apply to the Chinese context because of 
the peculiar role of the government and government-owned entities as a market clearing 
mechanism (Behr et al., 2018; Bruno et al., 2016; Gounopoulos et al., 2020). Therefore, this 
section provides a short overview of the Chinese financial sector infrastructure and explains 
how this plays a crucial role in our identification strategy.  
The Chinese government developed the current financial system to fund the fast 
economic growth and reforms in China at the beginning of the 1980s-1990s. This aim, 
according to many commentators, shaped in many aspects its model and ownership structure.  
Economic reforms in the early '80s have led to the fast economic growth of the Chinese 
economy over the past 40 years. The core of this growth is creating a private sector and 
allowing the co-existence of SOEs, previously representing the entire Chinese economy (the 
so-called "dual-track reform"). Contemporarily with these reforms, in the early '80s, a financial 
sector was also progressively created in China. However, contrary to the business sector, the 
liberalisation of the financial sector in China took substantially longer. In the '80s, the Chinese 
government created a banking sector by splitting the People's Bank of China (PBC) into four 
state-owned banks (the Big Four) to support state-owned enterprises financially. In the early 
'90s, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges were created; the interbank market in 1996 
and the other existing bond market in 2007. However, in all these markets, the favouritism of 
SOEs over private companies is ubiquitous in China (Gounopoulos et al., 2020; Cao et al., 
2019; Chen et al., 2011). Until recently, private companies were excluded from equity and 
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bond markets, and listing or issuance in these markets was an exclusive right of SOEs (Allen 
et al., 2005). To date, SOEs have priority, private companies have quotas on their bond 
issuances, and all major banks are state-owned. 
Because of all these reasons, financial frictions in China, such as those coming from 
foreign investors, are vastly under the central government's control. Four state-owned banks 
(the Big Four) vastly dominate the Chinese financial sector (Allen, et al., 2005; Firth et al., 
2016) and alone account for 40 percent of total deposits in 2018 (Song and Xiong, 2018). 
Together, the bond and equity market contribute to only a fifth of the credit to non-financial 
firms in 2018 (ibid.). Moreover, in the analysis period, the balance of payment is only partially 
liberalised; in particular, only "Qualified Institutional Investors" (eligibility criteria tightly 
defined by the central government) are allowed to invest in Chinese financial markets. 
Therefore, other than foreign direct investment (FDI)7, financial inflows in China almost 
entirely pass through state-owned banks. These banks (like other state-owned entities) enjoy 
explicit and implicit government guarantees on their lending (or borrowing) that induce 
significant misallocations (credit mispricing). That is because when either of these parties 
suffers substantial losses, domestic and international creditors expect that the government 
would bail them out, hence are willing to keep lending to these firms without increasing the 
price of these funds. That causes the build-up of further leverage, further inefficiencies, and 
greater risk of the Chinese financial system, which we test in this paper. 
 
 Identification 
To assess the impact of capital inflows in China on the creation of firms' leverage and the build-
up of the previously mentioned inefficiencies, we start from a recent study by Blanchard et al. 
(2017). The authors theoretically modelled the transmission of capital inflows to Emerging 
 
7 Note that FDI in China is mostly of “brownfield” nature and involving SOEs. 
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Markets' bond market and "non-bonds" assets (foreign direct investment, domestic equity 
market, and bank lending). The authors show that in Emerging Markets, non-bond flows 
(mainly constituted by interbank lending) have a more noticeable impact on the recipient 
economy than the bond counterparts because of "the relatively primitive financial system" 
(Blanchard et al., 2017:8) of these economies. Specifically, Blanchard et al. (2017) find that 
capital inflows have an expansionary effect on EMEs. They decrease the cost of credit for a 
given central bank rate and could lead to credit booms and expanded domestic output. Despite 
the broad macroeconomic focus of this study, its implications are of great value and very 
applicable to the Chinese context. The only partial liberalisation of foreign investment in (and 
out of) China in the period of analysis and the presence of a financial sector vastly dominated 
by a few state-owned banks makes the transmission of capital inflows inevitably passing 
through banks and in a similar way to that observed by Blanchard et al. (2017). This 
characteristic of the Chinese economy, hence its reliance on banks for domestic and foreign 
liquidity transmission, facilitates us in identifying cross-country liquidity transfers to the 
private sector. Moreover, it permits us to overcome some limitations of previous studies using 
aggregated data, hence the lack of disaggregated data on state-owned banks' positions or firms' 
positions in China.  
Therefore, we start from existing evidence on the expansionary features of capital 
inflows and, subsequently, we resort to the banking literature to identify their transmission. We 
argue that significant capital inflows in banks’ balance sheet, similar to an expansive monetary 
policy, reduce the cost of loanable funds, improving banks' profit opportunities and risk-taking. 
In China's case, the government guarantee on banks' credit arguably makes greater risk-taking 
and the associated greater returns significantly safer.  
Our work is not the first to connect expansions of domestic liquidity with the risk-taking 
incentives of banks. Previous literature has associated this phenomenon with financial 
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institutions rebalancing their portfolios to achieve a nominal return target (Bonizzi, 2017); with 
an understatement of borrowers' risk when interest rates are low (Ioannidou et al., 2014); or 
with more intense 'agency problems' (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012; Dinger and te Kaat, 2015). 
Paligorova and Santos (2017), among others, explored the risk-taking channel during regimes 
of expanded liquidity. Their analysis compares credit risk premia charged by banks to firms 
with different risk levels. They isolated demand factors using bank-year fixed effects. They 
find that greater information asymmetries reduce banks' screening incentives, leading to a 
softening of their lending standards. However, Dinger and te Kaat (2015) is perhaps the first 
study adopting this concept to study banks' risk-taking in the Euro Area (EA) during capital 
inflow. They hypothesise that the higher the capital inflows, the more unknown borrowers are 
for domestic banks, lead to more acerbated information asymmetries, which reduce banks' risk 
aversion. Accordingly, they find that countries characterised by strong capital inflows 
experienced sizeable bank lending, arising primarily from weakly capitalised or more insolvent 
banks. 
This paper adopts a similar identification strategy to study the increase in corporate 
sector leverage through greater implicit bank risk-taking. Therefore, like Paligorova and Santos 
(2017), Dinger and te Kaat (2015), and te Kaat (2017), we identify risk-taking of banks by 
looking at publicly available accounting indicators of risk and then comparing the volume of 
bank lending received by safe firms, as opposed to unsafe ones. In particular, we look at the 
quantity, rather than the price, of loans made to firms with higher risk during periods of 
expanded liquidity (more significant capital inflows) instead of the overall analysis period. We 
argue the existence of a risk-taking channel if firms with worse credit fundamentals receive 
greater lending than other comparable firms during capital inflow surges (vice versa, if instead 
firms with better accounting metrics receive more credit). Like previous studies, since the risk-
taking channel implies a bank-driven transmission, we use several fixed effects (firm-year, 
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industry-year, size-year, or age-year) to compare the volume of credit issued to firms with 
similar characteristics (but with different levels of risk). Using this approach, we manage to 
mitigate the effect of demand-driven channels (e.g., the interest rate or balance sheet channels).  
We argue that the Chinese economic centralisation allows a neater identification of 
capital flows transmission, despite bringing unsurmountable data availability and opacity 
issues. Unlike the previously mentioned studies in the US and European context (i.e., with a 
liberalised balance of payment and banking sector), the almost monopoly role of state-owned 
banks in the transmission of foreign liquidity in China allows this study to rule out 
heterogeneities in the diffusion of foreign capital implicitly flows to the Chinese corporate 
sector. Also, it will enable us to minimise the bias arising from the heterogeneity in banking 
sector financing choices which is characteristic of a liberal economic infrastructure.  
  
 Methodology 
As baseline models of our study, we use a fixed-effect regression model à la Covas and Den 
Haan (2011).  
Therefore, we regress gross capital inflows on the log-change in external debt financing 
(scaled by total assets) to test their association with the change in banks’ lending to the private 
sector. In particular, we assess whether larger inflows improve lending to more profitable firms, 
solvent, and with a higher Tobin’s q than their industry (or size) peers8. To benchmark 
individual firms (i) variables with those of firms with similar characteristics, we firstly 
computed the industry and size (j) median profitability (cash flows), solvency (z-score), and 
Tobin’s q. We defined highly profitable, highly solvent, or high Tobin’s q companies (at each 
given quarter) as those entities with respectively cash flow, z-score, or Tobin’s q exceeding the 
 
8 In their paper, Covas and Den Haan (2011) were studying external financing over the business cycle. Therefore, 
they were not looking at capital inflows but instead at the cyclical component of GDP.  
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industry median. Finally, we interact the calculated industry or size dummy variables with 
capital inflows to observe whether, during capital inflow surges, companies receiving more 
loans are also those with high profitability (or vice versa if they are less profitable). This 
analysis enables us to argue whether international capital inflows affect the growth in private 
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In our baseline model,  log(
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) stands for the log-change in Chinese firms’ debt financing, 
where i represent individual firms and t is time. log⁡(
𝐶𝐼𝐹
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)𝑡−1 represents instead the first lag of 
capital inflows scaled by GDP and is our main explanatory variable. Therefore, looking at the 
coefficient 𝛽1, we can assess whether capital inflow regimes can be considered as associated 
with the dramatic increase in Chinese firms’ debt (as in McCauley et al., 2015; BIS, 2015; 
Ahamed and Mallick, 2017; Koch, 2015; Dedola et al., 2017) through an increase in domestic 
liquidity leading to an increase in banks’ lending. Afterwards, we include several controls for 
firms’ profitability, solvency and Tobin’s q (respectively 𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑑𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1, and 𝑑𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1) and 
for the domestic monetary policy (𝑀𝑃) (see Appendices A.2.5 and A.2.6 for details on its 
computation). Since we contrapose individual firms’ risk against that of comparable firms, 
having analogous industry and size characteristics, we use 𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑑𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑑𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1; 
dummy variables taking value of 1 if the considered firm (i) at a given time exceed the industry 
(or size group) median profitability, solvency, or Tobin’s q, and zero otherwise.  
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> 0, 𝑑𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 = 1  if instead 
𝑧𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑧𝑗,𝑡−1̃ > 0, and 𝑑𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 1 if 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 −⁡𝑄𝑗,𝑡−1̃ > 0, whilst they take value of zero 
otherwise. Depending on the regression specification, j identifies the size or industry peers of 
firm i. 
In order to assess whether during capital inflows surges lending is more (or less) 
dependent on firms’ balance sheet fundamentals, we interacted the three previously mentioned 
dummies with our capital inflows variable. Therefore, looking at the sign and magnitude of 𝛽5, 
𝛽6⁡and⁡𝛽7, we can observe whether having a healthier balance sheet increases (or decreases) 
firms’ likelihood of receiving a loan during periods of greater capital inflows, as opposed to 
overall. Hence, we can conclude whether capital inflows, expanding domestic liquidity, 
enhance banks’ risk-taking, creating a misallocation of loans to less creditworthy firms. 
Ultimately, log⁡(𝑋)𝑡 is the log of our bank-level and macroeconomic control variables, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is 
instead the white-noise error term of the fixed effect regression. 
 
2.4 Data 
To obtain accounting data on Chinese listed firms between 2005 and 2016, we exploit the 
database Wind, a well-known data provider of consolidated accounting data on Chinese 
corporations. Wind allows us to obtain quarterly data on many accounting variables for 2968 
Chinese listed firms. Instead, we use data from the IMF to calculate quarterly gross capital 
in(out-)flows in (from) Mainland China. 
 
 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in our paper is the log-change in debt financing of a sample of 2968 
Chinese listed firms that we compute subtracting from firms’ book value of liabilities, their 
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account payables, and deferred tax liabilities9. Eventually, as in Covas et al. (2011), we used 
the first lag of individual firms' book value assets to benchmark this variable. This ratio helps 
us preserve our model's integrity by minimising the potential endogeneity arising from the 
considered firm-level variables.  
As motivated in Section 2.3, we assume that Chinese firms' debt variations are due to 
changes in banking sector lending standards (i.e., they are due to variations in banks' risk 
attitude). This assumption is not new to the relevant literate. For example, te Kaat (2017), trying 
to analyse corporate debt in bank-based Euro Area countries, uses the same assumption to 
identify the micro-transmission of international capital flows. 
 
 Independent variables 
Our paper includes three sets of independent variables. Firstly, we create an international 
capital inflow variable, the main variable of our baseline model. Then, we collect a series of 
accounting control variables, included in the Fazzari et al. (1988) model, relating firms' 
financing decisions to their profitability and Tobin's q. Thirdly, we resort to the banking 
literature to identify a set of financial and macro-economic control variables. The variables 
explain the macroeconomic drivers of the observed increase in bank lending. Finally, we 
interact our capital flow variable with firms' profitability, solvency, and Tobin's q to assess 
whether banks show an increase in risk-taking during capital inflow regimes. 
 
2.4.2.1 Capital inflows 
As standard in the literature on international capital flows, we build our capital inflow variable 
using quarterly data gathered from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IMF IFS).  
 
9 The paper several times uses the word ‘log’ or ‘logarithm’. In all these instances, we refer to the natural logarithm 
of the variable into consideration. 
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Moreover, we assume them to be exogenous, as mainly driven by pull factors independent from 
China's economic condition (see Rey, 2016; Broner, 2013; Ayala et al., 2017, Fratzscher et al., 
2017; Bowman et al., 2015; Giardin et al., 2017).  
Data from the IMF IFS consist of three types of international capital flows, such as 
Direct Investment (assets and liability), Portfolio Investment (assets and liability), Other 
Investments (assets and liabilities). These measures identify different types of international 
investment, with several features of risk, duration, and objectives. Direct Investment (FDI) 
includes a category of global investment that reflects the purpose of a resident entity in one 
country to obtain a lasting interest in an enterprise resident of another country10. Given the 
long-term nature of this investment, previous literature often associates FDI with host country 
economic growth (see Barrel, 1997; Contessi and Weinberger, 2009; Dellis et al., 2017). 
Portfolio investment is a return-driven form of international investment. Unlike FDI, it does 
not imply a long-lasting interest in the host country company or an active role in the 
management of the host country firm – it is a speculative investment. In particular, the 
instruments included in its portfolio investment classification are equity, debt securities, and 
derivatives assets. As a result, this category comprises risky and short-term cross-border 
investments targeting the host country. Finally, another investment is a residual category, 
containing financial instruments not included in neither of the previous variables. Its 
composition comprises trade credits, loans, currency and deposits, and other assets and 
liabilities (IMF, 2016)11. 
About these flow variables, the IMF IFS disclose flow data comprehensive of new 
transactions, revaluations, and changes in outstanding volumes of assets and liabilities (IMF, 
2016). Therefore, each of the capital inflow observations represents a quarter-to-quarter 
 
10 Specifically, the investment is classified as “direct investment” if the direct investor owns at least 10 percent 
or more of the ordinary shares or voting power (IMF, 2016). 
11 See Appendix A.2.1 for a more detailed description of our capital inflows components. 
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variation in outstanding liability volumes of China against the rest of the World at a given point 
in time. This feature of our data comes very handy for country intertemporal comparison. Our 
measure indeed already comes adjusted for exchange rate and valuation effects arising from 
changes in assets’ market values.  
  
We compute gross capital inflows from foreign countries in China as the sum of gross: Portfolio 
Investment liabilities (both in the form of debt securities and equities), other investment 
liabilities (mainly including bank loans, trade credit, and deposits), and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) (see Figure 2.2). 
[Insert Figure 2.2 around here] 
2.4.2.2 Firm Control Variables 
Following Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Covas and Den Haan (2011), we added 
several control variables, accounting for firms’ profitability, solvency, and Tobin’s q, as well 
as for size and industry. We identify firms’ profitability using their cash flows, which we 
compute as the difference between gross profit, interest expense, and corporate taxes12. 
Moreover, we control for firms’ insolvency using Altman Z-score, which we compute 
following De Nicoló et al. (2006) and Iosifidi and Kokoas (2015) (see Appendix A.2.3). These 
profitability and solvency measures have been used as identifiers of firms’ creditworthiness to 
test whether a surge in capital inflow results in higher risk-taking, hence in lending to less 
creditworthy customers. Eventually, since firms could borrow to finance investment and 
growth, we add firms’ Tobin’s q as a proxy for firms’ investment opportunities, which we 
compute following Huang and Mazouz (2018) (see Appendix A.2.3). 
 
 
12 Differently from Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), we used gross profit instead of EBITDA. This decision 
is due to the many missing values for the variable EBITDA. Considering the similarity of the two measures, we 
hardly believe that the results would be affect by the inclusion of either one or the other. 
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2.4.2.3 The creation of size portfolios 
In line with well-known literature on external financing over the business cycle (Korajcyk and 
Levy, 2003; Jermann and Quadrini, 2006; Covas and Den Haan, 2011; Begenau and Salomao; 
2018) and different liquidity regimes (see Gertler and Glichrist, 1994). We use a percentile 
approach to split Chinese firms into seven-size portfolios according to their book value of 
assets (𝐵𝑉⁡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡). That is a crucial step, as firms’ size impacts their financing ability both 
in surge and retrenchment periods of capital flows. The underlying reason is that easing and 
tightening of financing conditions have a different impact on firms according to their size. For 
instance, the greater access to direct financing of large firms than small ones makes the latter 
much more sensitive to variations in banks’ lending constraints. Also, since banks typically 
deem smaller firms riskier, they are normally charged higher lending rates than their larger 
counterparts. Therefore, everything else constant, less risk-averse banks would proportionally 
lend more to small firms than to large ones, because of the greater earning potential. 
 
2.4.2.4 The creation of industry portfolios 
We also divide our sample firms according to their industry (see Appendix A.2.2, for details 
on the Chinese industrial classification). That is also an important step, as firms’ industry 
determines their reliance on external debt and their likelihood of receiving a loan during periods 
of expanded liquidity. In particular, several scholars such as Rey (2013), Shin (2012) found 
evidence of a boost in asset prices during capital inflow surges. That could decrease the risk of 
some procyclical industries and increase their profitability, raising their likelihood of receiving 
bank lending. We also collect industry data from Wind for all the firms in our sample.  
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2.4.2.5 Financial and macroeconomic control variables 
We also included several financial and macroeconomic control variables that could affect bank 
lending, hence explain the variation in debt financing not explained by capital inflows and 
accounting variables. Macroeconomic control variables include controls for domestic 
monetary policy13, Consumer Price Index (CPI), and 10-year sovereign bond yields (which we 
collected from CEIC). We argue that higher sovereign risk will harm bank lending. That is 
because higher yields directly transmit to the banking sector through the collateral channel. An 
increase in yields decreases the value of banks' bond holdings and the value of government 
guarantees, increasing banks' risk of default (Acharya et al., 2014), which inevitably feeds back 
to the private sector through lower loans. Likewise, Acharya et al. (2014) also hypothesised a 
similar relationship, identifying an almost one-to-one relationship between sovereign risk and 
domestic banks' insolvency risk. 
We also add the banking sector and financial sector's specific control variables such as 
Chinese banks' profitability (ROA) (available from the CEIC) and Chinese stock market 
fundamentals (also gathered from CEIC). For the latter set of variables, we include as 
fundamentals Chinese stock market capitalisation (computed as the sum in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen end-of-quarter stock market capitalisations) and volatility (standard deviation of 
end-of-the-day stock market capitalisation in each quarter). 
 
2.5 Summary Statistics 
In this Section, we provide a detailed overview of the data adopted in our study. To assess the 
relationship between capital inflows and debt financing growth, we start by performing a 
correlation analysis of debt financing, capital inflows, and our key control variables (see Table 
 
13 Since China uses a mix of price- and quantity-based monetary policies. We created an indicator of Chinese 
monetary policy following Girardin et al. (2017). For more details on the calculation of this variable see 
Appendices A.2.5 and A.2.6. 
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2.1). Afterward, we analyse the pairwise correlation between debt financing and capital inflows 
in China, splitting our sample into seven size portfolios and ten industry groups (see Tables 2.2 
and 2.3). We also provide standard summary statistics on the variables adopted in our study, 
which we display in Appendix A.2.4.  
In Table 2.1, we observe a positive correlation between capital inflows and domestic 
monetary policy. Higher capital inflows lead PBOC to tighten its monetary policy and 
negatively correlated with stock market indicators, both capitalisation, and volatility. That is 
consistent with the idea that foreign investors buy when investment is cheap and low volatility. 
As predicted by the capital flows' literature, they are positively correlated with both Bank ROA, 
coherently with a risk-taking channel, while negatively correlated with Chinese economic 
fundamentals and inflation. We observe a negative correlation between our monetary policy 
variable and stock market measures and inflation, as well as with Chinese fundamentals. Stock 
market fundamentals appear instead negatively correlated with bank's ROA, suggesting a 
substitution effect between debt and equity financing, and positively correlated with Chinese 
inflation. Ultimately, also the remaining correlation coefficients reveal as significant and with 
the expected signs.  
Table 2.2 analyses the pairwise correlation between debt growth and capital inflows at 
the industry level. Coherently with the literature on cross-country capital flows (Rey, 2013; 
Broner, 2013; Shin, 2012), capital inflows are positively correlated with domestic country 
credit growth, but credit growth tends to be very heterogeneous across industries. In our study, 
we do not find a significant correlation (at 5 percent level) between debt financing growth and 
capital inflows for 'agriculture, forestry and fishing' ('1'), 'finance and insurance activities' ('6'), 
and other service activities' ('10'). On the contrary, more cyclical industries14 that are well-
known to receive more significant investment when risk appetite increases have high 
 
14 Such as mining, construction, manufacturing, IT, and real estate. 
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correlation coefficients, which appears consistent with hypothesised greater "risk-taking 
channel." The remaining industries react to capital inflow surges by increasing their debt, but 
their correlation coefficients are smaller (about 8 percent). 
  
We also assess the correlation between debt financing and capital inflows controlling for firms' 
size (see Table 2.3). We observe positive and significant correlation coefficients across all size 
percentiles except the top one, which implies a considerable heterogeneity in financing across 
size groups. In particular, we observe that the lowest quartile has the highest correlation 
coefficient (about 13 percent), hence three times higher than the average (4 percent). 
Eventually, correlation coefficients are not significant in the largest-size portfolios. Overall, 
exploring the relationship between leverage and firms' size, we find a significant negative 
correlation between the two variables. Similar works also pointed to a relatively higher 
synchronisation of small firms' external debt financing with domestic liquidity and the business 
cycle (see Gertler and Glichrist, 1994; Jermann and Quadrini, 2006; Covas and Den Haan, 
2011; Begenau and Salomao, 2018). 
[Insert Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 around here] 
2.6 Findings 
Following the approach outlined in Section 2.4, we analyse firms' financing behaviour during 
capital inflow surges. Since both financing and banks' funding depend on the size and industry 
characteristics of the credit recipient, when performing this analysis, we benchmark each firm's 
attributes to the median of the industry portfolio to which the firm belongs (see Table 2.4) and 
their relative size (see Table 2.5). 
In Table 2.4, we present the results obtained by estimating Equation [2.1], exploiting 
industry-level differences in median performance. We find that growth in debt financing 
(scaled by assets) is positively associated with capital inflows-over-GDP with a coefficient of 
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about 2.3 percent in all our regressions (see Table 2.4 columns (1), (2), and (3)). Afterward, 
we compare firms' financing decisions with their accounting fundamentals to gain an insight 
into evidence of more significant banks' risk-taking. We find that firms with lower profitability 
(expressed in terms of lower cash flows-over-assets) receive higher credit over the whole 
period than their industry peers. In particular, switching from non-profitable to profitable firms, 
we can observe a decrease in the geometric mean of debt financing (scaled by assets) of about 
32 percent. Looking at the interaction term between capital inflows and firms' fundamentals, 
hence at whether during capital inflow surges firms with more robust accounting fundamentals 
receive more credit, we find a negative marginal effect (of about -4 percent). That implies less 
profitable firms are more likely to receive credit during capital inflow surges. These appear 
significantly in line with what we anticipated in the correlation analysis (Section 2.3.3). The 
remaining control variables of solvency measure or investment opportunities are instead 
insignificant. These results provide evidence of a link between foreign capital inflows in China 
and its build-up of corporate sector debt. As hypothesised, during capital inflow surges, riskier 
companies receive more credit than their safer industry-level counterparts. In columns (3) and 
(4), we supplement our baseline regression with several macroeconomic, financial, and 
banking sector control variables. 
Macroeconomic control variables enable us to control for the domestic monetary policy 
stance (the MPI), hence addressing endogeneity concerns that could arise from the impact of 
PBOC monetary policy on banks' credit growth. Financial control variables help us control the 
cost of direct financing in equity markets (Shanghai and Shenzen Stock Exchanges). Variables 
of bank performance (Banks ROA) instead provide a "litmus test" for our story. Since the lower 
is the aggregate profitability of the Chinese banking sector, the higher would be banks' 
incentive to exploit greater foreign liquidity for profit maximisation. Almost all the variables' 
coefficients appear statistically significant and with the expected signs. PBOC monetary policy 
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is negatively associated with debt financing, with a coefficient of about -34 percent in column 
(3) and -25 percent in column (4). We do not find evidence of a switch between debt and equity 
financing, as our stock market capitalisation variable has a positive and significant coefficient 
in column (3). At the same time, it is instead non-significant in column (4), and stock market 
volatility is also non-significant. These results are not rare in periods of expanded liquidity, as 
both bank credit and risk appetite contemporaneously grow and share prices boom. Finally, we 
included 10-year government bond yields (representing Chinese credit risk), which inversely 
move with Chinese bonds' prices, directly affecting banks' collateral values, hence their central 
bank loans or loans from other banks in the interbank market. Therefore, as expected, this 
measure has a negative and significant sign, as higher yields imply lower loanable capital and 
vice versa. 
[Insert Table 2.4 around here] 
Calculating Equation [2.1] this time benchmarking firms with their closest size peers, we find 
very similar results to those just described (see Table 2.5). In all specifications, capital inflows 
positively affect firms’ increases in debt. The coefficients are statistically and economically 
significant with a magnitude of 2.3 percent (as in Table 2.4). Greater profitability (than other 
firms with similar size) appears negative and significant with a coefficient of about -30 percent. 
Once we interact this variable with international capital inflows (scaled by GDP), the 
interaction coefficient is still negative and significant, with a value of about -4 percent. 
Therefore, increases in capital inflows in China lead to a marginal increase in lending to less 
profitable firms in the analysis period. As in Table 2.4, control variables for firms’ solvency 
and Tobin’s q are not significant. Likewise, financial and macroeconomic control variables 
yield qualitatively the same results as those reported in Table 2.4. We also tested several more 
specifications of this model, and all of them produce similar results. 
[Insert Table 2.5 around here] 
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 Capital inflows and leverage developments in procyclical and capital-intensive 
industries 
In this subsection, we assess the impact of capital inflows on corporate debt in the industries 
displaying the most outstanding procyclicality and capital intensity. 
We start by defining procyclicality as the average correlation between the average 
leverage of firms in each industry and China's GDP growth. We consider procyclical industries 
with a correlation between leverage and business cycle in the top quartile ([75;100 percent]). 
Afterwards, we re-estimate Equation [2.1] for this group of firms. As in all our baseline 
regressions, when looking at firms' leverage, we benchmark it to the medial leverage of firms 
in the same industry (Table 2.6) or the same size (Table 2.7) of those in consideration.  
In Table 2.6, we find that a one percent increase in capital inflows lead to an almost 
double increase in leverage (the coefficient of 'CIF' is slightly smaller than the corresponding 
for the whole sample). We find an average negative correlation between profitability and 
solvency, and leverage. In particular, more significant capital inflows lead to more credit to 
less solvent firms (the interaction between profitability and capital inflows is not significant in 
this setting). Greater investment opportunities (Tobin's Q) lead to greater leverage (i.e., more 
obtained financing). Firms with better investment opportunities receive 5 percent more credit 
during capital inflows surges than their less attractive counterparts. Overall, there seems to be 
some evidence of "toxic" credit to insolvent firms in times of high capital inflows. Still, the 
effect of capital inflows on firms' leverage in procyclical industries appears comparable to (and 
not more substantial than) that observed for the whole sample.  
The effect appears much stronger than that observed for the whole sample when 
considering capital-intensive industries, characterised by firms with an average PPE-to-asset 
ratio in the top quartile. In Table 2.6, capital inflows affecting these firms lead to an average 
of about two and a half times more leverage growth in firms operating in capital intensive 
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industries. A one percent increase in capital inflows leads to an eleven percent more debt to 
less profitable firms. That provides strong evidence of credit misallocation, remarkably 
stronger in firms operating in capital intensive industries. Less intense instead for firms 
operating in procyclical industries (as stated in HP 3). 
Our results are unchanged in both statistical and economic significance if we 
benchmark firms accounting fundamentals to the firm's size peers rather than industry ones 
(see Table 2.7). We find support for a positive effect of international capital flows on creating 
corporate sector leverage both in procyclical and capital-intensive industries. The result, 
though, is substantially less strong for procyclical industries than for capital intensive ones. 
Insolvent firms and firms with higher investment opportunities in procyclical industries receive 
more credit than their more solvent size peers (profitability is not significant) when capital 
inflows increase. In capital intensive industries, greater capital inflows lead less profitable 
firms to receive substantially more credit than profitable ones of similar size. Also, in this case, 
we find support for greater credit to more capital-intensive industries (as hypothesised in HP 
3). We find less conclusive evidence for a stronger transmission of capital inflows to 
procyclical industries instead. Again, we observe clear evidence of credit misallocation that 
appears consistent with banks' greater risk-taking and confirm our second hypothesis. 
    [Insert Tables 2.6 and 2.7 around here] 
 Capital inflows and leverage of small and large firms 
Ultimately, in Table 2.8, we separately estimate Equation [2.1] for each size percentile 
available in our dataset. As hypothesised in HP 4, we find that the expansive effect of capital 
inflows leads to a significantly higher corporate debt growth in small firms (except for firms 
in the [90-95] percentile). Firms in the bottom 25 percent group experience the most 
remarkable increase in leverage in response to capital inflows. Except for the firms in the [90-
95] percentile, we observe that capital inflows are associated with smaller and smaller increases 
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in leverage as the firm size increases. That culminates with a negative and economically 
significant coefficient of -2.4 percent increase in leverage associated with a one percent capital 
inflow growth that we observe for the top 1 percent size portfolio. That indicates that different 
from what we observe for small firms, where capital inflow are associated with greater access 
to debt financing (procyclical debt financing), the external financing behaviour of the largest 
firms display a counter-cyclical behaviour. That provides strong support for our hypothesised 
more extraordinary transmission of an expansion in credit availability to the smallest firms 
categories and with previous findings on the pro- (counter-)cyclicality of debt financing of 
small (large) firms (Covas and Den Haan, 2011; Begenau and Salomao, 2018). 
     [Insert Tables 2.8 around here] 
2.7 Robustness checks 
This section presents several of the robustness checks that we perform to validate our baseline 
results.  
We start by testing the validity of our results to an alternative measure of capital 
inflows, i.e., current account imbalances (see Tables 2.9 and 2.10). Similar to capital inflows, 
a current account surplus expands the recipient country domestic liquidity or, at least, it 
contributes to the creation of an income stock that the recipient country can use to finance its 
investment in the following periods15. This makes it commonly used to assess financial 
integration and cross-country capital inflows16. Therefore, we re-estimated Equation [2.1], 
replacing CIF-to-GDP with the quarterly change in the current account balance (CAB)-to-GDP 
 
15 In the standard balance of payments (BOP) structure, a net current account value corresponds to an equivalent 
value arising in the country capital account (capital and financing accounts in IMF data) 
16 In this paper, we share the view that current account imbalances are imperfect measure of capital inflows, 
popular in current debate of the relevant literature on the topic. We agree that “current account patterns are largely 
silent about the role a country plays in international borrowing, lending and financial intermediation” (Borio and 
Disyatat, 2015:1), since the current account reveals the saving pattern of a country, not its financing. Moreover, 
as argued by the authors, investment is not driven by countries’ savings, but their financing, which is a gross 
measure, not a net one. Therefore, looking at the current account, it is possible to see whether a country attracts 
from (or release resources to) foreign investors, but we cannot assess whether the spending is financed from home 
or abroad (Borio and Disyatat, 2015). Therefore, we chose to use gross capital inflows in our baseline regression. 
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(we kept all the other variables unchanged). Examining the results of Tables 2.9 and 2.10, we 
can argue that our previous findings are confirmed. Therefore, we find evidence of a link 
between capital inflows (i.e., negative variations of Chinese current account balance) and credit 
growth. In particular, we find that an increase in the current account deficit leading to an almost 
3 percent credit growth in the private sector (see columns (1) and (2) of Tables 2.9 and 2.10). 
This finding is in line with previous work from Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), Gourinchas and 
Obstfeld (2012), pointing to a strong relationship between current accounts deficit and credit 
growth (widely associated with financial and banking crises). Assessing the theorised risk-
taking channel, using our previous dummy variables for firms’ profitability, solvency, and 
investment opportunities, which we benchmark to firms’ industry and size peers. We find 
slightly different results from those of the previous section. Therefore, we still find banks to 
lend to firms that are less profitable than their benchmark in the whole period. However, 
looking at the interaction term, we also observe a marginal increase in lending to profitable 
firms when capital inflows rise. This coefficient is significant in columns (2) and (3) of Table 
2.6, while just in column (2) of Table 2.10. On the contrary, in both Tables, we find that more 
significant capital inflows increase lending to more insolvent firms (with a lower z-score). In 
particular, a one percent increase in capital inflows is associated with a 4 percent greater of 
banks’ lending to entities closer to bankruptcy than the size or industry benchmark. That is 
consistent with the previous findings of our baseline regressions.  
[Insert Tables 2.9 and 2.10 around here] 
We also robustify our results by adding several more variables identifying profitability and 
risk. Following Iosifidi and Kokoas (2015), as additional performance measures, we included 
firms' return on assets (ROA) and the natural logarithm of firms' market value of equity, a 
forward-looking indicator of firms' performance. As measures of risk, we computed the 
volatility of firms' return on assets, calculated as a 12-quarters rolling standard deviation of 
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ROA, and firms' premium for risk (Sharpe ratio). Our conclusions again are unchanged. Capital 
inflows are indeed still highly positively correlated with an increase in firms' debt in all our 
regressions, with a coefficient of 2.3 in both Table 2.11 and Table 2.12. We find that banks 
lend to less profitable firms on average, and a marginal increase in capital inflows worsens this 
phenomenon (𝛽6 is negative and about -4 percent). We also observe that more profitable firms'' 
have a lower geometric mean of debt financing of about 4 percent in both Tables; the 
coefficients are, however, not significant. Firm risk, proxied by the standard deviation of ROA, 
is significant and positive, both in the whole period and in moments of growth in capital 
inflows. A one percent increase in capital inflows is associated with more lending to firms with 
more volatile ROA (the coefficient is 2 percent in Table 2.11 and about 3 percent in Table 
2.12). Both these measures support the existence of a risk-taking channel. 
[Insert Tables 2.11 and 2.12 around here] 
To further support a supply-driven change in debt financing of Chinese firms, we re-run our 
baseline regressions instrumenting CIF-over-GDP with Chinese banks loans to the non-
financial sector (see Table 2.13). Therefore, we exclude from this regression also all firms in 
the financial industry. The results are consistent with our baseline findings. Current bank loans 
are associated with higher debt growth over assets of Chinese firms in all our regressions. In 
particular, a 1 percent increase in bank loans lead to about 0.7 percent growth in firms’ debt-
over-assets. The coefficient has a lower magnitude than that of capital inflows-over-GDP in 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5. Still, it presents an identical sign, implying that a significant amount of 
private-sector debt is intermediated through bank loans (approximately 70 percent, as stated in 
Song and Xiong, 2018). Our baseline regressions used several dummy variables to compare 
individual firms with their industry peers. As far as firm fundamentals are concerned, our 
profitability dummy is again the variable with the highest explanatory power since neither the 
Z-score nor Tobin’s q is significant in any regressions. In particular, interacting d_prof with 
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the log of bank loans, we can observe that the marginal effect of an increase in bank loans leads 
to higher lending to firms with better fundamentals. That suggests that higher bank lending 
(i.e., with higher private sector debt) in standard times is associated with better accounting 
fundamentals. That leads us to conclude that, in normal times, lending does not seem driven 
by risk-taking incentives, different to periods of capital inflow surges, when firms with lower 
profitability receive instead more credit.  
[Insert Table 2.13 around here] 
Ultimately, to add further robustness to our results, we test whether the hypothesised risk-
taking channel is more present during episodes of procyclicality of cross-country capital 
inflows to the business cycle. Several scholars and policymakers, including Araujo et al. (2017) 
and Shin (2016), found gross capital inflows to ease domestic lending standards in the host 
country, especially when capital flows are procyclical. Other authors (see Behn et al. (2016), 
Danielsson et al. (2001), Kashyap and Stein (2004), Repullo and Suarez (2012)) explained the 
procyclicality of lending as linked to capital requirements regulation, establishing capital 
charges on banks as based on institutions' asset risk. Therefore, as asset risk is sensitive to the 
economic condition, this implies that banks' capital availability (and thus lending) is more 
accessible (as capital charges are lower) in periods of economic expansion than in recession 
periods. When gross capital inflows are procyclical, these expand the business cycle and boost 
asset prices (Rey, 2013). That increases banks' lending capacity through Behn et al.'s (2016) 
regulatory-driven procyclicality of banks' financing. Therefore, evidence of a positive 
relationship between the cyclical component of capital inflows and corporate debt would 
support a bank-driven transmission channel.  
To compute procyclicality, we firstly retrieved the cyclical components of capital 
inflows (CIF) and of quarter-to-quarter GDP growth (since CIF is a quarter-to-quarter flow 
measure) using a Hodrick-Prescott filter (with λ=1600) – see Figure 2.3. As evident from 
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Figure 2.3, the two variables have a positive correlation, which equals 58.28 percent, 
significant at 1 percent level. Secondly, we computed the 12 quarters rolling window 
correlation between CIF and GDP growth, which we substituted our baseline regression model 
instead of the first lag of log(CIF/GDP). Eventually, we re-run our baseline regressions17.  
The results presented in Table 2.14 are coherent with our hypotheses. Greater capital 
inflows procyclicality is associated with greater firms' leverage. Moreover, the marginal effect 
of an increase in procyclicality is more lending to firms with weaker fundamentals (less 
profitable and more insolvent). This finding is confirmed both across industry and size. In other 
words, we conclude that capital inflow procyclicality stimulates a risk appetite of banks, which 
lend to more risky customers. The observed change increase in private sector leverage is very 
likely bank-driven, as opposed to firm-driven. 
[Insert Figure 2.3 around here] 
[Insert Table 2.14 around here] 
We perform several additional robustness specifications, even if we do not display the results 
in the manuscript. These include estimations using variations in the fixed-effect structure; 
estimates of our baseline regression using firms’ age rather than size, or sectors rather than 
industries; the consideration of stock rather than flow measures of capital inflows, or of net 
capital flows (calculated as capital inflows minus outflows) rather than capital inflows. The 
results are in all specifications unaffected. 
 
2.8 Conclusions 
Using an extensive firm-level panel dataset, this paper analyses international capital flows in 
China between 2005 and 2016. Starting from previous evidence on the relationship between 
 
17 In the regressions, we computed the Z-score using Leaven and Levine (2009) formula. This would help us to 
avoid multicollinearity arising from an identical rolling-window computation of most of our explanatory 
variables. 
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capital inflows, expanded domestic liquidity, and risk-taking, our main contribution lies in 
developing a methodology that empirically found an association between foreign capital 
inflows and corporate sector debt during the Chinese Corporate Debt Crisis. In other words, 
this study provides an insight into the real effects of global capital inflows on the Chinese 
corporate sector.  
Specifically, we find that a 1 percent increase in capital inflows (scaled by GDP) leads 
to about a 2.3 percent increase in corporate sector debt, a result which we find robust in several 
empirical settings (e.g., splitting the sample by size, industry, and age). This result, we believed 
to be driven by an expansion of domestic liquidity (as suggested by Blanchard et al. (2017)). 
That leads not only to a more significant domestic debt (as found by Rey (2013), Shin (2012), 
and many others), but also to higher risk-taking of banks (as proposed by Minsky (1992), 
Acharya and Naqvi (2012), and Ioannidou et al., (2014)). To assess risk-taking and 
inefficiencies arising from the Chinese government implicit guarantee, we individually 
benchmark our sample of Chinese firms to their industry or size peers according to numerous 
risk and profitability measures. Our results are that less profitable firms receive more credit 
both overall and during surges in capital inflows. In particular, we find that a marginal increase 
in capital inflows leads to about 4 percent greater lending to less profitable (than the 
benchmark). All our regressions find support for this result. We also performed several 
robustness tests. We included additional profitability and risk measures (e.g., ROA, the 
standard deviation of firms ROA, and market value of equity) and replaced capital inflows with 
current account imbalances. Our findings are still unchanged.  
Overall, our paper closely relates to the previous literature on capital flows, such as Rey 
(2013) and Shin (2012), among others. In the peculiar Chinese context, heavily relying on a 
few state-owned banks for liquidity transmission, we argue that capital inflow surges 
unsustainably expand banks’ loanable funds leading to the build-up of excessive corporate 
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sector debt. The combination of greater bank liquidity from foreign investors and the implicit 
bailout guarantee of most Chinese banks leads to greater lending, especially to less credit-
worthy customers. Therefore, our results suggest that the excessive credit in China, vastly 
discussed by academics and policymakers, could result from a risk-taking channel originating 
from banks’ greater liquidity during capital inflow surges and enhancing the corporate sector’s 
credit risk. That suggests the need for stricter supervision of banks’ credit when capital inflows 
intensify. 
We also acknowledge the limitations of our methodology. As a matter of fact, despite 
the many robustness tests, the lack of loan-level data for China do not allow this study (or any 
other study) a precise identification of banks’ lending volumes to the private sector. Iosifidi 
and Kokoas (2015) did excellent work identifying firm-bank lending transactions and the 
potential risks involved. Their identification strategy relies on a dataset of US syndicated loans 
available from DealScan, matched with firms’ accounting risk measures. Unfortunately, the 
vast under-reporting and opacity of Chinese state-owned entities make this data impossible to 
obtain for China. That makes research on this topic much scarcer and more difficult.  Therefore, 
greater transparency is quintessential for a better knowledge of international capital flows 
transmission to the real economy and for a better understanding of the impact of central 






Table 2.1 Correlation Analysis  
Table 2.1 presents the correlations matrix containing our key country-level explanatory variables: capital inflows-
over-GDP, stock market capitalisation and volatility, Banks ROA, Inflation, Sovereign Bond Yields and our key 
explanatory and control variables. Underneath the Table, we explain how we assigned the stars reported next to 
the correlation coefficients. Coefficients have been marked with ***, **, and * when significant at 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels. 






Sov. Yields ∆log(CPI) 
CIF 1       
mpi 0.090*** 1      
Stock Mkt 
Cap 
-0.344*** -0.338*** 1     
Mkt vol -0.634*** -0.001** 0.503*** 1    
Banks 
ROA 
0.211*** 0.070*** -0.207*** -0.244*** 1   
Sov. 
Yields 
0.106*** -0.541*** -0.052*** -0.183*** -0.551*** 1  
∆log(CPI) -0.176*** -0.290*** 0.773*** 0.209*** 0.259*** -0.322*** 1 
Table 2.2 Pair-wise correlation between leverage growth and capital inflows (split by industry) 
Table 2.2 reports pair-wise correlations between the debt financing of firms and the first lag of capital inflows-
over-GDP. In the Table, we split firms according to their industry to observe the correlation between the two 
variables taking into account the impact of firms’ industry on their received lending. Finally, we marked with two 
stars correlation coefficients that are significant at 5 percent level. 
Industry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
corr (CIF, Lev. ratio) 0.05 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.05 0.06** 0.08** 0.08** 0.06 
Table 2.3 Pair-wise correlation between leverage growth and capital inflows (split by size) 
Table 2.3 reports pair-wise correlation coefficients between firms' debt financing and the first lag of capital 
inflows-over-GDP. Using a percentile approach, we allocated firms to one of the seven size groups reported in 
the Table at each point in time. Splitting firms according to their size, we observe the correlation between the two 
variables considering the impact of firm size on debt financing. Finally, we marked with two stars correlation 
coefficients that are significant at 5 percent level. 
Size [0-0.25] [0.25-0.5] [0.5-0.75] [0.75-0.9] [0.9-0.95] [0.95-0.99] [0.99-1] 
corr (CIF, Lev. ratio) 0.129** 0.076** 0.044** 0.016 0.006 -0.001 0.026 
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Table 2.4 Baseline regression – industry-level results  
Table 2.4 reports Equation 2.1 results, which we present decomposed into four columns. In column 4, we display 
the estimation results, including all control variables and fixed effects in the regression. However, we omit the 
coefficients of our control variables and fixed effects for graphical reasons but only present those of our main 
explanatory variables. d_prof, d_Z, and d_Q are calculated respectively as the difference between a firm 
profitability, solvency, and investment opportunities and the corresponding industry median. In this regression, 
we add to our variables of interest several macro-economic control variables and firm, time, and size fixed effects. 
Note that, in Appendix A.2.3, we describe all the variables displayed in this Table and their calculation. We also 
report the coefficients’ standard errors in round-brackets underneath each regression coefficient. Finally, 
coefficients have been marked with ***, **, and * when significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio 
CIF 2.334*** 2.335*** 2.302*** 2.298*** 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) 
Core firm fundamentals:     
d_prof  -0.324*** -0.323*** -0.314*** 
  (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) 
d_prof * CIF  -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.041*** 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
d_Z  -0.024 -0.010 -0.010 
  (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) 
d_Z * CIF  -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
d_Q  -0.016 -0.014 -0.014 
  (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) 
d_Q* CIF  -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant 9.398*** 9.495*** -91.203*** 18.141 
 (0.159) (0.163) (10.281) (17.450) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size FE No No No Yes 
Fin. markets fundamentals controls No No Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic fundamentals controls No No No Yes 
Obs 78,469 78,469 64,607 64,607 




Table 2.5 Baseline regression – size-level results  
Table 2.5 reports Equation 2.1 results, which we present decomposed into four columns. In column 4, we display 
the estimation results, including all control variables and fixed effects in the regression. However, we omit the 
coefficients of our control variables and fixed effects for graphical reasons but only present those of our main 
explanatory variables. d_prof, d_Z, and d_Q are calculated respectively as the difference between a firm 
profitability, solvency, and investment opportunities and the corresponding median of firms in the same size 
percentile. In this regression, we add to our variables of interest several macro-economic control variables and 
firm, time, and size fixed effects. Note that, in Appendix A.2.3, we describe all the variables displayed in this 
Table and their calculation. We also report the coefficients’ standard errors in round-brackets underneath each 
regression coefficient. Finally, coefficients have been marked with ***, **, and * when significant at 10, 5, and 
1 percent levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio 
CIF 2.334*** 2.335*** 2.297*** 2.297*** 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) 
Core firm fundamentals:     
d_prof  -0.339*** -0.319*** -0.319*** 
  (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) 
d_prof * CIF  -0.047*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
d_Z  0.013 0.025 0.025 
  (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) 
d_Z * CIF  0.005 0.007 0.007 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
d_Q  -0.032 -0.012 -0.011 
  (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) 
d_Q* CIF  -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant 9.398*** 9.489*** -91.460*** 18.507 
 (0.159) (0.163) (10.282) (17.456) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No No Yes 
Fin. markets fundamentals controls No No Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic fundamentals controls No No No Yes 
Obs 78,469 78,469 64,607 64,607 
R-squared 0.208 0.214 0.090 0.090 
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Table 2.6 Baseline regression – industry-level results  
Table 2.6 reports Equation 2.1 results estimated for procyclical and capital-intensive industries. In column 4, we display the estimation results, including all control variables 
and fixed effects in the regression. However, we omit the coefficients of our control variables and fixed effects for graphical reasons but only present those of our main 
explanatory variables. d_prof, d_Z, and d_Q are calculated respectively as the difference between a firm profitability, solvency, and investment opportunities and the 
corresponding industry median. In this regression, we add to our variables of interest several macro-economic control variables and firm, time, and size fixed effects. Note that, 
in Appendix A.2.3, we describe all the variables displayed in this Table and their calculation. We also report the coefficients’ standard errors in round-brackets underneath each 
regression coefficient. Finally, coefficients have been marked with ***, **, and * when significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
 Procyclical Industries Leverage Capital Intensive Industries Leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio 
CIF 1.743*** 1.741*** 1.056*** 1.077*** 2.397*** 2.412*** 2.430*** 2.424*** 
Core firm fundamentals:         
d_prof  -0.263* -0.269* -0.253*  -0.630*** -0.769*** -0.761*** 
d_prof * CIF  -0.038 -0.040 -0.035  -0.092*** -0.117*** -0.115*** 
d_Z  -0.287** -0.206 -0.196  -0.017 0.055 0.056 
d_Z * CIF  -0.062** -0.044† -0.041  -0.003 0.013 0.013 
d_Q  0.231* 0.189 0.191  0.064 -0.033 -0.031 
d_Q* CIF  0.049* 0.043 0.043  0.015 -0.008 -0.007 
Constant 6.645*** 6.693*** 11.244 -35.484 10.208*** 10.433*** -90.442*** 25.704 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size FE No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Fin. markets fundamentals controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic fundamentals controls No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Obs 10,417 10,417 8,256 8,256 27,501 27,501 21,497 21,497 





Table 2.7 Baseline regression – size-level results  
Table 2.7 reports Equation 2.1 results estimated for procyclical and capital-intensive industries. In column 4, we display the estimation results, including all control variables 
and fixed effects in the regression. However, we omit the coefficients of our control variables and fixed effects for graphical reasons but only present those of our main 
explanatory variables. d_prof, d_Z, and d_Q are calculated respectively as the difference between a firm profitability, solvency, and investment opportunities and the 
corresponding industry median. In this regression, we add to our variables of interest several macro-economic control variables and firm, time, and size fixed effects. Note that, 
in Appendix A.2.3, we describe all the variables displayed in this Table and their calculation. We also report the coefficients’ standard errors in round-brackets underneath each 
regression coefficient. Finally, coefficients have been marked with †, ***, **, and * when significant at 15, 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
 Procyclical Industries Leverage Capital Intensive Industries Leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio 
CIF 1.743*** 1.745*** 1.095*** 1.095*** 2.397*** 2.431*** 2.450*** 2.450*** 
Core firm fundamentals:         
d_prof  -0.282** -0.287** -0.288**  -0.714*** -0.831*** -0.831*** 
d_prof * CIF  -0.041 -0.044 -0.044  -0.113*** -0.133*** -0.133*** 
d_Z  -0.318** -0.235* -0.235*  -0.050 -0.014 -0.014 
d_Z * CIF  -0.069** -0.050† -0.050  -0.012 -0.004 -0.004 
d_Q  0.236* 0.248* 0.249*  0.068 0.056 0.056 
d_Q* CIF  0.053* 0.053* 0.053*  0.017 0.013 0.013 
Constant 6.645*** 6.718*** -34.864 -35.202 10.208*** 10.509*** 25.769 25.766 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Fin. markets fundamentals controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic fundamentals controls No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Obs 10,417 10,417 8,256 8,256 27,501 27,501 21,497 21,497 





Table 2.8 Baseline regression for each size group 
Table 2.8 reports Equation 2.1 results, which we estimate separately for each of the defined size percentiles. Each regression includes all control variables and fixed effects. 
However, we omit the coefficients of our control variables and fixed effects for graphical reasons but only present those of our main explanatory variables. d_prof, d_Z, and 
d_Q are calculated respectively as the difference between a firm profitability, solvency, and investment opportunities and the corresponding industry median. In this regression, 
we add to our variables of interest several macro-economic control variables and firm, time, and size fixed effects. Note that, in Appendix A.2.3, we describe all the variables 
displayed in this Table and their calculation. We also report the coefficients’ standard errors in round-brackets underneath each regression coefficient. Finally, coefficients have 
been marked with †, ***, **, and * when significant at 15, 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
Size groups [0-25%] [25-50%] [50-75%] [75-90%] [90-95%] [95-99%] [99-100%] 
 Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio 
CIF 3.271*** 2.125*** 1.872*** 0.313** 3.078*** -0.154 -2.386*** 
Core firm fundamentals:        
d_prof -0.438*** -0.424*** -0.137* -0.301*** -0.270* -0.291 -0.051 
d_prof * CIF -0.044 -0.065*** -0.009 -0.045* -0.036 -0.048 -0.010 
d_Z -0.041 -0.135 -0.010 -0.006 -0.158 -0.021 0.118 
d_Z * CIF -0.005 -0.033* -0.003 -0.003 -0.035 -0.005 0.024 
d_Q 0.154 -0.083 0.112 -0.018 0.065 -0.120 0.274 
d_Q* CIF 0.032 -0.017 0.025 0.001 0.013 -0.027 0.066 
Constant 52.241* 253.355*** -552.523*** 546.967*** -1.331 -384.304*** 1,084.950*** 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fin. markets fundamentals controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic fundamentals controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 14,905 15,996 16,227 10,171 3,463 2,741 1,104 
R-squared 0.194 0.094 0.053 0.018 0.189 0.033 0.352 
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Table 2.9 Baseline regression using current account balance – industry-level results  
Table 2.9 reports Equation 2.1 results, which we present decomposed into four columns. In column 4, we display 
the estimation results, including all control variables and fixed effects in the regression. However, we omit the 
coefficients of our control variables and fixed effects for graphical reasons but only present those of our main 
explanatory variables. d_prof, d_Z, and d_Q are calculated respectively as the difference between a firm 
profitability, solvency, and investment opportunities and the corresponding industry median. In this regression, 
we add to our variables of interest several macro-economic control variables and firm, time, and size fixed effects. 
Note that, in Appendix A.2.3, we describe all the variables displayed in this Table and their calculation. We also 
report the coefficients’ standard errors in round-brackets underneath each regression coefficient. Finally, 
coefficients have been marked with ***, **, and * when significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio 
CIF_CA -2.908*** -2.946*** -2.560*** -2.561*** 
 (0.032) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 
Firm fundamentals:     
d_prof  -0.272*** -0.130*** -0.135*** 
  (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) 
d_prof * CIF_CA  0.171*** 0.031 0.035* 
  (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
d_Z  0.028 0.049** 0.048** 
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) 
d_Z * CIF_CA  -0.024 -0.049*** -0.048*** 
  (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
d_Q  -0.017 -0.029 -0.028 
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) 
d_Q* CIF_CA  0.015 0.030 0.029 
  (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Constant 2.126*** 2.216*** 49.966*** 46.018*** 
 (0.046) (0.049) (1.699) (5.068) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size FE No No No Yes 
Fin. markets fundamentals controls No No Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic fundamentals controls No No No Yes 
Obs 93,419 93,419 79,550 79,549 
R-squared 0.214 0.218 0.091 0.092 
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Table 2.10 Baseline regression using current account balance – size-level results  
Table 2.10 reports Equation 2.1 results, which we present decomposed into four columns. In column 4, we display 
the estimation results, including all control variables and fixed effects in the regression. However, we omit the 
coefficients of our control variables and fixed effects for graphical reasons but only present those of our main 
explanatory variables. d_prof, d_Z, and d_Q are calculated respectively as the difference between a firm 
profitability, solvency, and investment opportunities and the corresponding median of firms in the same size 
percentile. In this regression, we add to our variables of interest several macro-economic control variables and 
firm, time, and size fixed effects. Note that, in Appendix A.2.3, we describe all the variables displayed in this 
Table and their calculation. We also report the coefficients’ standard errors in round-brackets underneath each 
regression coefficient. Finally, coefficients have been marked with ***, **, and * when significant at 10, 5, and 
1 percent levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio 
CIF_CA -2.908*** -2.964*** -2.555*** -2.555*** 
 (0.032) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 
Firm fundamentals:     
d_prof  -0.278*** -0.122*** -0.122*** 
  (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) 
d_prof * CIF_CA  0.180*** 0.025 0.025 
  (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
d_Z  0.042** 0.060*** 0.061*** 
  (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
d_Z * CIF_CA  -0.043** -0.064*** -0.064*** 
  (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
d_Q  -0.057*** -0.038* -0.037* 
  (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
d_Q* CIF_CA  0.057*** 0.040** 0.040** 
  (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Constant 2.126*** 2.234*** 50.011*** 46.935*** 
 (0.046) (0.049) (1.699) (5.065) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No No Yes 
Fin. markets fundamentals controls No No Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic fundamentals controls No No No Yes 
Obs 93,419 93,419 79,550 79,549 




Table 2.11 Baseline regression using additional risk and profitability measures – industry-level results  
Table 2.11 reports Equation 2.1 results, which we present decomposed into five columns. In column 5, we display 
the estimation results, including all control variables and fixed effects in the regression. However, we omit the 
coefficients of our control variables and fixed effects for graphical reasons but only present those of our main 
explanatory variables. d_prof, d_Z, and d_Q are calculated respectively as the difference between a firm 
profitability, solvency, and investment opportunities and the corresponding industry median. As 'Additional firm 
fundamentals', we include in this Table d_σ(ROA), d_Sharpe, and d_ROA; dummy variables that take a value of 
1 if a firm is more profitable (or risky) than the corresponding industry median. In this regression, we add to our 
variables of interest several macro-economic control variables and firm, time, and size fixed effects. Note that, in 
Appendix A.2.3, we describe all the variables displayed in this Table and their calculation. We also report the 
coefficients' standard errors in round-brackets underneath each regression coefficient. Finally, coefficients have 
been marked with ***, **, and * when significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio 
CIF 2.334*** 2.332*** 2.325*** 2.287*** 2.283*** 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) 
Core firm fundamentals:      
d_prof  -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.314*** 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) 
d_prof * CIF  -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.041*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
d_Z  0.040 0.041 0.049 0.050 
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
d_Z * CIF  0.009 0.009 0.011 0.011 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
d_Q  -0.045 -0.068 -0.062 -0.059 
  (0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) 
d_Q* CIF  -0.011 -0.016 -0.014 -0.013 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant 9.398*** 9.474*** 9.438*** -91.223*** 18.321 
 (0.159) (0.163) (0.167) (10.282) (17.451) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size FE No No No No Yes 
Additional firm fundamentals No No No No Yes 
Fin. markets fundamentals controls No No Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic fundamentals 
controls 
No No No Yes Yes 
Obs 78,469 78,469 78,469 64,607 64,606 




Table 2.12 Baseline regression using additional risk and profitability measures – size-level results  
Table 2.12 reports Equation 2.1 results, which we present decomposed into five columns. In column 5, we display 
the estimation results, including all control variables and fixed effects in the regression. However, we omit the 
coefficients of our control variables and fixed effects for graphical reasons but only present those of our main 
explanatory variables. d_prof, d_Z, and d_Q are calculated respectively as the difference between a firm 
profitability, solvency, and investment opportunities and the corresponding median of firms in the same size 
percentile. As 'Additional firm fundamentals', we include in this Table d_σ(ROA), d_Sharpe, and d_ROA; dummy 
variables that take a value of 1 if a firm is more profitable (or risky) than the corresponding size group median. In 
this regression, we add to our variables of interest several macro-economic control variables and firm, time, and 
size fixed effects. Note that, in Appendix A.2.3, we describe all the variables displayed in this Table and their 
calculation. We also report the coefficients' standard errors in round-brackets underneath each regression 
coefficient. Finally, coefficients have been marked with ***, **, and * when significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent 
levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio 
CIF 2.334*** 2.339*** 2.310*** 2.274*** 2.274*** 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) 
Core firm fundamentals:      
d_prof  -0.340*** -0.337*** -0.319*** -0.319*** 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) 
d_prof * CIF  -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
d_Z  0.032 0.029 0.033 0.033 
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
d_Z * CIF  0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
d_Q  -0.065 -0.104** -0.073 -0.074 
  (0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) 
d_Q* CIF  -0.016 -0.024** -0.017* -0.016* 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant 9.398*** 9.498*** 9.366*** -91.598*** 17.696 
 (0.159) (0.163) (0.168) (10.281) (17.456) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No No No Yes 
Additional firm fundamentals No No No No Yes 
Fin. markets fundamentals controls No No Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic fundamentals 
controls 
No No No Yes Yes 
Obs 78,469 78,469 78,469 64,607 64,606 




Table 2.13 Bank lending behaviour unaffected by capital inflows 
Table 2.13 reports Equation 2.1 results, in which we substituted the variable CIF with log(Bank Loans). In 
columns 3 and 6, we display the estimation results, including all control variables and fixed effects in the 
regression. However, we omit the coefficients of our control variables and fixed effects for graphical reasons but 
only present those of our main explanatory variables. d_prof, d_Z, and d_Q are calculated respectively as the 
difference between a firm profitability, solvency, and investment opportunities and the corresponding median of 
firms in the same industry or size percentile. As 'Additional firm fundamentals', we include in this Table 
d_σ(ROA), d_Sharpe, and d_ROA; dummy variables that take a value of 1 if a firm is more profitable (or risky) 
than the median of the corresponding industry or size group. In this regression, we add to our variables of interest 
several macro-economic control variables and firm, time, and size fixed effects. Note that, in Appendix A.2.3, we 
describe all the variables displayed in this Table and their calculation. We also report the coefficients' standard 
errors in round-brackets underneath each regression coefficient. Finally, coefficients have been marked with ***, 
**, and * when significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio 
 Industry Split Size Split 
log(Bank Loans) 0.753*** 0.684*** 0.672*** 0.753*** 0.683*** 0.665*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Core firm fundamentals:       
d_prof  -0.898*** -0.906***  -0.937*** -0.938*** 
  (0.064) (0.064)  (0.063) (0.064) 
d_prof * log(Bank Loans)  0.082*** 0.082***  0.086*** 0.086*** 
  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) 
d_Z  0.067 0.020  -0.075 -0.005 
  (0.056) (0.062)  (0.056) (0.062) 
d_Z * log(Bank Loans)  -0.007 -0.002  0.008 0.001 
  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.007) 
d_Q  -0.078 -0.010  0.042 -0.008 
  (0.056) (0.062)  (0.056) (0.062) 
d_Q* log(Bank Loans)  0.008 0.001  -0.004 0.001 
  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.007) 
Constant -7.650*** -6.936*** -6.796*** -7.650*** -6.904*** -6.733*** 
 (0.105) (0.118) (0.125) (0.105) (0.117) (0.126) 
Obs 93,608 93,608 93,608 93,608 93,608 93,608 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size FE No Yes No No No No 
Industry FE No No No No Yes No 
Additional firm controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Fin. markets controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Macroeconomic controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Obs 93,608 93,608 93,608 93,608 93,608 93,608 




Table 2.14 Debt financing in periods of procyclical capital inflows 
Table 2.14 reports Equation 2.1 results, in which we substituted the variable CIF with the correlation between 
capital inflows and the quarter-to-quarter change in Chinese GDP [corr (CIF, ∆GDP)]. In columns 2 and 3, we 
display the estimation results, including all control variables and fixed effects in the regression. However, we omit 
the coefficients of our control variables and fixed effects for graphical reasons but only present those of our main 
explanatory variables. d_prof, d_Z, and d_Q are calculated respectively as the difference between a firm 
profitability, solvency, and investment opportunities and the corresponding median of firms in the same industry 
or size percentile. In this regression, we add to our variables of interest several macro-economic control variables 
and firm, time, and size fixed effects. Note that, in Appendix A.2.3, we describe all the variables displayed in this 
Table and their calculation. We also report the coefficients' standard errors in round-brackets underneath each 
regression coefficient. Finally, coefficients have been marked with ***, **, and * when significant at 10, 5, and 
1 percent levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lev. ratio Lev. ratio Lev. ratio 
  Industry Split Size Split 
corr(CIF, ∆GDP) 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Core firm fundamentals:    
d_prof  -0.112*** -0.114*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) 
d_prof * corr(CIF, ∆GDP)  -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
d_Z  0.021** 0.011 
  (0.009) (0.009) 
d_Z * corr(CIF, ∆GDP)  -0.001*** -0.001* 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
d_Q  -0.009 -0.004 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
d_Q* corr(CIF, ∆GDP)  0.000 0.001* 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -1.774*** -1.690*** -1.685*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Fin. markets controls No No Yes 
Macroeconomic controls No No Yes 
Obs 95,242 95,242 95,242 




Figure 2.1 Assets and Liabilities positions of Chinese banks  
   
Notes. Figure 2.1 represents global cross-country positions of the World vis-à-vis China taking place in the form 
of foreign banks’ claims on China – left-hand side graph – and Chinese financial institutions credit – on the right-
hand side. 
Sources: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics (LHS graph), BIS Credit to the non-financial sector (RHS graph). 
Units: millions of US dollars (LHS graph), billions of RMB (RHS graph). 
Figure 2.2 Capital Inflows in China 
 
Notes. Figure 2.2 pictures international capital inflows in Mainland China. In the graph, the blue line represents 
Capital Inflows (liabilities of China) denominated in millions of USD. 
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Figure 2.3  Capital Inflows in China vis-à-vis China’s business cycle 
 
Notes. In Figure 2.3, we show the Hodrick-Prescott cyclical components of CIF and quarter-to-quarter GDP 
growth from the beginning of 2005 to the end of 2016. 
Sources. IMF IFS and author’s own calculations.
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3 Risk, Financial Stability and FDI18 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Over the past decade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock has grown markedly, rising almost 
65% at a global level. This led to an increasing awareness on behalf of policymakers as to its 
role as a source of economic growth. For example, in 2016, FDI accounted for 35% of global 
GDP (Carril-Caccia & Pavlova, 2018; Neto & Veiga, 2013). The Euro Area (EA) has been 
both a key recipient of FDI investments and an important FDI supplier. This has been attributed 
not only to the elimination of transaction costs and exchange risk in the reallocation of capital 
between members of the monetary union (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2008; Darvas et al., 2013), 
but also to an increase in international investors’ confidence in its financial institutions and 
supervisory bodies (Shatz & Venables, 2000). In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC), worries about fiscal sustainability in the EA intensified (Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012; 
Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012; Bernoth & Erdogan, 2012; Afonso et al., 2014, 2018) as risks 
in the banking sector fed back to the sovereign position and vice versa, generating a detrimental 
cycle (De Bruyckere et al., 2013; Acharya et al., 2014a; Delatte et al., 2017). As a result, in the 
run-up of the sovereign debt crisis, the EA experienced significant capital outflows.  
In this context, our paper examines how sovereign and banking sector risks that 
accumulated during the crises affected FDI in the EA. More specifically, we dissect the effect 
of sovereign and banking risk in origin (foreign investors) and host countries (EA), which we 
consider as main drivers of investors’ capital allocation in the period of analysis. We draw from 
several strands of the literature on FDI in scenarios of crisis (e.g., Milesi-Ferretti & Tille, 2010; 
 
18 The work of this Chapter is based on the article ,"Risk, Financial Stability and FDI" published in the Journal 
of International Money and Finance by myself, Neil Kellard, Alexandros Kontonikas, Michael Lamla and 
Geoffrey Wood (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2020.102232). 
 81 
Weitzel et al., 2014; Darvas et al., 2013; Habib and Venditti, 2018; Acharya et al., 2007; Carril-
Caccia & Pavlova, 2018; Sondermann & Vansteenkiste, 2019), as well as work on investment 
allocation during the sovereign debt crisis (e.g., Beck et al., 2016; Weitzel et al., 2014). 
However, our approach extends the empirical literature on FDI that typically considers just 
domestic factors as drivers for foreign investment (e.g., Carril-Caccia & Pavlova, 2018; Dellis 
et al., 2016; Razin & Sadka, 2007). By contraposing banking and sovereign stress in the country 
where FDI originates (i.e., the origin country) with the corresponding recipient country of FDI 
(i.e., the host), our paper isolates the impact that EA countries’ sovereign and banking risk have 
on their ability to attract FDI from other factors, whilst also considering the relative importance 
of origin countries’ domestic risk. Moreover, we provide evidence on cross-country spillovers 
arising from sovereign and banking sectors’ stress and the transmission to the Euro Area 
through FDI. From a methodological perspective, we argue that the modelling of the EA 
constitutes per se an ideal setting for our empirical analysis, given all countries in the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) have a common currency and monetary policy, which mutes the effect 
from monetary transmission and allows for a cleaner identification of variations in the financial 
account of the Balance of Payments.  
The empirical analysis employs a large panel dataset from the IMF Coordinated Foreign 
Direct Investment Survey (IMF CDIS) on 112 countries FDI stock positions between 2009 and 
2016, which we adopt to identify inward FDI in the EA. The main advantage of this dataset is 
that disaggregating countries’ FDI positions using their immediate counterpart, the CDIS data 
allows for a cross-country and over time comparison of FDI positions (Damgaard & Elkjaer, 
2017). We subsequently match the obtained data on bilateral FDI positions with bank and 
sovereign risk measures for host and origin countries. Additionally, we control for all the 
standard gravity variables commonly used in extant literature on international FDI (e.g., Martin 
& Rey, 2004; Portes & Rey, 2005; Daude & Fratzscher, 2008).  
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Our empirical work yields three main findings. Firstly, we observe that an increase in 
non-performing loans-over-total loans – widely employed in the banking literature (see Aiyar 
& Monaghan, 2015) to test banking sector stability – in the origin country leads to a decrease 
in FDI. However, importantly, changes in the corresponding bank risk in host countries leaves 
inward-FDI unaffected. Secondly, we find that FDI responds negatively to upturns in sovereign 
yields both in origin as well as host countries, arguing that (i) an increase in origin country 
sovereign yield encourages corporate sector Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) to engage in 
less risk-taking, whilst (ii) an increase in host country yield implies that other destinations 
appear more attractive. Additionally, when the EA sample is separated into subsamples of non-
stressed and stressed (GIIPS: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) countries, these 
findings are confirmed, reinforcing our confidence regarding the identified transmission 
channels. In a nutshell, what we find is that economic conditions – including financial stability 
– in origin countries particularly matters for FDI. Here, the key point is the identification of a 
spillover effect of risk in origin countries to the Euro Area through FDI. Finally, we re-affirm 
findings in the literature related to the importance of economic and financial ties in investment 
and financing decisions, embedded in standard gravity variables.  
Overall, we identify four main strands of the FDI literature to which our work relates. 
Firstly, there is a wide range of literature affirming the importance of economic and financial 
ties in investment and financing decisions, embedded in standard gravity models. These results 
find a common root in both the literature on institutional affinity (see Shukla & Cantwell, 
2018), or on transaction costs, whereby ceteris paribus, countries’ geographical closeness or 
common cultural background considerably reduces informational and transaction costs, 
therefore affecting FDI decisions (Martin & Rey, 2004; Portes & Rey, 2005; Daude & 
Fratzscher, 2008; Beck et al., 2016; Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2008; Sondermann & 
Vansteenkiste, 2019). Other factors similarly popular in this literature consist of proxies for 
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institutional quality (see Dellis et al., 2017), as well as identifiers of incentives for regulatory 
or tax evasion (see Damgaard et al., 2018; Haufler et al., 2018; Egger et al., 2018). In our paper, 
we include standard gravity variables adopted by the previous literature, as well as additional 
variables which are specific to the context of crisis under consideration.  Secondly, we draw 
from a limited number of studies that consider the response of FDI to macroeconomic shocks 
arising during crises. These include studies on the Asian financial crisis (Aguiar and Gopinath, 
2005; Acharya et al., 2007), the Latin American financial crisis (Krugman, 2000), other 
emerging markets crises (Alquist et al., 2013), and the GFC and sovereign debt crisis 
(Demertzis & Pontuch, 2013; Forster et al., 2011; Darvas et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2016; 
Sondermann & Vansteenkiste, 2019). Thirdly, we contribute to studies on the sovereign debt 
crisis and determinants of euro-area sovereign bond yield spreads (vs. German bunds), which 
are commonly viewed as key indicators of crisis intensity (Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012; 
Bernoth & Erdogan, 2012; Afonso et al., 2014, 2018). Such studies investigate the role of 
banking risk in transforming the GFC into sovereign debt crisis, and consequently, the nexus 
between banking risk and sovereign risk (De Bruyckere et al., 2013; Acharya et al., 2018; 
Delatte et al., 2017). Finally, a set of studies on FDI considers the EMU membership and its 
impact on the ability of its composing countries to attract FDI (see Shatz & Venables, 2000; 
Carril-Caccia & Pavlova, 2018; Sondermann & Vansteenkiste, 2019). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 3.2 we further explore the 
theoretical and empirical background that motivates our study. In Section 3.3, we explain the 
proposed methodology. In Section 3.4, we provide an exhaustive description of our dataset and 
the underlying literature justifying our choices. The empirical results are presented in Section 
3.5. In Section 3.6, we present robustness tests and, in Section 3.7, the conclusions. 
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3.2 Theoretical and empirical background 
The recent crises experienced by countries in the Euro Area, as well as the GFC, provided non-
trivial evidence on the effect of bank credit cycles on economic growth, and fiscal and financial 
stability (Shin, 2012; Rey, 2013; Habib & Venditti, 2018). The build-up (and subsequent 
decline) of bank credit growth has been detrimental for domestic economies and a crucial 
predictor of crisis, and also largely synchronised on a global scale (Shin, 2012; Rey, 2013; 
Banti & Phylaktis, 2019). Similarly, in the context of the sovereign debt crisis, sovereign yields 
increased in numerous countries and regions. Several authors found evidence of contagion 
arising from spillovers from stressed EA countries sovereign risk across the EA (see Claeys & 
Vašícek, 2014) and other advanced and emerging economies (Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013).  
In light of the above evidence, it becomes interesting to distinguish between origin and 
host countries’ financial conditions when analysing the determination of inward FDI in the 
Euro Area. To do so, our paper newly hypothesises that both host and origin countries’ 
conditions are relevant determinants of cross-country transmission of global FDI. In particular, 
we posit that greater risk in the origin country’s banking sector (observed using the outstanding 
amount of non-performing loans as a ratio of total bank loans) is expected to depress FDI in 
the EA. This can be interpreted as a ‘leverage channel’, whereby firms borrow from banks in 
their home country to finance investment, including FDI. This effect will be stronger for firms 
wishing to invest overseas where imperfect knowledge considerations are greater. According 
to this argument, credit availability19 is an important determinant of FDI. The importance of 
credit cycles for the real economy (Bernanke & Gertler, 1990; Bordo & Jeanne, 2002; Chen et 
al., 2012) has led to attempts by policymakers to tame them. Similarly, we assume that in origin 
 
19 Arguments related to the importance of credit availability for M&As, also called brownfield FDI, have been 
put forward by Harford (2005), amongst others. As described by Harford (2005), brownfield FDI could depend 
on industry, technological and regulatory shocks, which in the latter case included Basel regulation on banks’ 
capital requirements, but also on the availability of "capital liquidity to accommodate the asset reallocation" 
(Harford, 2005, p. 530). 
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countries, greater sovereign credit risk (observed by examining the yields of 10-year national 
government bonds) will encourages the corporate sector MNEs to engage in less risk-taking. 
This is due to a stronger motive for companies to hoard cash for precautionary motives (see 
Akguc & Choi, 2013). Different precautionary motives have been explored by the finance 
literature, such as higher uncertainty about future cash flows (Bacchetta et al., 2014) or the 
future macro-economic conditions (Gao & Grinstein, 2014). Analogously, recent work has 
identified higher cash holdings and less investment generally due to financial crises (Campello 
et al., 2010; Pinkowitz et al., 2013; Song & Lee, 2012).  
As far as the host country is concerned, we assume that greater banking risk (i.e., greater 
banks’ non-performing loans) will also discourage foreign investment in the EA. In this respect, 
a comprehensive literature already exists on the impact of host countries economic 
fundamentals on inward FDI (Cai et al., 2018; Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Bellak et al., 2009; 
Dellis et al., 2017; for a review see Antonakakis and Tondl, 2011). Analogously, we 
hypothesise that periods of high sovereign yields will lead to lower inward FDI in the EA, via 
a credit risk channel. This is consistent with existing evidence, which uses sovereign credit 
ratings as a proxy for sovereign risk, and shows that rating changes affect investment (Chen et 
al., 2013) and direct investment (Cai et al., 2018). In other words, we expect that when credit 
risk is higher, this will make investment in the EA less attractive to foreign investors than 
investments in other, less risky foreign countries. Both our measures of banking and sovereign 
risk have been widely used by academics, practitioners and policy makers in their periodic 
assessment of a country credit risk (and financial stability) – especially during the years of the 
sovereign debt crisis and immediately afterwards. Therefore, these provide an ideal proxy for 
investors’ assessment (both of origin and host countries) of the outstanding financial stability 




To analyse the effects of risk and financial stability on FDI, we build a panel dataset including 
all available bilateral holdings of origin and host countries. Specifically, the dataset contains 
information on the end-of-the-year positions of 112 foreign direct investor countries in 16 EA 
countries20 over the period ranging from 2009 to 2016. We take the logarithm of our dependent 
variable21, as well as our proxy variables for sovereign and banking risk, and equations (3.1) 
and (3.2) below show our chosen regression specification: 
 
log(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖ℎ,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝑡 + 𝛽1 log(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐺𝑖ℎ + 𝛽3𝑂𝐶𝑖ℎ + 𝛽4 log(𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠ℎ,𝑡) +
𝜀𝑖ℎ,𝑡                     [Equation 3.1]          
                 
log(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖ℎ,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝑡 + 𝛽1 log(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛⁡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐺𝑖ℎ + 𝛽3𝑂𝐶𝑖ℎ + 𝛽4 log(𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠ℎ,𝑡) +
𝜀𝑖ℎ,𝑡                   [Equation 3.2] 
 
In the regression equations, i is the country of the foreign direct investor (or origin country), 
while h denotes the host country. Our main variables of analysis are 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 =
{𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡, 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ,𝑡} consisting of banking sector risk origin countries i and 
host countries h; and, 𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛⁡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 = {𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛⁡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡, 𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛⁡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ,𝑡} which 
represents sovereign yields of origin (i) and host countries (h). Gih includes our set of gravity 
variables, representing transaction (and information) costs and the cultural bonds connecting 
the host-origin country pairs. OCih stands for other control variables (see subsection 3.4.3 
Additional risk measure and main controls), accounting for other motives that could drive 
 
20 As in Beck et al. (2016), we consider all Euro Area (EA) countries with the exception of small countries with 
large financial sectors (i.e., Malta and Luxembourg) and Lithuania, as it joined the EA in 2015. 
21 As Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2008), since several observations in the FDI dataset have value of zero. Before 
taking the log, we replaced those values of cross-country FDI with the value of 1 USD. This enable us to preserve 
the greatest possible amount of observations without affecting the reliability of our results.  
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direct investment in the EA. Taxesh represents host EA countries tax revenues over GDP, and 
proxies host countries’ fiscal regimes. t is instead a time dummy included to account for time 
fixed-effects causing abnormal variations in FDI. Finally, εih,t represents the error term. We 
estimate (3.1) and (3.2) using a least squares approach with Huber-Eiker-White robust standard 
errors, clustered at the bilateral-country level22.  
 
3.4 Data 
 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable used in our paper is the bilateral FDI holdings of 112 direct investor 
countries in the Euro Area (EA). In a similar vein to Beck et al. (2016), we compose our dataset 
using end-of-the-year bilateral FDI in the Euro Area, collected from the IMF Coordinated 
Foreign Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) between 2009 and 2016. 
The CDIS is a dataset published by the IMF in 2010 and updated on an annual basis. It 
has been created to allow a global analysis of cross-country linkages. In the dataset, the IMF 
provides data on bilateral direct investment holdings of more than 100 countries, participating 
in the survey. Moreover, disaggregating countries’ FDI positions using their immediate 
counterpart, the CDIS data allows for a cross-country and over time comparison of FDI 
positions (Damgaard & Elkjaer 2017). Consequently, we are in a position to observe bilateral 
direct investment, disentangling effects and drivers of origin and host countries. This allows 
for a better identification of effects as compared to standard approaches used in the literature 
which implicitly assumes that host characteristics are the main drivers. 
To emphasise, the main advantage of this dataset is that it enables us to disentangle 
origin and destination of FDI. This is of course necessary in order to be able to test our 
 
22 Test for the error component structure have been performed using Wooldridge test for serial correlation 
(Wooldridge 2010) and Pesaran (2004) test for cross-sectional dependence.  
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hypothesis. Our hypothesis requires use information on the host and origin country 
simultaneously as determinants of the direct investment. As highlighted in Beck et al. (2016), 
the understanding of the causes and origins of these foreign investors’ positions is of crucial 
importance for policy makers. For instance, with respect to central bank policy, while intra 
Euro Area flows can be easily managed by the ECB, significant variations of outside (non-EA) 
FDI – particularly ‘sudden stops’ in FDI – could potentially undermine central banks’ goals 
and targets. As a matter of fact, as pointed out by the authors, intra-EA capital allocation can 
be more easily supervised and managed by the ECB through Target balances and variations in 
official flows. In the following sections, we exploit the bilateral properties of our data to 
compare bilateral inward FDI in “stressed” and “non-stressed” Euro Area countries23 (cf. Table 
3.2) from all countries with inward FDI. 
Of course, there are some caveats to mention related to the use of this data which we 
try to minimise. Firstly, FDI data from the CDIS is unadjusted for valuation effects. Secondly, 
to increase the representativeness of the data, CDIS include data on both listed and unlisted 
firms, however, different valuation methods, especially for unlisted firms, can generate 
significant geographical asymmetries in the data (Damgaard & Elkjaer, 2017). Thirdly, data 
from the CDIS is not adjusted for exchange rate effects. Therefore, changes in stock positions 
could potentially reflect EUR/USD exchange rate movements. As Beck et al. (2016, p.452) 
notes, “purging these valuation effects from the stock positions would require detailed 
knowledge about the currency and maturity composition of the holdings, on which data do not 
exist.” Finally, as the dataset discloses FDI by immediate counterpart economy, it also includes 
transactions performed by MNEs through Special Purpose Entities (SPEs), often for tax 
avoidance purposes or financial engineering (Dellis et al. 2017; Damgaard & Elkjaer, 2017; 
 
23 Defined according to their exposure to the European sovereign debt crisis (see Table 3.7 – Summary 
Statistics, for reference). 
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Damgaard et al., 2018; Haufler et al., 2018; Egger et al., 2018). This effect might be greater in 
smaller countries that have relatively large financial sectors. 
Therefore, as remarked on by Beck et al. (2016) and Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2010), ideally 
we would use a panel dataset collecting consolidated bilateral flows, adjusted for exchange rate 
effects and recorded on a residence (locational) basis, where “the ‘ultimate risk’ basis implies 
that the borrower is the entity ultimately responsible for the liability” (Milesi-Ferretti et al., 
2010: 21), but such data does not exist. Thus, to minimise the aforementioned biases and avoid 
data distortions, following Beck et al. (2016) we exclude countries considered major tax 
heavens and smaller countries with proportionately large financial sectors and we use stock 
data.24 Finally, to mitigate the impact of the exchange rate channel, we build our baseline model 
‘in levels’ and test the robustness of our results to economic growth, using GDP per capita in 
USD. Note that Table 3.7 presents summary statistics for our dependent variable and risk 
measures for GIIPS and non-GIIPS Euro Area countries.  
For the sake of transparency and completeness, in Figure 3.1, we also present 
aggregated – non-bilateral – data on FDI flows collected from UNCTAD. Such flow data, 
unfortunately, does not suit our empirical study due to its opacity regarding the nationality of 
the foreign direct investor (origin country), limiting its use to a descriptive assessment of FDI 
behaviour during and after the crisis. Interestingly, looking at FDI inflows in the Euro Area, 
we observe a substantial drop during the GFC.  Subsequently, it appears to stabilise (see Figure 
3.1) and stagnate until early 2015, when it surges. Recent work on FDI has also observed this 
pattern and argued that direct investment appears to differ in its drivers from all other forms of 
international investments and has proved considerably more resilient than portfolio flows to 
domestic countries during crises (Milesi-Ferretti & Tille, 2010; Forster et al., 2011; Darvas et 
al., 2013; Pegkas, 2015; Sondermann & Vansteenkiste, 2019). Several authors observed this 
 
24 For a detailed overview see Appendix A.3.0.2. 
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intriguing response of FDI to the crisis. Habib and Venditti (2018) found that FDI is less 
sensitive to global risk and that it seems to “follow a cycle which is different from other asset 
classes” (Habib & Venditti, 2018:17). Sondermann and Vansteenkiste (2019) controlled for 
both the GFC and for the sovereign debt crisis found evidence of a low sensitivity of FDI in 
the EMU to their domestic crisis dummies.  Recent work from Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2010), 
considering just the period of the GFC, yielded also similar results. This per se seems to provide 
some validation for our hypotheses on the importance of other factors of risk, other than the 
domestic ones.  
 
 Independent variables   
As said, we focus on specific risks for MNEs involved in FDI. Particularly, we look at financial 
stability, arising from concerns about a fragile banking sector and high sovereign indebtedness 
with implications for the overall economy and consequently on the expected investment return 
(Acharya et al., 2018). 
Specifically, as proxy for bank risk taking, we opt for using the ratio of banks non-
performing loans-over-total loans (NPL ratio), which measures the outstanding banks credit 
risk, by quantifying the vulnerable portion of banks’ assets. Hence, this constitutes a 
straightforward measure of banks’ risk. NPLs affect bank lending through at least three main 
channels: (i) eroding banks’ profitability, as NPLs generate less income for banks and require 
more provisions, reducing their net income; (ii) reducing banks available capital, since banks’ 
capital adequacy regulation require banks to allocate capital buffers proportionally to the risk 
of their assets; (iii) greater funding costs, arising from the worsening of banks credit profile, as 
a result of their impaired balance sheet (Aiyar & Monaghan, 2015). European Institutions 
significantly increased their focus on reducing the level of banks’ non-performing loans of EA 
banks after the GFC (see Deslandes et al., 2018, for a review of European institutions debate 
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and initiatives on NPLs). Higher NPLs impact the private sector, particularly in countries 
relying heavily on bank financing such as within the Euro Area, making access to credit harder 
and more expensive, especially for SMEs (ibid.). Data on non-performing loans ratio is 
collected from the ‘Financial Institutions: Stability’ indicators of the World Bank Global 
Financial Development DataBank. 
To measure sovereign risk we use instead 10-year government bond yields. This is a 
widely agreed proxy for sovereign risk (Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012; Bernoth & Erdogan, 
2012; Afonso et al., 2014, 2018). Recent works, by e.g. Cai et al. (2018), have examined the 
relation between sovereign credit ratings and FDI. While using credit ratings is a reasonable 
measure, we believe that using sovereign bond yields for our purposes is a superior approach, 
as it reflects the market perspective and should react more quickly to changes in relevant 
information – see Barroso (2010) and De Vries & de Haan (2016). To maximise our sample 
coverage, we merge data from IMF International Financial Statistics (IMF IFS), OECD 
Financial Statistics, CEIC, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, and Bloomberg. 
Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of our sovereign and banking risk measures. We observe 
a decline outside the EA zone and for non-GIIPS countries, whilst for GIIPS countries, 
sovereign risk increased dramatically until mid-2012. At the peak of the sovereign debt crisis, 
sovereign yields in GIIPS countries being more than 3 times higher than non-GIIPS ones, and 
still twice higher at the end of 2016. After the extraordinary commitment from the ECB to 
stabilise the EMU, spreads began to fall. They remain, however, at elevated levels by the end 
of our sample period. Non-performing loans-over-total loans also show a similar pattern. 
Therefore, even if in 2016 non-performing loans of EA banks were still at a much higher than 
in 2009, we can observe that in 2013, just after the announcement of the Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) program and the creation of the Banking Union, they either stabilised (in 
non-GIIPS countries) or substantially reduced (in GIIPS). Moreover, the substantial variation 
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that we detect in both our measures of risk is certainly something that we can exploit in our 
analysis. 
As evident from Figure 3.2, however, neither financial stability risk nor the following 
recovery is homogeneous across the EA. In particular, sovereign yields and non-performing 
loans remain considerably higher in GIIPS countries than in non-GIIPS countries, leaving 
overall risk in the EA at high levels. In light of this, we question whether financial stability risk 
in EA might just be driven by risk in the former group, rather than in the latter, but then 
affecting the EA as a whole. To address this empirical question, in our empirical analysis, we 
test the impact of financial stability risk on inward FDI considering both the EA as a whole and 
separating it between GIIPS and non-GIIPS countries (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). 
Overall, the implication of these graphs are twofold: on the one hand, they highlights 
again the importance of the ‘regulator’ in improving sovereign and banks’ safeness – as the 
ECB Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and Quantitative Easing (QE) programs have 
reduced both EA countries average yields and banks’ exposure to NPLs; on the other hand, the 
graphs also supports the hypothesis of a strong fragmentation within the Euro Area, arising 
from significant differences in both measures of risk. 
 
 Additional risk measure 
For robustness reasons, we re-estimate our models using a different bank risk measure. We 
select a popular measure that has been frequently used to measure the outstanding risk of banks: 
banks Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets. This, we think that certainly is a focused 
measure of the stability of each country’s banking system, particularly given its contemporary 
policy attention. Our idea is that if banks are asked to hold more regulatory capital, this will 
likely have a detrimental impact on the amount lent to firms (Fraisse et al. 2017; De Goede, 
2004; Flinders and Buller, 2006; Dovis et al., 2016). 
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In more detail, Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets measures the aggregate 
amount of core capital allocated by a country’s banking sector as a buffer on their risky assets. 
This variable is commonly used in the banking literature to assess the stability of the banking 
sector (see De Bruyckere et al. (2013), Afonso et al. (2018), Delatte et al. (2017) and reflects 
policymakers attempts to address excessive bank risk taking through greater capital buffers. In 
order to maximise the country sample, we combined data from the IMF Financial Soundness 
Indicators and World Bank Global Financial Development DataBank. 
In Figure 3.3 we observe that, after the GFC, greater worldwide regulation of the 
banking sector led banks globally to increase the amount of capital allocated as a buffer for 
their risky assets. The new regulatory frameworks have considerably shrunk the credit 
availability of banks, hence resulting in lower bank risk taking. Also, in the case of our latter 
variable, the enhancement of banks solvency appears as especially pronounced post-OMT and 
Banking Union announcements, which is sign of an improvement in banks safety. However, 
overall we observe a similar picture to that presented in Figure 3.2, disclosing a significantly 
higher banking risk in GIIPS countries as opposed to non-GIIPS, represented by much riskier 
positions of banks (supported by thinner capital buffers). 
[Insert Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 about here] 
 Main Controls 
Finally, we include in our baseline model several additional control variables. In particular, we 
include standard gravity model variables, controlling both for information frictions and 
transaction costs arising from the individual FDI bilateral transactions and for cultural links, 
arising from a shared historical background of origin and host countries. The inclusion of 
gravity model variables is a standard practice in the literature on bilateral cross-border 
investment, especially when studying FDI. Portes & Rey (2005) provide evidence that gravity 
variables proxying country size and transaction costs – arising from informational frictions 
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differences in technology – might explain up to 83% of bilateral cross-country equity flows 
(Martin & Rey 2004, Portes & Rey 2005). Daude & Fratzscher (2008) confirm that FDI is 
much more dependent on informational frictions than portfolio flows. With respect to gravity 
variables, we follow Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2008) amongst others and include several control 
variables, such as: (i) a dummy variable identifying whether the analysed countries share the 
same official language; (ii) a control for the physical distance between the countries; (iii) a 
dummy variable disclosing whether the considered countries share a geographical border; (iv) 
a dummy variable identifying countries with a common religion; (v) a control variable for the 
time difference between the analysed countries; and (vi) a dummy variable determining country 
pairs with a common legal origin. 
In addition to the gravity variables, we also added supplementary control variables, 
identifying other potential drivers of FDI. Following Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2008), we 
controlled for the trade link between origin and EA countries, using the average bilateral import 
of the EA from the considered origin countries between 2009 and 2016. While, as suggested 
by Davis et al. (2000), we included correlation between host and origin countries GDP growth 
and between host countries’ stock market capitalisation and origin countries GDP growth. 
Specifically, the former variable accounts for diversification incentives (benefits) which could 
lead origin countries to FDI, while the latter to control for hedging incentives, arising from 
potential negative output shocks in the origin country. We also control for origin countries 
wealth and financial sector development, using respectively the second lag of origin countries 
GDP per capita and financial market capitalisation-over-GDP. This is motivated in the case of 
wealth by the idea that, as risk aversion is decreasing with wealth, we expect richer countries 
to be strongly driving FDI (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2008). In the case of financial market 
development instead, this is based on the assumption that financial sophistication can facilitate 
foreign investment – see Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2001). Lastly, since push factors from the 
 95 
home country may include the need to escape domestic taxes or high exchange rate 
fluctuations, we added a control for host countries fiscal policies, using host countries’ 
government tax revenues-over-GDP, and for exchange rate movements, using the standard 
deviation of bilateral currencies (for more details on the computation of our control variables, 
see Appendix A.3.0.1). 
 
3.5 Results 
In this section, we present and discuss the estimation results of equations (3.1) and (3.2). Table 
3.1 contains our main specification where we focus on the two core risk variables – Non-
Performing Loans and 10-Year Sovereign Bond Yields. Given the bilateral nature of our data, 
we estimate for each risk proxy, two equations (3.1) and (3.2), for the origin and host country 
risk, respectively. Doing this, we can assess which one is the most relevant for FDI, i.e. whether 
risk in the origin country or in the host country matter the most, or whether they matter in a 
similar fashion. In Table 3.2, we split our sample into GIIPS and non-GIIPS countries. The 
separate consideration of our full sample of countries is a standard step performed by literature 
analysing the geographical pattern of capital flows – see Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2010), Beck et 
al. (2016) – and is especially crucial for our study. This is justified by the considerable 
difference that we observe in the levels of sovereign and banking risk within the Monetary 
Union (see Figure 3.2).  
Considering Table 3.1 first of all, the included gravity variables are statistically 
significant and have the expected sign. In line with the previous literature (Beck et al., 2016; 
Daude & Fratzscher, 2008; Martin & Rey, 2004; Portes & Rey, 2005), both average import and 
standard gravity variables – proxying information and transaction costs – are important drivers 
of FDI. Sharing the same official language and high proximity, increase foreign direct 
investment. This is testified by comm_lang dummy with a coefficient of about 1.4 in both 
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columns (1) and (2) and by the two variables of log(distance) and contig25. The latter variables 
have respectively coefficients of -0.95 in column (1) (and 0.6 in column (2)) – in the case of 
log(distance) – and 2.10 in column (1) (and 1.37 in column (2)) – for contig. All the coefficients 
are supporting our “story” and are significant at 1% level. Similarly, we found that cultural and 
institutional affinity also positively affect FDI in the EA. Specifically, having a shared religion 
or colonisation history positively influence FDI as well as sharing a legal origin. Apart from 
the common religion dummy, however, the other two variables are mostly found non-
significant. Similarly, also not significant appear to be the correlation in host and origin 
countries GDP growth and government tax revenues-over-GDP, ruling out the diversification 
incentive as potential driver for FDI, and the tax evasion motif. As expected, we found 
exchange rate volatility as extremely significant, both economically and statistically, as 1 
percent increase in volatility in the origin currencies-over-euro lead to an almost equivalent 
loss in foreign direct investment in EA countries (the coefficients are -1.17 in column(1) and -
0.92 in column (2)).  
 
 Country risk impact on FDI 
Considering next the effect of greater non-performing loans in banks’ balance sheet on inward 
FDI – column (1), the origin country coefficient estimate in column (1) is statistically 
significant and has negative sign (-0.16), implying a reduction of FDI volume invested by 
MNEs. To the contrary, we observe that the coefficient estimate capturing the risk of host 
countries is not significant. These results do not confirm our hypothesis, highlighting that origin 
country risk hugely matters when dealing with FDI. As discussed in Section 3.1, increases in 
non-performing loans are likely to lead to less credit availability, particularly for firms wishing 
 
25 We tested our result also using the time difference between host and origin countries, the results are unaffected, 
and the coefficients are similar to those of the log(distance) variable. The two variables have not been included 
together because of the high correlation between them.  
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to invest overseas where imperfect knowledge considerations are greater. This matters much 
more in origin countries, where a closer institutional affinity and familiarity between banks and 
MNEs may well see more FDI financing take place than in host markets. In other words, our 
findings present an asymmetric effect across origin and host countries, resulting in FDI in the 
origin country being predominantly carried out via local banks, hence insensitive to host 
countries’ risk. 
Continuing to focus on Table 3.1 and examining 10-year Sovereign Bond Yields, we 
can observe that both coefficients in column (2) of Table 3.1 are statistically significant and 
present a negative sign. This implies that higher sovereign risk, both domestically as well as in 
the host country, results in lower FDI in the Euro Area and confirms the first hypotheses. An 
increase in either origin or host country sovereign risk, is likely to decrease the FDI of MNEs 
giving a higher motive for companies to engage in less risk-taking and accumulate more cash 
holdings. Analogously, recent work has identified higher cash holdings and less investment 
generally due to financial crises (Song & Lee, 2012). Notably when comparing the magnitude 
of the coefficient estimates in column (2), we observe that the coefficient of the origin country 
is bigger than the coefficient of the host country. In particular, our regression model predicts 
an increase of 1% in 10 years government bonds’ yields in origin countries to result in a 1.4 
percent decrease in FDI, while an equivalent increase in host countries bond yields to result in 
a much less strong impact – a 0.46 percent decrease (more than three times smaller). Hence, it 
appears that origin countries risk is considerably more relevant than that of the host country, 
also providing evidence of the key role held by banks in financing global FDI – via the so-
called lending channel – discussed by the existent literature (Bridges et al., 2014; Bacchetta et 
al., 2014; Harford, 2005; Aiyar & Monaghan, 2015; Fraisse et al., 2017).  
In Table 3.2, we have a closer look at the EA countries and split the sample into GIIPS 
(i.e., stressed) and non-GIIPS (i.e., non-stressed) Euro Area countries. Given the sharper 
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increase of sovereign risk for GIIPS countries over our sample period, the effect of such risk 
should be more pronounced in GIIPS countries than in non-GIIPS countries. Table 3.2 contains 
the relevant estimation results. Again, our main hypotheses, are confirmed. We confirm that 
banking risk and sovereign risk are both relevant. Banking risk is relevant for the origin country 
only, with respect to non-GIIPS countries (see column (1)), while sovereign risk is important 
for both origin and host country in all specifications (see column (2)). Surprisingly, the 
coefficient estimates of our chosen risk variables become larger in absolute magnitude in the 
non-GIIPS country sub-sample. This might be attributed to foreign investors’ awareness of 
GIIPS greater levels of non-performing loans, hence to a previous embodiment of this piece of 
information. Undoubtedly, FDI in GIIPS countries, whose banking sector has been severely 
disrupted by the crises, seem to be also sensitive to an increase in banking sector stability. For 
example, an increase in banks’ capital buffers of 1 percent seem to increase FDI in GIIPS of 
0.16 percent. Sovereign yield shocks, among other variables, have instead a much stronger 
impact on FDI in GIIPS. This is coherent with a much stronger impact that the sovereign debt 
crisis had on the EA periphery, and with the numerous sovereign rating downgrades that took 
place in the years of analysis.  
This finding of an asymmetric behaviour of FDI in the EA, which came out 
contraposing direct investment in stressed as opposed to non-stressed EA countries, we believe 
has very important policy implications. This, as it increases the fragmentation within the 
European Monetary Union (EMU), both in terms of growth potential and in terms of 
availability of public finances, putting additional risk on GIIPS countries, hence enhancing 
political and financial market tensions in the European Union (Beck et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
this asymmetry between investor behaviour – mostly arising from origin countries – 
significantly limit ECB capital flow management policies, requiring a narrower and more 
specific scope.  
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Several alternative specifications have been estimated, where we added various 
controls and fixed effects (e.g. we tested all variables in one regression, we excluded intra-EA 
FDI, and so on). Results are qualitatively unaffected by these alterations and are available on 
request.  
 [Insert Tables 3.1 and 3.2 around here] 
3.6 Robustness 
In the paper, we present several robustness tests of our baseline model results.  
In Table 3.3 below we include an additional proxy for banking risk discussed previously 
in Section 3.4.4. Overall, our results and conclusions remain unaffected with further support 
provided for our hypotheses. In particular, also Regulatory Capital-over-Risk-Weighted Assets 
confirms that the origin country’s, as opposed to the host country’s, banking risk situation 
matters for FDI decisions.  
In Table 3.4, we test the possibility that a hedging incentive (see in columns (1) and (2)) 
or greater investors’ risk aversion are driving FDI positions of origin countries (in columns (3) 
and (4)) in the Euro Area. Therefore, following Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2008), Davis et al. 
(2000), in columns (1) and (2) we add to the baseline models the correlation between host 
countries financial market capitalisation and origin countries GDP per capita – proxy for a 
hedging incentives. In case of a hedging channel, we expect to observe the variable to have a 
negative coefficient, meaning that when domestic conditions in origin countries’ financial 
markets are impaired MNEs have the incentive to invest abroad. This would further support 
our theory on FDI being driven considerably more by origin country conditions, rather than 
host country ones. In columns (3) and (4), we test instead the relevance of origin countries’ 
economic wealth as driver for FDI. According to Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2008), since FDI 
involves risk, and risk aversion is a decreasing function of economic wealth, greater economic 
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wealth should have a positive impact on origin countries FDI (i.e. richer countries would 
display greater levels of FDI).  
Overall, in Table 3.4, we find weak evidence of a hedging channel and strong support 
for the importance of origin countries’ wealth. Looking at columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.4, we 
find that a 1 percent increase in the synchronisation host-origin countries’ economic conditions 
implies a decrease in 0.44 percent in FDI. The result, however, is only significant at 10% level 
in column (1), it is not significant instead in the second regression. In accordance with the 
findings of Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2008), we confirm the importance of countries’ wealth, 
which we proxy using second lag of origin countries GDP per capita. Therefore, we find that 
1 percent increase in GDP per capita (t-2) results in a 0.6 increase in FDI in column (3) – and 
a 0.5 increase in column (4). Moreover, in both regressions model our core signs and economic 
significance remain unaffected.   
In Table 3.5 and 3.6, to further ensure that that our baseline regressions capture country 
specific risk – of origin and host countries – as opposed to global risk, we perform two 
additional tests. Firstly, we use two measures of global risk aversion (the VIX and the World 
Uncertainty Index26) capturing “push” (or common) risk factors, as opposed to “pull” (or 
country-specific) ones – already embedded in our baseline model. Secondly, to account for any 
cross-sectional variation arising at the host country level, we use host country and time fixed 
effects and we replace our core explanatory variables (banking and sovereign risk) with the 
corresponding differences between origin and host country risk. This is a standard practice of 
the gravity model literature (e.g. Beck et al. (2016); Carril-Caccia & Pavlova (2018)).  
 
26 In order to determine the components of banking and sovereign risk which are not determined by global “push” 
factors, we used a two-stage approach. Specifically, in the first stage we separately regressed non-performing 
loans ratio and 10-years government bond yields on the VIX. The residuals from the first stage are then used in 
the second stage regression as additional explanatory variables for respectively the component of global risk, not 
captured by either banking or sovereign risk. 
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Tables 3.5 and 3.6 again confirms the validity of our results, which remain qualitatively 
unaffected both after the inclusion of global risk variables and when we replace individual 
countries’ banking and sovereign risk with the difference between origin and host countries’ 
values of these variables27. Therefore, we still find that origin country characteristics outweigh 
those of the host when trying to explain inward FDI in the EMU. 
Lastly, when estimating FDI movements within a monetary union, it might be relevant 
to distinguish Euro Area FDI inflow from non-Euro Area FDI inflow. Hence we estimate the 
regression from Table 3.2 with inward FDI from non-Euro Area countries only (see Table 3.12 
– Appendix A.3.2). Our results suggest that even when excluding intra-EA FDI allocation, 
origin country banking and sovereign risk conditions remain the main causes of lower FDI in 
the EA. 
 [Insert Tables 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 around here] 
3.7 Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate how elevated sovereign and banking risk affect Euro Area 
countries’ ability to attract foreign investment. In analysing this type of investment, the 
international finance and international business literature have examined several determinants 
of FDI, including those arising from political, social, geographical, technological, regulatory 
and/or firm specific spheres (Alam & Zulfiqar, 2013; Borin & Mancini, 2016; Dellis et al., 
2017; Narula, 2014). However, financial sector risk has often been considered less important 
and consequently, the risks to FDI, emanating both from recent financial crises (e.g., the GFC 
and sovereign debt crisis) and any policy responses to these, have been underexplored. To 
remedy this, we inspect inward FDI stock in the Euro Area between 2009 and 2016 in relation 
 
27 In Table 3.6, instead of contraposing origin and host country risk factors, we include ‘Diff_bank_risk’ computed 
as the difference in ‘NPL ratio_orig’ and ‘NPL ratio_host’ as banking risk measure; and, ‘Diff_sov_risk’ 
computed as the difference in ‘Sovereign yields_orig’ and ‘Sovereign yields_host’ as sovereign risk measure. The 
results have been supplemented with both gravity and control variables previously explained, as well as time (t) 
and host country fixed effects (i). 
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to various measures of financial stability, including non-performing loans and sovereign yields. 
Most importantly, we newly discriminate between effects emanating from the host and origin 
country.  
 Interestingly, when we analyse the impact of non-performing loans across both origin 
and host country banks, we find that host country banking risk is never significant in any our 
regression models or robustness tests. By contrast, origin country banking risk appears as an 
important determinant of the volume of FDI received by Euro Area countries. We attribute this 
finding to a ‘leverage channel’, whereby firms borrow from banks to finance investment, 
including FDI. Drawing on the banking literature, we suggest that banks’ lending in origin 
countries will be considerably tighter when banks in their home countries display high levels 
of NPL, or, more generally speaking, in moments of greater uncertainty.  
 When we analyse sovereign risk of origin and host countries and inspect how this 
affects FDI, our findings are mixed. As a matter of fact, greater sovereign risk in either origin 
countries or hosts (EMU countries) leads to lower FDI positions in the Euro Area. However, 
in absolute magnitude, sovereign risk of the origin country matters more than that of the host 
country; an interesting finding given the typical weight placed on the importance of the host 
country characteristics in attracting FDI. We think that our findings are consistent with the 
literature on uncertainty and precautionary motives, whereby an increase in domestic country 
risk encourages its own MNEs to engage in less risk-taking. On the other hand, an increase in 
host country yield arguably implies that other destinations appear more attractive. 
When the Euro Area sample is separated into two subsamples representing non-stressed 
and stressed (i.e., Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) countries, our findings remain 
qualitatively unaffected in our baseline regressions, as well as in all our robustness tests. 
Additionally, the reduction in FDI from origin countries with respect to sovereign risks, is 
clearly greater in the stressed case. The opposite is found with respect to banking risk, as an 
 103 
increase in such risks has a greater impact on non-GIIPS ability to attract FDI. However, origin 
country risk always appears to matter more than that of the host.  
Overall, our theoretical arguments and empirical results show that financial stability, 
both in origin and host countries, matters for FDI. This study provides further illustration of 
the dynamics of such processes, focusing on the effects of variations in bank-related risk, a key 
systemic feature where the range of regulatory choices is somewhat circumscribed. We would 
encourage policymakers in countries that seek to attract FDI not only to be mindful of the 
domestic conditions that lead to lower sovereign risk, but also to be cognisant of the changing 
financing environment that MNEs may face in their home countries, and, indeed, in deciding 
which countries to target in seeking FDI. Additionally, we suggest the importance of addressing 
the asymmetric behaviour of FDI within the core and periphery of the Euro Area. Improving 
Euro Area convergence with respect to inward foreign investment, we believe could 
substantially reduce its fragmentation as well as curtail political and financial market tensions 
in the European Union.
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Tables 
Table 3.1 The impact of banking and sovereign risk on inward-FDI 
Estimation results on the impact of banking and sovereign risk on inward FDI in the EMU by OLS.  
Country Risk 
 Banking Risk   Sovereign Risk  
 (1)  (2) 
 log (FDI)  log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.163*** (0.034)   
log (NPL ratio_host) 0.055 (0.042)   
log (Sovereign yields_orig)   -1.402*** (0.137) 
log (Sovereign yields_host)   -0.456*** (0.134) 
avg (log(import)) 0.381*** (0.063)  0.470*** (0.085) 
comm_lang 1.331** (0.452)  1.420** (0.489) 
log(distance) -0.954*** (0.090)  -0.591*** (0.103) 
contig 2.099*** (0.425)  1.366*** (0.413) 
comrelig 1.014*** (0.271)  0.723* (0.380) 
colony 0.491 (0.635)  0.956 (0.695) 
com_leg_orig -0.188 (0.188)  0.690* (0.348) 
corr (GDP) 0.155 (0.203)  0.019 (0.254) 
log (vol FX) -1.173*** (0.070)  -0.920*** (0.077) 
log(taxes) 0.137 (0.341)  0.205 (0.447) 
Constant 12.381*** (1.457)  11.180*** (1.759) 
N 9,636  6,098 
Time FE Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.385  0.478 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the 
parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects 
are included but unreported. See the ‘Data’ section for variable description.
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Table 3.2 The impact of banking and sovereign risk on inward-FDI (non-GIIPS vs GIIPS countries) 















 non-GIIPS  GIIPS 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 log (FDI)  log (FDI)  log (FDI)  log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.175*** (0.047)    -0.160** (0.047)   
log (NPL ratio_host) 0.058 (0.057)    0.201 (0.601)   
log (Sovereign 
yields_orig) 
  -1.379*** (0.190)    -1.433*** (0.203) 
log (Sovereign 
yields_host) 
  -0.413** (0.169)    -0.957** (0.257) 
avg (log(import)) 0.395*** (0.076)  0.494*** (0.115)  0.388** (0.134)  0.414** (0.115) 
comm_lang 0.927 (0.697)  0.831 (0.748)  1.542** (0.463)  1.239 (0.971) 
log(distance) -0.923*** (0.109)  -0.513*** (0.112)  -1.120*** (0.223)  -0.876*** (0.188) 
contig 2.696*** (0.392)  2.094*** (0.440)  0.787 (1.091)  0.187 (0.951) 
comrelig 0.581 (0.490)  -0.091 (0.557)  1.372*** (0.294)  1.060** (0.359) 
colony 0.290 (0.893)  0.461 (0.978)  0.596 (0.450)  1.819* (0.712) 
com_leg_orig -0.308 (0.313)  0.446 (0.494)  -0.039 (0.132)  1.132*** (0.159) 
corr (GDP) 0.135 (0.202)  0.263 (0.253)  0.177 (0.342)  -0.265 (0.233) 
log (vol FX) -1.130*** (0.102)  -0.898*** (0.122)  -1.294*** (0.080)  -1.016*** (0.058) 
log(taxes) 0.384 (0.466)  0.364 (0.623)  -0.490 (0.878)  0.585 (0.281) 
Constant 11.459*** (1.716)  10.023*** (2.280)  15.322*** (3.680)  13.255*** (1.709) 
N 6,944  3,993  3,220  2,105 
Time FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.398  0.476  0.372  0.510 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered 




Table 3.3 The impact of banking risk on inward-FDI (additional risk measure) 
Robustness check on the impact of banking risk (proxied by RC/RWA) on inward FDI in Euro Area 
by OLS.  
Additional banking Risk measure 
 log (FDI) 
log (RC/RWA_orig) -1.827*** (0.283) 
log (RC/RWA_host) 0.649 (0.387) 
avg (log(import)) 0.403*** (0.062) 
comm_lang 1.336*** (0.450) 
log(distance) -0.975*** (0.086) 
contig 1.987*** (0.404) 
comrelig 0.942*** (0.293) 
colony 0.495 (0.616) 
com_leg_orig -0.209 (0.190) 
corr (GDP) 0.039 (0.191) 
log (vol FX) -1.150*** (0.068) 
log(taxes) 0.175 (0.404) 
Constant 15.001*** (1.833) 
N 9,636 
Time FE Yes 
R-squared 0.395 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the 
parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects 
are included but unreported. See the ‘Data’ section for variable description. 
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Table 3.4 The impact of sovereign and banking risk on inward-FDI (hedging incentives vs risk aversions aversion transmission channel) 














 Test for Hedging incentives  Test for Origin country Risk Aversion 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 log (FDI)  log (FDI)  log (FDI)  log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.172*** (0.037)    -0.121*** (0.029)   
log (NPL ratio_host) 0.137 (0.083)    0.044 (0.045)   
log (Sovereign yields_orig)   -1.430*** (0.152)    -1.099*** (0.124) 
log (Sovereign yields_host)   -0.533*** (0.162)    -0.477*** (0.133) 
avg(log(import)) 0.458*** (0.067)  0.501*** (0.098)  0.385*** (0.063)  0.480*** (0.085) 
comm_lang 1.350** (0.492)  1.347** (0.548)  1.340*** (0.447)  1.411*** (0.459) 
log (distance) -0.928*** (0.097)  -0.588*** (0.121)  -0.845*** (0.085)  -0.536*** (0.104) 
contig 2.053*** (0.469)  1.148** (0.450)  1.989*** (0.383)  1.359*** (0.392) 
comrelig 0.932*** (0.273)  0.731* (0.384)  1.040*** (0.266)  0.672* (0.381) 
colony 0.191 (0.668)  0.750 (0.749)  0.547 (0.569)  0.965 (0.641) 
com_leg_orig -0.133 (0.192)  0.827** (0.356)  -0.099 (0.170)  0.727** (0.327) 
corr (GDP) 0.079 (0.241)  -0.077 (0.277)  0.087 (0.185)  -0.043 (0.240) 
log (vol FX) -1.219*** (0.070)  -0.952*** (0.085)  -0.799*** (0.044)  -0.768*** (0.072) 
log(taxes) 0.146 (0.338)  0.224 (0.450)  0.100 (0.341)  0.208 (0.453) 
corr (GDP, MKTCAP) -0.444* (0.218)  -0.332 (0.204)     
L2 (GDP per capita orig)     0.634*** (0.070)  0.504*** (0.054) 
Constant 11.627*** (1.795)  11.162*** (1.976)  4.315** (1.733)  4.959** (2.015) 
N 8,026  5,308  9,617  6,080 
Time FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.375  0.477  0.426  0.497 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered 
within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects are included but unreported. In columns (1) and (2) we proxy hedging incentives using the correlation between 
host country stock market capitalisation and origin country GDP growth. In columns (3) and (4), defined origin country wealth using the second lag of GDP 
per capita of origin countries and assuming that wealth is positively associated to risk-taking. 
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Table 3.5 The impact of sovereign and banking risk on inward-FDI (‘push’ vs ‘pull’ risk factors) 
Results on the impact of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ risk factors on inward FDI in the EMU by two-stage OLS regression.  
Country Risk 
 Banking Risk  Sovereign Risk Banking Risk Sovereign Risk  
 VIX WUI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 log (FDI) log (FDI) log (FDI) log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.162*** (0.043)   -0.116*** (0.036)  
log (NPL ratio_host) 0.057 (0.044)  0.056 (0.039)  
log (Sovereign yields_orig)  -1.334*** (0.107)  -0.701*** (0.102) 
log (Sovereign yields_host)  -0.300*** (0.112)  -0.148* (0.086) 
res_VIX 0.065 (0.149) 3.035*** (0.435)   
res_WUI   0.144 (0.112) -1.395*** (0.332) 
avg (log(import)) 0.381*** (0.040) 0.470*** (0.047) 0.428*** (0.020) 0.484*** (0.032) 
comm_lang 1.331*** (0.411) 1.420*** (0.435) 1.453*** (0.369) 1.796*** (0.378) 
log (distance) -0.954*** (0.099) -0.591*** (0.114) -0.445*** (0.091) -0.305*** (0.109) 
contig 2.099*** (0.411) 1.366*** (0.415) 1.504*** (0.374) 0.732* (0.385) 
comrelig 1.014*** (0.293) 0.723** (0.361) 0.881*** (0.256) 0.598* (0.333) 
colony 0.491 (0.524) 0.956* (0.576) -0.118 (0.474) 0.186 (0.521) 
com_leg_orig -0.188 (0.180) 0.690*** (0.231) -0.404** (0.159) 0.289 (0.224) 
corr (GDP) 0.155 (0.139) 0.019 (0.178) 0.254** (0.125) 0.143 (0.167) 
log (vol FX) -1.173*** (0.078) -0.920*** (0.097) -0.804*** (0.067) -0.691*** (0.091) 
log (taxes) 0.137 (0.370) 0.205 (0.425) 0.275 (0.318) 0.197 (0.393) 
Constant 12.326*** (1.514) 8.833*** (1.640) 6.240*** (1.353) 5.503*** (1.589) 
N 9,636 6,098 9,406 5,911 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.440      0.494 0.496 0.535 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered 
within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects are included but unreported. In columns (1) and (2) we report the results of a two-stage OLS regression having 
the VIX as of ‘push’ risk factor. In columns (3) and (4) we report the results of a two-stage OLS regression using the World Uncertainty Index (WUI) as of 
‘push’ risk factor. In Table 5, we disclose only the results of the second stage regression.  
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Table 3.6 The impact of sovereign and banking risk growth rate on inward-FDI 
Estimation results on the impact of banking and sovereign risk on inward FDI in the EMU by OLS.  
 Banking Risk  Sovereign Risk Both 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 log (FDI) log (FDI) log (FDI) 
log (∆bank_risk) -0.148*** (0.036)  -0.088** (0.044) 
log (∆sov_risk)  -1.145*** (0.097) -1.116*** (0.097) 
avg (log(import)) 0.697*** (0.236) -0.203 (0.309) -0.266 (0.308) 
comm_lang 1.255*** (0.428) 1.238*** (0.461) 1.209*** (0.463) 
log (distance) -0.947*** (0.098) -0.579*** (0.113) -0.622*** (0.114) 
contig 2.182*** (0.408) 1.558*** (0.418) 1.534*** (0.418) 
comrelig 0.980*** (0.307) 0.597* (0.357) 0.600* (0.358) 
colony 0.584 (0.520) 1.042* (0.591) 1.030* (0.597) 
com_leg_orig -0.205 (0.190) 0.629*** (0.231) 0.655*** (0.232) 
corr (GDP) 0.081 (0.157) 0.062 (0.182) 0.056 (0.182) 
log (vol FX) -1.180*** (0.078) -1.025*** (0.094) -1.024*** (0.094) 
log (taxes) 1.028** (0.497) -0.773 (0.757) -0.925 (0.754) 
Constant 7.772*** (2.475) 14.964*** (3.530) 16.124*** (3.524) 
N 9,636 6,098 6,098 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Host FE  Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.399 0.484 0.486 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the 
parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects 





Figure 3.1 FDI inflows in the EA (in all countries, in non-GIIPS and GIIPS countries) 
 
Notes. In this Figure, we display FDI inflows in the Euro Area (dotted line), as well as in GIIPS (solid 
line) and Non-GIIPS (dashed line) countries. FDI inflow data ranges from 2002 to 2016 and its reported 
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Figure 3.2 Sovereign and Banking Risk measures (in all countries, in non-GIIPS and GIIPS countries) 
  
 
Notes. On the left-hand side, we present the average 10-year Sovereign Bond Yields. In our paper, we use this indicator to measure EA sovereign risk. On the 
right-hand side, we show instead Non-Performing Loans/Total Gross Loans. In our paper, we use this indicator to measure the risk of the EA banking sector. 
Both measures have been averaged across three main groups of countries: major non-EA countries {USA, UK, CAN, JPN} (MJ-NEA), Euro Area Periphery 
(GIIPS) and non-Periphery EA countries (non-GIIPS-EA). For a detailed list of the countries included in each of the aforementioned categories, see Table 7. 
Source. IMF International Financial Statistics (IMF IFS), OECD Financial Statistics, CEIC, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Bloomberg, World Bank Global 
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Figure 3.3 Banks’ Regulatory Capital-to-Risk-weighted Assets (in all countries, in non-GIIPS and GIIPS 
countries) 
  
Notes. Averages of Regulatory Capital/Risk-Weighted Assets of major non-EA countries {USA, UK, 
CAN, JPN} (MJ-NEA), Euro Area Periphery (GIIPS) and non-Periphery EA countries (non-GIIPS-
EA). In our paper, we use this indicator to measure the risk of the EA banking sector. For a detailed list 











































4 Deal or No Deal? Modelling the Impact of Brexit Uncertainty on UK 




“…for management researchers, Brexit provides a natural experiment to explore the effects on 
PE of a major exogenous shock” (Wright et al., 2016: p. 682) 
 
The Brexit vote to leave the EU, recorded at the UK referendum of 23 June 2016, was a 
momentous event. Largely unexpected by most academics, practitioners and policymakers, the 
result led to a considerable rise in uncertainty for UK business in general.29 Such Brexit-related 
uncertainty is different to prior uncertainty shocks due partially to its length, magnitude and 
political complexity (Bloom et al., 2018; 2019) and the ongoing and widespread impact is still 
being debated and evaluated. So far, the focus has been typically on the detrimental economic 
effects of Brexit (e.g., Van Reenen, 2016; Born et al., 2019; Bloom et al., 2019; Steinberg, 
2019; McGrattan and Waddle, 2020; Hassan et al., 2020; Hill et al., 2019) and the related 
impact on banks and financial markets (e.g., Schiereck et al., 2016; Davies and Studnicka, 
2018; Berg et al., 2019; Hudson et al., 2020).  
Recent work from Wright et al. (2016) explores the impact of uncertainty from the 
Brexit referendum on the UK private equity (PE) market, noting that the UK PE market is the 
largest in Europe. In particular, they highlight that whilst in the years that followed the global 
 
28 The work of this Chapter is based on the article "Deal or No Deal? Modelling the Impact of Brexit Uncertainty 
on UK Private Equity Activity" published in the British Journal of Management by myself, Neil Kellard, 
Alexandros Kontonikas and Michael Lamla (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12479). 
29 The referendum outcome was a largely unexpected event as the leaders of the three largest parties in the UK 
and the majority of MPs were pro-remain. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
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financial crisis (GFC) of 2007/8, the PE market recovered to pre-crisis activity levels, deal 
values fell precipitously in 2016 reflecting higher uncertainty. Moreover, the paper posits early 
in the Brexit debate that the referendum result produced an extraordinary shock, damaging 
market confidence and likely impairing PE funds' returns as well as their ability to fundraise 
and relatedly, their reliance on debt availability. On the other hand, the future activities of UK 
PE firms may be subject to less regulation, possibly generating a deregulation premium, and 
the EU will no longer necessarily be able to inhibit UK state aid. Hence, Wright et al. (2016) 
conclude by stressing that Brexit generates both threats and opportunities for PE activity in the 
UK and creates “an exciting new research agenda” (p. 685) for researchers in entrepreneurial 
finance.30  
Building on the work of Wright, co-authors, and other existing literature on PE (e.g., 
Leslie and Oyer, 2009; Lerner et al., 2011; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; Hotchkiss et al., 2011; 
Cumming et al., 2020; for an excellent review see Gilligan and Wright, 2020), our paper 
investigates two associated research questions: firstly, what is the effect of uncertainty and, in 
particular, Brexit-related uncertainty, on PE activity in the UK? And secondly, what are the 
channels that operationalise the transmission of uncertainty to the PE market? In terms of 
measuring activity, we follow others (e.g., Wright et al., 2016)31 in defining PE as the ‘risk 
capital employed to finance the acquisition of mature businesses via a leveraged buyout 
(LBO).’ Less straightforward is the identification an appropriate analytical framework given 
that the conceptualisation and measurement of uncertainty is a non-trivial task. To circumvent 
this, we employ a set of uncertainty measures including the Bloom et al. (2019) Brexit 
Uncertainty Index (BUI) and the Baker et al. (2016) Economic Policy Uncertainty Index 
(EPU). 
 
30 Policymakers, analysts, and PE practitioners have expressed concerns about the implications of Brexit. See, for 
example, Bank of England (2019), Deloitte (2016), British Private Equality and Venture Capital Association 
(2019). 
31 The same paper notes that LBOs represent about three-quarters of total UK merger and acquisition activity. 
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Our analysis is performed on a novel dataset that we construct by conflating several 
data sources. We collect data on buyout investors and targets from S&P Market Intelligence 
and Capital IQ, identifying UK targets acquired by PE buyout firms over the 2010-2019 period 
and following standard deal classification criteria from the existing literature (see Axelson et 
al., 2013; Faccio and Hsu, 2017). Subsequently, we employ Capital IQ, Compustat Global and 
Orbis databases to obtain data for the necessary accounting and financial fundamentals of our 
sample targets. After matching targets to available accounting data, we obtain a sample of 765 
UK targets. Moreover, to provide a suitable control group to these targets, we consider all UK 
firms with analogous size characteristics, generating a final dataset of 290,022 firms.   
To derive appropriate hypotheses, we follow Bonaime et al. (2018) and Adra et al. 
(2020) in drawing on related literature including: work positing that uncertainty will increase 
the real option to delay investment (cf. Quigg, 1993; Gulen & Ion, 2015); notions of an interim 
risk channel of uncertainty (see Bhagwat et al., 2016), where periods of high uncertainty widen 
the interim period occurring between announcement and completion of an acquisition (or 
buyout deal); and principal-agent theory, whereby greater uncertainty can lead to increased 
moral hazard if limited partners (principals) ability to control general partners (agents) is 
impaired. In doing so, our investigation sheds light on the impact of uncertainty for PE and 
entrepreneurial finance (e.g., Wright et al., 2016; Cumming and Zahra, 2016; Brown et al., 
2019), the general economic and financial effects of uncertainty (e.g., Baker et al., 2016; Gulen 
and Ion, 2016; Drobetz et al., 2018; Bonaime et al., 2018), and related issues of effective policy 
for supporting investment during periods of higher uncertainty due to exogenous shocks.  
We find that Brexit uncertainty negatively affects UK PE activity, primarily arises from 
policy, FX and CFOs (firm-level) uncertainty and transmits through real-options and interim 
risk channels. These results imply industries most deeply affected are those relying on fixed 
assets, durable goods, or heavily exposed to the EU because of their export/import activities. 
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We also find that the impact and transmission of uncertainty varies according to the different 
nature of uncertainty itself. Different types of uncertainty have different degrees of persistence 
or lead to longer deal interim periods, therefore “scaring off” potential PE investors. These 
considerations lead us to urge policy makers to address uncertainty arising from Brexit whilst 
encouraging a more holistic view of uncertainty ‘types’ and channels.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 considers the extant literature 
and theoretical underpinnings of our work, whilst Section 4.3 provides an overview of the data. 
Section 4.4 presents the empirical methodology and results on the effects of uncertainty on PE 
buyout activity, whilst Section 4.5 explores the channels of transmission. Section 4.6 
concludes.  
 
4.2 Literature and theoretical underpinnings 
 Uncertainty 
As noted in the introduction, the conceptualisation and measurement of uncertainty, and in 
particular policy-related economic uncertainty, is not straightforward. Baker et al. (2016: 
p.1598) comment, ‘We aim to capture uncertainty about who will make economic policy 
decisions, what economic policy actions will be undertaken and when, and the economic effects 
of policy actions (or inaction) – including uncertainties related to the economic ramifications 
of “noneconomic” policy matters, for example, military actions.” Most likely, types of 
uncertainty (e.g., Policy, Brexit, pandemic, monetary and fiscal) will affect individual sectors 
of the economy differently and display varying degrees of persistence. For this reason, when 
analysing such uncertainty, it is crucially important to model the economic effect of various 
uncertainty measures and their related transmission mechanisms.  
In this paper, we address this issue by collecting a set of measures, reflecting differing 
(but potentially overlapping) aspects of uncertainty. Firstly, the Baker et al. (2016) Economic 
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Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index, quantifies UK policy-related economic uncertainty by 
examining the frequency of the words ‘uncertain’ or ‘uncertainty’, ‘economic’ or ‘economy’, 
as well as other policy-relevant terms, such as ‘policy’, ‘tax’, ‘spending’, ‘regulation’, ‘Bank 
of England’, ‘budget’, and ‘deficit’ in the eleven most popular UK newspapers. Secondly, we 
include an index created by Bank of England on UK macroeconomic uncertainty which reflects 
the economic uncertainty of British households and companies. More specifically, this 
combines macroeconomic measures of economic and financial market uncertainty, with survey 
data collected by the Bank of England on households and firms’ short and medium-term 
expectations.  
Our third and fourth measures capture financial market uncertainty: specifically, 
Sterling option-implied volatility (i.e. exchange rate uncertainty) and the FTSE All-Share 
option-implied volatility (i.e. stock market uncertainty). Both measures are likely to, at least 
partially, reflect Brexit-related expectations of investors. Our fifth and final measure attempts 
to explicitly identify uncertainty arising from the Brexit Referendum. In contrast to indices 
described beforehand, the Bloom et al. (2019) Brexit Uncertainty Index (BUI) is built using 
surveys to the CFOs of approximately 3,000 UK businesses, therefore capturing company level 
uncertainty.  
 
 Uncertainty and the level, value and likelihood of LBOs 
Wright et al. (2016) remark that in the first half of 2016, UK PE deal values decreased 
significantly and suggest this reflected higher macroeconomic uncertainties, in part due to the 
uncertainties surrounding Brexit. They argue that in this environment, PE firms find it difficult 
to both raise investment and obtain debt (e.g., via banks or debt funds). This funding squeeze, 
when combined with potentially less buyout opportunities, can lead a reduction in the overall 
number as well as the value of deals. In any case, Ljungqvist et al. (2020) and Malenko and 
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Malenko (2015) find that buyouts significantly accelerate when credit market conditions ease. 
Extending this work, Axelson et al. (2013) examine capital structure theories using cross-
sectional factors and showing that credit conditions are the main driver of PE acquisitions.  
In a more general context of US merger and acquisitions (M&As), Bonaime et al. 
(2018) show empirically that policy-related economic uncertainty is negatively associated with 
M&A activity. Several theoretical rationales for the linkage are investigated including the real 
options channel (see Bloom, 2009), the interim risk channel (Bhagwat et al., 2016) and moral 
hazard framing (Duchin and Schmidt, 2013). We shall explore these potential transmission 
channels for uncertainty in more detail below but when combined with earlier arguments that 
relate uncertainty to worsening credit conditions, lead to our first hypothesis:    
 
H1: Greater uncertainty significantly reduces the level, value and likelihood of PE 
buyouts. 
 
Of course, it could be that greater uncertainty causes PE firms to simply delay investment, 
rather than engage in an actual reduction. However, there is some prima facie evidence that the 
effects of policy-related economic uncertainty (including Brexit) can be long-lasting. For 
example, Bloom et al. (2019: p.2) suggests, ‘Brexit is unusual in that it generated persistent 
uncertainty – three years after the original vote, the UK had not left the EU, there was still no 
clarity on the eventual outcome […].’ Such persistence in uncertainty, can lead to persistent 
effects on variables of interest and this leads to our second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Greater policy uncertainty, including Brexit, presents persistent and negative 




 The real-options PE transmission channel  
In the next three subsections, we examine the transmission channels of uncertainty to the UK 
PE market. To begin, we note that when uncertainty is higher, the value of the real option to 
delay investment increases (cf. Quigg, 1993; Gulen & Ion, 2015). In a buyout context, this 
implies that when uncertainty is elevated, PE firms could have a greater incentive to postpone 
buyouts. As a result of this argument, PE firms performing buyouts during periods of elevated 
uncertainty are either those for which delaying investment is more costly or those that cannot 
delay the investment. This has important implications in terms of the bargaining power between 
buyer (PE firm) and seller (portfolio firm management/shareholders) since it potentially 
increases the bargaining power of the seller. Within this theoretical framework, the value of 
the option depends on three main factors. Firstly, the degree of investment irreversibility – 
clearly, the less reversible the investment, the higher the value of an option to delay. Secondly, 
the cost of postponing the buyout. For example, and as is suggested by Grenadier (2002), 
delaying investment is considerably more expensive when the target firms operate in a highly 
competitive industry, where a delay could lead to competitors’ appropriation of part of the 
benefits (profitability) yielded by the investment project. Finally, the extent to which 
uncertainty affects the investment target (i.e., the PE portfolio target). Bloom et al. (2019: p.2) 
emphasises, ‘The vote for Brexit was a largely unexpected event and we observe that it has had 
a heterogeneous impact on firms according to their pre-referendum exposure to Europe.’ In 
this spirit, we argue that the incentive to delay investment when uncertainty arises is likely 
greater for industries that are more exposed to Brexit (e.g., those relying more on the external 
trade sector). Taken together, these arguments lead to our third hypothesis:  
 




 Interim risk channel of uncertainty 
Next, we explore the interim risk channel of uncertainty, proposed by Bhagwat et al. (2016). 
They posit that in periods of higher uncertainty, interim periods between the announcement 
and completion of an acquisition tend to be wider. Longer interim periods significantly 
discourage M&As – and of course LBOs and management buyout (MBOs) – since equity 
prices are highly volatile in the interim period. Indeed, target price volatility strongly enhances 
the risk for the acquirer in a public-to-private transactions (i.e. leading to less convenient 
buyout terms) and moreover, can increase the cost of bank financing and the risk of breaking 
debt covenants.  
Considering the persistence of policy-related economic uncertainty and the related 
Brexit referendum, we suggest that PE investors could have decided to delay (or dismiss) 
buyout investment in the UK because of the greater interim risk imposed by the inherent 
complexities in the relationship between EU and UK (e.g., market access, labour market rules, 
regulatory changes, and so on), leading to our fourth hypothesis:  
 
H4: Greater uncertainty is transmitted to the PE buyout market via the interim risk 
channel.  
 
At this point, it can be noted that several transmission channels can co-exist; therefore, any 
evidence of an interim risk channel would not contradict evidence for the real-option channel. 
 
 Moral hazard channel 
Lastly, we consider the existence of a moral hazard channel of uncertainty, as suggested by 
Duchin and Schmidt (2013). According to this theoretical framing, greater uncertainty can lead 
to greater moral hazard incentives if limited partners (principals) ability to control general 
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partners (agents) is impaired, creating “empire building incentives.” Lower control can 
motivate general partners to invest in deals of lower quality and try to “rip off” target companies 
profit and cash holdings. The question of whether PE buyouts are optimal for portfolio target 
firms has been subject of extensive academic and policy makers debate,32 with considerable 
evidence of greater “value-destroying” deals when moral hazard incentives are at play. Of 
course, it is perhaps likely that the moral hazard channel is not the primary transmission channel 
of (Brexit) uncertainty; however, some effects from this channel may still a play a role in 
buyout decisions. This leads to the fifth hypothesis:  
 
H5: Greater uncertainty is transmitted to the PE buyout market via the moral hazard channel.  
 
4.3 Data 
 Data on Buyouts 
To identify UK PE targets from 2010 to 2019, we first use data from S&P Market Intelligence 
and Capital IQ and the methodology outlined in Axelson et al. (2013) and Faccio and Hsu 
(2017). This approach recognises PE buyouts based on the deal structure adopted in the 
acquisition of the portfolio firm, the target’s country of incorporation, and the investment stages 
adopted by the PE investor33 (see Appendix A.4.1 for more detail on dataset construction).  
Second, we use Capital IQ, Compustat Global and Orbis to obtain several accounting 
measures that are potential drivers of PE buyouts in the UK. These include total assets, return 
on assets (ROA), leverage and cash-to-assets (see Appendix A.4.2). This information is 
 
32 Poul Rasmussen (former Danish Prime Minister and author of European Commission’s Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers Directive) stated that “‘leveraged buy-outs’ leave the company saddled with debt and interest 
payments, its workers are laid off, and its assets are sold, ... benefiting neither workers nor the real economy” 
(Rasmussen, 2008, p. 130-132). 
33 There is no country restriction for PE firms. 
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available for 765 target firms – constituting our sample of UK target portfolio firms – and 
allowing for a rich set of firm specific control variables. 
This study covers three main categories of buyouts: LBOs, going private transactions 
and MBOs. These constitute 25% of all PE activity in the UK, a significant portion, over the 
period of analysis (2010-2019)34 and consisting of a total buyout volume of US $180 trillion. 
[Insert Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1] 
Among buyouts, LBOs constitute the large majority of PE transactions in the UK and reach a 
maximum of 92 percent in 2013 (see Table 4.1, Panel A). As evident from Figure 4.1a and 
4.1b, after the Brexit referendum in 2016, we observe a slowdown in UK buyout activity with 
a substantial decrease in investment amounts; this coincides with a reduction in the absolute 
numbers of these types of deals (see Table 4.1, Panel B). Going private transactions reach their 
peak in 2019, when the percentage of funds invested almost equals that of LBOs (see Table 
4.1, Panel A). Finally, in Figure 4.1a and 4.1b, we also juxtapose buyouts in the UK and the 
rest of the world (RoW). Noticeable differences between the two series appear to correspond 
with phases of elevated uncertainty, over both the whole sample period and those periods 
associated with Brexit.  
To form an appropriate control group for UK PE targets, we obtained the universe of 
all UK (listed and unlisted) firms from Orbis and information on their financial statements, 
industry sector, age and so on. In a further refinement, we only consider UK firms with similar 
size characteristics to our PE targets (see Appendix A.4.3). We merged this refined dataset with 
our data on UK PE targets, generating a final annual frequency sample of 290,022 firms from 
2010 to 2019 
 
 
34 Other deal structures include: acquisition financings, add-on, asset acquisitions, other corporate acquisitions/ 
divestitures, follow-on offerings, growth capital transactions, IPOs, mergers, Private Investment in Public Equity 
(PIPE), private placement transactions, recapitalizations and other unclassified activities. 
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 Measures of uncertainty 
As discussed earlier in Section 4.2.1, different types of uncertainty will have differing effects 
on separate sectors of the economy and are likely to display varying degrees of persistence. 
Therefore, we collect a set of uncertainty measures, which we explore in more detail below.  
 
4.3.2.1 Policy-related economic uncertainty 
Our first measure is the economic policy uncertainty index (EPU) of Baker et al. (2016). The 
index measures domestic uncertainty derived from British newspapers by examining the 
frequency of words identifying several dimensions of uncertainty related to government. To 
extract the monthly value of policy uncertainty, the index is then normalized to obtain a 
standard deviation of 1 and a mean 100 before 2011. 
The index cleverly captures a dimension of uncertainty (sentiment) concerning 
government policies that were previously difficult to quantify. As reported in Baker et al. 
(2016), at a macro level, EPU displays a high correlation with popular uncertainty measures 
(e.g., implied stock market volatility) and a lack of bias towards newspapers' political 
orientation. Moreover, EPU seems to have some success in predicting variations in 
employment and investment. As a result, this measure of uncertainty is widely used in the 
extant economic and finance literature.  
[Insert Figure 4.2] 
As shown in Figure 4.2, EPU increased at the start of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and 
most strikingly, we can observe a sharp increase during 2016, at the time of the Brexit 




4.3.2.2 Index of macroeconomic uncertainty 
Our second measure of uncertainty is an index of macroeconomic uncertainty produced by 
Bank of England (cf. Haddow et al., 2013). The index considers a wide range of dimensions of 
uncertainty, which are aggregated by the Bank using principal component analysis and 
subsequently, retrieving the first principal component. In more detail, the index includes the 
three-month option-implied volatility of the FTSE All-Share index, and the three-month 
option-implied volatility of sterling-euro and sterling-dollar export-weighted exchange rates, 
as generic proxies of overall corporate sector uncertainty. It also incorporates the dispersion of 
annual company earnings GDP growth forecasts, which provide a supply-side measure of 
private sector uncertainty. Lastly, as proxy of demand-side uncertainty, the measure uses 
several surveys assessing businesses’ expectations and sentiment, such as the: (i) GfK 
unemployment expectations balance; (ii) CBI ‘demand uncertainty limiting investment’ score; 
and (iii) number of press articles citing ‘economic uncertainty.’ The former two surveys are 
used by the Bank to assess the impact of greater unemployment and households’ precautionary 
savings on domestic demand; the latter is meant as a barometer of the ‘public mood.’ 
 
4.3.2.3 FTSE All-Share index and Sterling option-implied volatility 
We separately include the FTSE All-Share index and Sterling option-implied volatility 
(described above) in our regression models as indicators of financial (stock and FX) market 
uncertainty. Equity option-implied volatility is one of the most popular measures of financial 
market uncertainty. The underlying idea is that the higher the uncertainty about the future 
performance of the UK stock market, the higher the price that investors – including PE 
investors highly exposed to their target performance – would be prepared to pay for options 
hedging their risk. This measure, therefore, provides a forward-looking measure of investors’ 
expectations after an uncertainty shock. 
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In the wake of the Brexit referendum, UK investors and businesses observed drastic 
variations in the value of Sterling. In October 2016, during the so-called ‘Sterling flash crash’, 
the dollar rate fell below $1.20 (as low as 1.15$), reaching the lowest value since 1985 and 
experienced an unprecedented level of volatility. Sharp variations in the exchange rate 
significantly affect UK businesses, by impacting their export prices – reducing their export-
related revenues – and increasing the cost of imported production input. For PE firms, a 
significant decrease in operating financial performance reduces the incentive to invest in UK 
businesses. In Figure 4.3, we show the time-series pattern of uncertainty across all the 
previously described measures. 
[Insert Figure 4.3] 
4.3.2.4 Brexit Uncertainty Index (BUI) 
In an attempt to isolate the effect of Brexit-specific uncertainty on UK firms, we employ the 
Bloom et al. (2019) Brexit Uncertainty Index (BUI). This index is built using survey data from 
the Decision Maker Panel (DMP), a monthly survey performed on a wide sample of UK firms 
across several industries. Through the survey, the authors estimate the extent to which Brexit 
has been affecting British firms, which industries have been more impacted and how?35 The 
BUI crucially extends the scope of the DMP by estimating the portion of firms heavily affected 
by Brexit uncertainty – measured as the percentage of CFOs reporting Brexit in the top three 
sources of uncertainty in the DMP survey. BUI, therefore, provides a relatively clear-cut 
identification of the transmission of Brexit uncertainty to the UK corporate sector.  
In the earlier Figure 4.2, we present a graphical representation of the BUI, alongside 
the EPU index. Compared to EPU and other indexes of uncertainty, uncertainty captured by 
BUI remains elevated and even increases following the referendum. Notably, the highest values 
 
35 This is accomplished by asking detailed questions to CFOs on their exposure to Brexit – e.g. by asking about 
their share of sales to the EU, their share of EU exports or the share of EU migrants in their workforce – and their 
expected percentage change in performance in comparison to the previous fiscal year (Bloom et al. 2019, 2020). 
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of Brexit uncertainty appear in 2018-2019, i.e., close to the original deadline for Brexit 
negotiations, where more than 50 percent of all CFOs surveyed in the DMP report Brexit as 
one of the top three sources of uncertainty for their firm. 
 
 Other macroeconomic and industry specific control variables 
In line with Valkama, Maula, Nikoskelainen and Wright (2013), we also include several 
macroeconomic and industry control variables. According to the authors, these are in fact 
important drivers of buyout returns in the UK – in particular target industry growth 
fundamentals, which explains most of the heterogeneity in PE investors’ performance36. Our 
first macroeconomic control is a proxy for the UK economic activity (henceforth ‘Investment 
Opportunity Index’). This is computed using several proxies of the future performance of the 
economy, such as the: (i) Agents’ survey of investment intentions, Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) survey on investment intentions, Bank of England’s General economic situation 
expectations survey; (ii) Bank of England’s Household personal financial situation 
expectations survey and unemployment projection (inverted); and (iii) Bank of England one 
year-ahead GDP growth forecast at market rates. To avoid multicollinearity issues, without 
losing information, we compute the first principal component of the series reported above. We 
also control for market liquidity using the UK TED spread, employing data collected from 
Bank of England.  
As industry-specific controls, we use the industry median of proxies for equity 
valuation (i.e. 36-month cumulative stock return) and volatility (i.e. the standard deviation of 
the former variable), as indicators of industry performance. We include industry median 
Tobin’s q as an additional forward-looking proxy of firms’ valuation, where a high Tobin’s q 
 
36 Valkama et al. (2013) find that in the UK economic performance, industry growth and stock market returns 
are the main predictors of PE buyout returns. 
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indicates high valuation periods. Lastly, to create proxies for industry-level economic shocks 
we combine CRSP and Compustat Global databases and follow Harford (2005) to construct 
each of the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries (see Appendix A.4.2).  
 
4.4 Empirical methodology and results 
 The response of PE buyouts to different measures of uncertainty 
In this section we examine investment dynamics at the firm-level. Specifically, using a logit 
model, we estimate the probability of a buyout – investing in an LBO, MBO and/or going 
private transaction – as a function of the mean level of uncertainty in the previous year, after 
controlling for numerous determinants of PE investment. In our logit regression model 
therefore 𝑌𝑗 = 1 if a given firm j receives a buyout in year 𝑡 + 1; 𝑌𝑗 = 0  if firm j does not 
receive a buyout. Subsequently, we estimate the probability of 𝑌𝑗 = 1 given a set of firm-level, 
industry-level and macro-level independent variables in the following manner: 
 
 𝑃(𝑌 = 1|𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛) = 𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛) [Equation 4.1] 
 
4.4.1.1 Uncertainty and the likelihood of a buyout 
The results of our baseline logit estimations, presented in Table 4.2, support H1 since for 
several uncertainty measures, greater uncertainty significantly reduces the likelihood of PE 
buyouts the following year.  
[Insert Table 4.2] 
In particular, EPU, Sterling option-implied volatility and BUI (see Table 4.2 - columns 
1, 3 and 5, respectively) are negatively signed and statistically significant, the first and latter 
measure at the one percent level. In other words, increases in these three measures significantly 
reduce the likelihood of UK PE buyouts in the upcoming year. Turning to the marginal effects 
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of the considered logit models (at the mean), consider the case of BUI, the most explicit 
measure of Brexit uncertainty37. Here, a one percent increase in BUI leads to a mean marginal 
decrease in the likelihood of buyouts in the following year of about 0.016 percent, 
corresponding to approximately 79 percent of the unconditional probability of a buyout during 
the Brexit period.  
By contrast in Table 4.2, both the Bank of England macroeconomic uncertainty index 
and FTSE All-Shares option-implied volatility are not significant at the 10 percent level (see 
columns 2 and 4). We gently attribute this finding to the different components and forecast 
horizons of the uncertainty measures; for example, the FTSE All-Shares option-implied 
volatility might be considered a short-term indicator. In any case, such a result sheds light on 
the importance of considering differences in indicators of uncertainty when assessing impact 
on domestic economic activity and investment.  
Other control variables included in the regressions are portfolio targets’ specific 
controls, such as: the natural logarithm of the firm assets, ROA, firms’ leverage (computed as 
liabilities-over-equity), and cash and equivalents-over-assets. As standard, some control 
variables are omitted from the regression if they display high correlation with the core 
explanatory variable of the regression to avoid multicollinearity problems (see Appendix 
A.4.4). In each regression we use robust standard errors clustered at the level of the buyout 
target (portfolio firm). Moreover, we include industry and firm-level variables measured in the 
previous fiscal year (t).  
 
4.4.1.2 The persistence of uncertainty effect on buyouts 
Following our baseline results in Table 4.2, we assess the persistence of the effect of an 
uncertainty shock on buyout activity. If greater uncertainty leads PE investors to delay 
 
37 See Table A.6 in the Appendix for the marginal effects. 
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investment, rather than reduce it, we would expect a reversal in the logit coefficient sign. 
Therefore, in Table 4.3, we re-explore our baseline regression, this time considering the 
likelihood of a buyout up to five-years ahead (t+1, t+2, t+3, t+4, and t+5) given an uncertainty 
shock at time t (controlling for industry and macroeconomic shocks).  
[Insert Table 4.3] 
We start our analysis on the persistence of uncertainty by analysing economic policy 
uncertainty, or EPU. As reported in Panel A of Table 4.3, we do not observe a sign reversal in 
the response to greater policy uncertainty in the three following years – although after two 
years the level of significance reduces. The coefficient sign of the EPU index changes in year 
t+4, indicating that after an event increasing policy uncertainty on average it takes four years 
for PE investment to recover (the PE investment receives a 4-year delay). This provides 
evidence to both the economic significance and persistence of a policy uncertainty shock to PE 
investment, which is in line with our H2. Additionally, we observe in Panel B that Sterling 
uncertainty significantly reduces the likelihood of a buyout for years (t+1 and t+2), with no 
significant reversal in t+3. As for the EPU index, we observe a sign reversal in the likelihood 
of a buyout four years after sterling uncertainty arose, which lead us to conclude that sterling 
uncertainty causes an average four years delay of PE buyouts. Finally, Panel C presents the 
impact of Brexit uncertainty on the future likelihood of a buyout. In a strong confirmation of 
H2, one can observe that the response of three-year ahead buyout volume to BUI is negative 
and persistent. Eventually, it has no significant effect on the likelihood of a buyout in year t+4. 
 
Overall, we observe that Brexit uncertainty leads to an average of four-year delay in PE buyout, 
after which investment is recovered. Following the second year ahead of the uncertainty event, 
the coefficient of year t+3 is often not significant, while that of year t+4 is instead positive and 




4.4.1.3 Country Counterfactual using the US PE Market 
To further establish the findings, we re-run our analysis for a country that has not experienced 
Brexit and hence should not be negatively affected by the related uncertainty. Arguably one 
could even postulate that the US market could have even profited from Brexit by attracting PE 
capital. In such a context, the coefficient estimate on uncertainty measures associated with 
Brexit should be either insignificant or even positive. 
For this purpose, we use the sample selection criteria adopted in Section 4.3.1 (for UK 
PE targets) and create a comparable sample of US private equity targets firms (exploiting the 
data from Capital IQ). As the Brexit uncertainty shock is specifically localised in Britain and 
the EU, testing our baseline models on this last sample may further validate our findings and 
support the lack of sampling bias in our results. Given the lack of the identical firm and industry 
specific variables in the new sample, we perform a panel fixed effect logistic regression using 
industry and time-fixed effects. We include in the regression our baseline models’ variables of 
uncertainty – i.e. EPU, Sterling Option-Implied Volatility and the BUI.  
[Insert Table 4.4] 
Our results, reported in Table 4.4, show that Brexit dimensions of uncertainty adopted in our 
baseline model (with the exception of sterling option-implied volatility – which also accounts 
for USD uncertainty) have strikingly positive effect on the likelihood of a buyout in the US. 
This indicates that Brexit uncertainty had an important and UK-specific negative effect on PE 
activity, supporting the validity of our prior results and potentially pointing to cross-country 




4.4.1.4 Additional results  
In Appendix A.4.6 we present some additional results. First, we re-estimate the baseline 
regression during the ‘Brexit period’ (2016-2019) and find that uncertainty has a significantly 
negative impact on PE buyout activity (Appendix A.4.6.1). Second, we follow the merger 
waves literature to account for the counter-cyclicality of target firms’ valuations. We show that 
the key result about the negative effect of uncertainty is robust. 
 
4.5 The transmission channels of uncertainty to the PE market 
We investigate the three postulated transmission channels of uncertainty characterised in our 
hypotheses H3-H5 and developed earlier in sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4 and 4.2.5. First, we consider 
predictions from theory predicting that uncertainty will increase the real option (general partner 
incentive) to delay investment (cf. Quigg, 1993; Gulen and Ion, 2015). Bloom et al. (2018) 
analysing the impact of Brexit on business investment found a significant decrease in business 
investment in the UK since the Brexit Referendum. Likewise, other authors such as Serwicka 
and Tamberi (2018), or McGrattan and Waddle (2020) found evidence of a significant shift of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) from the UK to other countries in the European Union. Second, 
we test the potential effect of a greater interim risk channel, known to significantly depress 
equity valuations (see Bhagwat et al., 2016) in the interim period between announcement and 
completion of an acquisition. Finally, we test the existence of a greater moral hazard incentive, 
created by the high period of uncertainty and leading limited partners to have lower control and 
ability to assess the performance of general partners. According to this argument, when 
uncertainty is elevated if limited partners (principals) control over general partner (agent) 




 Testing the real-options transmission channel 
As we noted earlier in section 4.2.3, the value of the option is conditional on three main factors: 
(i) the degree of investment irreversibility; (ii) the cost of postponing the investment (buyout); 
and (iii) the extent to which uncertainty affect the investment target (PE portfolio target). We 
explore these factors in more detail below. 
 
4.5.1.1 Investment irreversibility 
To assess the validity of the real option theory applied to the context of UK buyouts, we use 
three different proxies of investment irreversibility to assess whether the effect of uncertainty 
on leveraged-buyouts is stronger for irreversible investments. All measures of investment 
irreversibility are measured at the target level of a given buyout.  
The first proxy of investment irreversibility is the PE target industry capital intensity 
ratio – computed as the industry mean net property, plant, and equipment (PPE) over total 
assets. The underlying assumption is that investment in firms with greater amounts of fixed 
assets (PPE) would be harder to reverse. Therefore, we create a dummy variable taking the 
value of one if a buyout target in a given year has a greater capital intensity ratio than the 
industry median. 
Our second proxy of investment irreversibility is based on a given investment sunk 
costs. In a similar spirit to Kessides (1990) and Farinas and Ruano (2005), we argue that the 
greater is the rent and lease of firm tangible assets, the faster is its fixed capital depreciation 
i.e., the shorter is the life cycle of its assets, and the greater is the available secondary market 
for firm assets, the lower would be the sunk costs associated with an acquisition. Lower sunk 
costs should reduce the value of the option to delay a given buyout. Therefore, following 
Bonaime et al. (2016) and Gulen and Ion (2016), we compute the average industry level of: 
rent and lease expenditure; depreciation expense; and, yearly sales of PPE (all scaled by lagged 
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PPE). We then create a dummy variable to characterise an industry as having low investment 
sunk costs if all three measures are contemporaneously above the industry median in a given 
year.  
We then follow Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Almeida and Campello (2007) by 
suggesting that highly cyclical industries receive a considerably higher discount on asset 
liquidation values in periods of crisis. Therefore, in periods of high uncertainty, highly cyclical 
industries are significantly riskier than less cyclical ones, as firms in the same industry would 
be similarly affected by a given uncertainty shock. To identify cyclical industries, as standard 
practice in the relevant literature (cf. Sharpe, 1994), we use SIC industry codes identifying 
cyclical industries as those industries characterised by the greater amount of durable goods.  
Lastly, if predictions from the real option theory hold, hence greater uncertainty creates 
the incentive for the general partner to postpone investment, this incentive should be lower 
when postponement is more costly. In particular, as suggested by Grenadier (2002), delaying 
investment is considerably more expensive when the target firms operate in a highly 
competitive industry, where a delay could lead to competitors’ appropriation of part of the 
benefits (profitability) yielded by the investment project. Based on this assumption, the 
incentive to delay the (completion of the) investment until uncertainty is resolved is 
considerably higher in concentrated industries – i.e. less competitive – where it is actually 
relatively inexpensive to delay. To assess industry concentration, we adopt the methodology 
used for the creation of the Herfindahl sales-based index of industry concentration. Therefore, 
we use a dummy variable taking the value of one if the median industry sales in a given year 
exceed all industries sales median, and zero otherwise. Also with respect to this proxy of 
industry concentration, the results appear robust and all point to a greater impact of uncertainty 
on PE investment within industries that are more concentrated rather than vice versa, as 
predicted by the real option theory. 
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[Insert Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7] 
In Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7, we show the results of our baseline model regressions including the 
aforementioned proxies of industry capital intensity, sunk costs, and cyclicality. All the results 
point to a uniformly strong effect of uncertainty (with the exception of Sterling option-implied 
volatility) on PE activity for buyouts characterised by high levels of investment irreversibility 
and analogous measures – in accordance with H3. This appears to be the case, with respect to 
both PE investment in the entire period of analysis and during the Brexit period, with statistical 
significance being generally higher for regressions estimated using the BUI. On the contrary, 
we document a much weaker real option channel with respect to the transmission of Sterling 
uncertainty.  
 
4.5.1.2 Industry-level transmission of Brexit uncertainty 
Next, we examine industry-level transmission of Brexit uncertainty. As pointed out in Bloom 
et al. (2019), “The vote for Brexit was a largely unexpected event and we observe that it has 
had a heterogeneous impact on firms according to their pre-referendum exposure to Europe” 
(Bloom et al., 2019: p. 2). In light of these findings, we argue that the incentive to delay 
investment when Brexit Uncertainty arises is greater for industries that are more exposed to 
Brexit uncertainty – i.e. more exposed to the external trade sector (as in Bloom et al., 2019; 
2020). Of course, measuring exposure to uncertainty can be non-trivial. Hassan et al. (2020), 
using tools from computational linguistics, measured firm-level exposure to Brexit analysing 
the recurrence of discussions of benefits (and costs) associated to Brexit in listed firms’ 
quarterly earning conference calls proceedings. They find a much stronger transmission of 
Brexit-related uncertainty (e.g., leading to outcomes such as: loss of investment, employment, 
productivity, etc) to firms that are highly exposed to Brexit. We measure external exposure 
using data on industry-level import and export from the UK Office for National Statistics 
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(ONS). In particular, we compute for each industry and year the difference between the 
industry median of import (IM), export (X), and total exposure (IM+X) and national median in 
a given year t. We then assess the impact of Brexit-related uncertainty on probably of a buyout 
in an industry with high exposure to Brexit (i.e. its exposure to the external sector).  
[Insert Table 4.8] 
In Table 4.8, we find that sectors more heavily exposed to the external sector have a lower 
likelihood of buyout as a result of greater Brexit uncertainty, in line with H3. We repeat the 
test using the EPU and sterling uncertainty from 2016 onward, instead of the BUI, and our 
results remain robust and unaffected (see columns 2, 5, and 7). In confirmation of the above 
argument, we do not find evidence of a greater transmission of uncertainty to industries heavily 
exposed to the external sector before the Brexit Referendum (see columns 3 and 6).   
 
 Testing the interim risk channel  
In Table 4.9, we test whether across our whole sample period and in the Brexit period, 
uncertainty transmitted to the buyout market through this channel. In an interim risk channel 
(see section 4.2.4), uncertainty transmits to PE activity in the interim period, hence leading 
investors to postpone (or cancel) investment38. However, crucially, deals with a longer interim 
period are subject to much greater interim risk than deals with shorter interim periods.  
[Insert Table 4.9] 
Therefore, we measure the interim periods of all buyout deals considered in our analysis and 
assess the impact of policy uncertainty (in column 1), Sterling option-implied volatility (in 
column 2, and Brexit uncertainty (in column 3) on the likelihood of a buyout of a target with a 
longer than the industry median interim period. We find that neither policy uncertainty nor 
 
38 Test for this channel are exclusively performed on UK firms that at some point in the period of analysis were 




Sterling uncertainty significantly affect the likelihood of a buyout – based on the target interim 
period – hence, we find no evidence of an interim risk channel for the whole period of analysis 
(2010-2019). On the contrary, Brexit uncertainty significantly reduced the likelihood of buyout 
of a target with longer interim period than the industry median. This implies that during the 
years of elevated Brexit uncertainty, not only were buyouts were more unlikely, and investment 
lost (as we found in Tables 4.2 and 4.3) but the interim risk channel played a role, in agreement 
with H4.  
 
 Testing the moral hazard channel  
We build our empirical setting to investigate the empire building incentive by focusing on the 
“value-destruction” implications of this channel (see section 4.2.5). We do so by assessing the 
change in our baseline model accounting variables (ROA, Operating Income, Total Assets, and 
Cash-to-Assets) around the time of the buyout (between t-1 and t+1) in moments of high 
(Brexit) uncertainty and low (Brexit) uncertainty39, and we test the significance of the 
difference of the coefficients in the two time periods.  
[Insert Table 4.10] 
The results presented in Table 4.10 show deals realised in periods of high policy uncertainty 
are characterised by a higher short-term growth in ROA and by lower operating income than 
those in periods of low policy uncertainty (see Panel A). We find no sign of moral hazard when 
comparing periods of high and low sterling option volatility (see Panel B). Hence, the evidence 
does not support H5. In periods of high Brexit uncertainty, we observe that only deals with a 
greater change in ROA are significant – all other variables being not significant (see Panel C). 
We find this evidence as refuting the ‘empire building channel’. Periods of high uncertainty 
 
39 We classify years of high uncertainty as such if in those years a given uncertainty measures have values above 
the median for the whole period of analysis. Vice versa, years with low uncertainty have a value below the entire 
period median.   
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are in fact characterised by a loss of buyout deals, as explained above, rather than an increase 
– as the moral hazard channel would predict. Moreover, deals realised in periods of uncertainty 
do not seem to compromise shareholder value, as hypothesised by Duchin and Schmidt (2013).  
 
4.6 Conclusions 
In this paper we explore the role of uncertainty on PE activity in the UK by developing new 
hypotheses and employing a novel dataset of PE targets and non-targets from 2010 to 2019. 
Our particular focus is to elicit the uncertainty stemming from the Brexit referendum and 
contrast it with other forms of uncertainty (e.g., macroeconomic, equity and currency). 
Uncertainty from Brexit is directly measured by employing the recent Bloom et al. (2019) 
Brexit Uncertainty Index (BUI) constructed from surveys to the CFOs of approximately 3,000 
UK businesses. To complement this approach, we conduct a finer grained analysis of the 
relevance of potential uncertainty transmission channels that might affect buyouts.  
Strikingly, we provide evidence that uncertainty affects PE activity negatively, even 
when controlling for economic activity. Strikingly, Brexit-related uncertainty has a significant 
negative effect which is distinctly different from other forms of uncertainty and consequently 
augments the other uncertainties PE companies are facing. Moreover, uncertainty not only 
reduces PE activity but also delays PE buyouts. In terms of transmission channels, we provide 
evidence that Brexit-related uncertainty operates via the real option channel and the interim 
channel but has no statistically measurable effect via the moral hazard channel. Notably, 
uncertainty particularly affects sectors where investments are relatively irreversible, sunk costs 
are high and good durable. Overall, our empirical analysis finds strong empirical support for 




Of course, presently, Brexit uncertainty is ongoing. Our results suggest that this 
particular uncertainty will continue to result in less PE activity and as a corollary, reduced 
investment and economic activity in UK. To avoid the continued amplification of negative long 
run economic effects, we would urge UK policymakers to resolve such uncertainties as quickly 
as possible. This work and our conclusions are built on the foundations of some earlier work 
by Mike Wright and co-authors. We would like to note that Mike Wright’s work was highly 
original, influential and vast, in both scope and scale. He was also a great friend to many. We 
very much hope that our work above, building on just a few of his many insights into private 




Table 4.1 Investment in PE buyouts  
In this Table we present British PE Buyouts disaggregated in their individual deal structure: Going Private, LBO, 
MBO. In Panel A, we report the portion PE investment allocated to each of the three deal structures reported 
above in a given year. In Panel B, we report instead the total number of buyout deals in the UK in a considered 
year. Once again, we disclose both the aggregate number of deals in a given year and the individual amounts of 
deals as divided in: Going Private, LBO, MBO. The numbers of deals included in Panel B does include multiple 
purchases of a same target in a given year. In this case, each deal is considered as separate even if it involves the 
same target. 
 




LBO MBO Total 
2010 10% 74% 16% 100% 
2011 6% 70% 24% 100% 
2012 12% 78% 10% 100% 
2013 0% 92% 8% 100% 
2014 8% 80% 12% 100% 
2015 0% 89% 11% 100% 
2016 14% 81% 5% 100% 
2017 22% 72% 6% 100% 
2018 31% 66% 3% 100% 
2019 43% 56% 1% 100% 




LBO MBO Total 
2010 9 160 70 239 
2011 12 188 86 286 
2012 10 173 79 262 
2013 1 178 67 246 
2014 7 234 99 340 
2015 1 193 70 264 
2016 4 184 59 247 
2017 6 178 65 249 
2018 4 196 57 257 





Table 4.2 Uncertainty and PE buyout activity 
The Table displays the results of our baseline logistic regression of the likelihood of a buyout (‘Buyout t+1’) on 
Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU; column 1), Macro-economic Uncertainty (column 2), Sterling Option-
implied Volatility index (column 3), FTSE All-Share Option-implied Volatility index (column 4), and Brexit 
Uncertainty Index (BUI; column 5). All regressions are supplemented with several controls for industry and target-
specific economic fundamentals. In each regression, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1, if at time t+1 a 
certain target firm is the object of a buyout, and zero otherwise. All independent variables are continuous and 
measured instead at time t. Further in-depth information on the variables included in this Table is reported in the 
Appendix A.4.2.1.   












           
Policy Uncertainty (EPU) -0.280***     
 (0.089)     
Macro Uncertainty  -0.032    
  (0.099)    
Sterling Opt-Impl. Volatility   -0.165**   
   (0.071)   
FTSE Opt-Impl. Volatility    0.062  
    (0.172)  
Brexit Uncertainty (BUI)     -0.108*** 
     (0.026) 
Investment Opportunity -0.096*  -0.073  -0.014 
 (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.034) 
Industry Shock 0.354*** 0.356*** 0.368*** 0.354*** 0.377*** 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.077) 
TED Spread -1.451 -0.501 -1.011 -0.616  
 (0.911) (0.885) (0.931) (0.939)  
Industry Cumulative Returns -0.771*** -0.696*** -0.808*** -0.641** -0.531** 
 (0.222) (0.249) (0.237) (0.251) (0.234) 
Industry Cumulative STD 
Returns 0.237 0.418 0.501 0.325 -0.399 
 (0.598) (0.602) (0.588) (0.613) (0.640) 
Industry q 0.443*** 0.440*** 0.412*** 0.451*** 0.499*** 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.098) (0.095) (0.090) 
Total Assets 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash-to-Asset -1.593*** -1.593*** -1.593*** -1.592*** -1.590*** 
 (0.254) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) (0.253) 
Constant -6.640*** -7.295*** -7.159*** -7.385*** -7.243*** 
 (0.328) (0.254) (0.265) (0.321) (0.196) 
      
Observations 412,622 412,622 412,622 412,622 412,622 
Notes: ***, **, *, or ⦾ mark regression coefficients significant 1, 5, 10 or 15 percent level. Standard Errors are 
reported in the parentheses underneath the regression coefficients.  
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Table 4.3 The persistence of uncertainty effects 
The Table displays the results of a logistic regression of the likelihood of a buyout in the future (‘Buyout t+1’; 
‘Buyout t+2’; ‘Buyout t+3’; ‘Buyout t+4’; ‘Buyout t+5’) on Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU; Panel A), 
Sterling Option-Implied Volatility (Panel B), and Brexit Uncertainty Index (BUI; Panel C). All regressions are 
supplemented with several controls for industry and target-specific economic fundamentals, which for space 
reasons are not presented below. In each regression, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1, if at time t+1, 
t+2, t+3, t+4, t+5 a certain target firm is the object of a buyout, and zero otherwise. All independent variables 
are continuous and measured instead at time t. Further in-depth information on the variables included in this Table 
is reported in the Appendix A.4.2.1. 
Panel A. Economic Policy Uncertainty 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Buyout t+1 Buyout t+2 Buyout t+3 Buyout t+4 Buyout t+5 
        
  
Policy Uncertainty (EPU) -0.280*** -0.225*** -0.095 0.793* 0.462 
 (0.089) (0.086) (0.077) (0.415) (0.602) 
    
  
Observations 412,622 362,609 311,788 261,615 214,549 
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B. Sterling Option-Implied Volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Buyout t+1 Buyout t+2 Buyout t+3 Buyout t+4 Buyout t+5 




-0.165** -0.181*** -0.007 0.220** 0.132 
 (0.071) (0.069) (0.065) (0.089) (0.122) 
    
  
Observations 412,622 362,609 311,788 261,615 214,549 
Macroeconomic 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-level 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C. Brexit Uncertainty Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Buyout t+1 Buyout t+2 Buyout t+3 Buyout t+4 Buyout t+5 
          
Brexit Uncertainty (BUI) -0.108*** -0.101*** -0.077 -0.189 - 
 (0.026) (0.032) (0.051) (0.189) 
- 
    
  
Observations 412,622 362,609 311,788 261,615 - 
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
- 
Industry-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
- 
Firm-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes - 
Notes: ***, **, *, or ⦾ mark regression coefficients significant 1, 5, 10 or 15 percent level. Standard Errors are 
reported in the parentheses underneath the regression coefficients. We cannot produce 5-years ahead predictions, 
since the BUI is different from zero between 2015 and 2019, i.e. the time window is too narrow.  
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Table 4.4 Comparing the impact of uncertainty on buyouts in the UK vs. the US 
The Table displays in columns (1), (2) and (3), the results of a fixed effect logistic regression of the likelihood of 
a buyout in the United States in year t+1 on several UK measures of uncertainty: Economic Policy Uncertainty 
(EPU), Sterling Option-Implied Volatility, and Brexit Uncertainty Index (BUI). All regressions are supplemented 
with industry effects. In columns (4), (5), and (6), we repeat this model specification on our baseline UK buyouts 
sample to provide a clear comparison of the regression coefficients of our uncertainty measures. In both regression 
models, we do not include a control sample of firms that are never target of PE buyouts. 
 United States sample UK sample 














           
Policy Uncertainty (EPU) 0.090***   -0.288***   
 (0.030)   (0.087)   
Sterling Opt-Impl. Volatility  -0.144***   -0.251***  
  (0.019)   (0.052)  
Brexit Uncertainty (BUI)   -0.008   -0.080*** 
   (0.007)   (0.018) 
       
Constant -2.539*** -2.345*** -2.386*** -1.958*** -2.311*** -2.295*** 
 (0.397) (0.398) (0.395) (0.131) (0.015) (0.021) 
       
Observations 60,024 60,024 60,024 10,008 10,008 10,008 
Industry-level FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: ***, **, *, or ⦾ mark regression coefficients significant 1, 5, 10 or 15 percent level. Standard Errors are 




Table 4.5 Real-options channel – Economic policy uncertainty 
The Table displays the results of a logistic regression of the likelihood of a buyout on Economic Policy 
Uncertainty (EPU). All regressions are supplemented with several controls for industry and target-specific 
economic fundamentals. In column 1, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1, if at time t+1 target firms with 
a degree of investment irreversibility with above the industry median are the object of a buyout, and zero 
otherwise. In column 2, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1, if at time t+1 a target firm pertaining to an 
industry with higher sunk costs is the object of a buyout, and zero otherwise. In column 3, the dependent variable 
assumes a value of 1, if at time t+1 a firm from an industry classified in Sharpe (1994) as a durable good industry 
is the target of a buyout, and zero otherwise. Eventually, in column 4, the dependent variable assumes a value of 
1, if at time t+1 a target firm from an industry with a high degree of concentration is the object of a buyout, and 
zero otherwise. All independent variables are continuous and measured instead at time t. Further in-depth 
information on the variables included in this Table is reported in the Appendix A.4.2.1.   









         
Policy Uncertainty 
(EPU) -0.319** -0.281** -0.433* -0.539*** 
 (0.130) (0.117) (0.236) (0.156) 
Investment 
Opportunity -0.213*** -0.199** 0.032 -0.228** 
 (0.080) (0.084) (0.125) (0.090) 
Industry Shock 0.350*** 0.775*** -0.038 1.801*** 
 (0.103) (0.106) (0.170) (0.151) 
TED Spread -1.202 -2.432** -1.700 -0.862 
 (1.165) (1.229) (2.171) (1.335) 
Industry Cumulative 
Returns -0.550* -0.759** -2.191*** -0.332 
 (0.287) (0.324) (0.471) (0.330) 
Industry Cumulative 
STD Returns 0.696 5.061*** 4.540*** -1.214 
 (0.697) (0.736) (0.866) (0.976) 
Industry q 0.348*** 0.421*** 0.701*** 0.655*** 
 (0.132) (0.133) (0.192) (0.171) 
Total Assets 0.006*** 0.003* -0.004 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
ROA 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.001 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash-to-Asset -2.078*** -1.454*** -2.429*** -1.871*** 
 (0.305) (0.325) (0.665) (0.373) 
Constant -7.098*** -7.580*** -8.503*** -9.127*** 
 (0.445) (0.424) (0.773) (0.668) 
     
Observations 412,622 181,738 412,622 412,622 
Notes: ***, **, *, or ⦾ mark regression coefficients significant 1, 5, 10 or 15 percent level. Standard Errors are 
reported in the parentheses underneath the regression coefficients.  
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Table 4.6 Real-options channel - Sterling option implied volatility 
The Table displays the results of a logistic regression of the likelihood of a buyout on BoE Sterling Option-Implied 
Volatility. All regressions are supplemented with several controls for industry and target-specific economic 
fundamentals. In column 1, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1, if at time t+1 target firms with a degree 
of investment irreversibility with above the industry median are the object of a buyout, and zero otherwise. In 
column 2, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1, if at time t+1 a target firm pertaining to an industry with 
higher sunk costs is the object of a buyout, and zero otherwise. In column 3, the dependent variable assumes a 
value of 1, if at time t+1 a firm from an industry classified in Sharpe (1994) as a durable good industry is the 
target of a buyout, and zero otherwise. Eventually, in column 4, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1, if at 
time t+1 a target firm from an industry with a high degree of concentration is the object of a buyout, and zero 
otherwise. All independent variables are continuous and measured instead at time t. Further in-depth information 
on the variables included in this Table is reported in the Appendix A.4.2.1.   









         
Sterling Opt-Impl. Volatility -0.045 ⦾ -0.198* -0.258 -0.423*** 
 (0.097) (0.104) (0.178) (0.123) 
Investment Opportunity -0.171** -0.192** 0.060 -0.211** 
 (0.081) (0.087) (0.124) (0.087) 
Industry Shock 0.355*** 0.785*** -0.028 1.896*** 
 (0.105) (0.110) (0.174) (0.161) 
TED Spread -0.388 -2.193* -1.251 -0.431 
 (1.149) (1.294) (2.301) (1.435) 
Industry Cumulative Returns -0.463 -0.795** -2.306*** -0.450 
 (0.311) (0.358) (0.539) (0.368) 
Industry Cumulative STD 
Returns 0.822 5.318*** 4.877*** -0.650 
 (0.690) (0.757) (0.928) (0.963) 
Industry q 0.341** 0.373*** 0.669*** 0.527*** 
 (0.135) (0.143) (0.206) (0.188) 
Total Assets 0.006*** 0.003* -0.004 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
ROA 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.001 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Leverage -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash-to-Asset -2.079*** -1.452*** -2.433*** -1.873*** 
 (0.305) (0.325) (0.666) (0.373) 
Constant -7.777*** -8.016*** -9.246*** -10.019*** 
 (0.338) (0.382) (0.590) (0.586) 
     
Observations 412,622 181,738 412,622 412,622 
Notes: ***, **, *, or ⦾ mark regression coefficients significant 1, 5, 10 or 15 percent level. Standard Errors are 
reported in the parentheses underneath the regression coefficients.
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Table 4.7 Real-options channel - Brexit uncertainty index 
The Table displays the results of a logistic regression of the likelihood of a buyout on Bloom et al. (2019) Brexit 
Uncertainty Index (BUI). All regressions are supplemented with several controls for industry and target-specific 
economic fundamentals. In column 1, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1, if at time t+1 target firms with 
a degree of investment irreversibility with above the industry median are the object of a buyout, and zero 
otherwise. In column 2, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1, if at time t+1 a target firm pertaining to an 
industry with higher sunk costs is the object of a buyout, and zero otherwise. In column 3, the dependent variable 
assumes a value of 1, if at time t+1 a firm from an industry classified in Sharpe (1994) as a durable good industry 
is the target of a buyout, and zero otherwise. Eventually, in column 4, the dependent variable assumes a value of 
1, if at time t+1 a target firm from an industry with a high degree of concentration is the object of a buyout, and 
zero otherwise. All independent variables are continuous and measured instead at time t. Further in-depth 
information on the variables included in this Table is reported in the Appendix A.4.2.1.   









         
Brexit Uncertainty (BUI) -0.216*** -0.089*** -0.097 -0.144*** 
 (0.036) (0.033) (0.064) (0.037) 
Investment Opportunity -0.114*** -0.046 0.132 -0.150*** 
 (0.043) (0.045) (0.081) (0.051) 
Industry Shock 0.380*** 0.769*** -0.016 1.820*** 
 (0.101) (0.099) (0.170) (0.145) 
TED Spread     
     
Industry Cumulative 
Returns -0.242 -0.522 -1.968*** 0.036 
 (0.289) (0.318) (0.517) (0.337) 
Industry Cumulative 
STD Returns -0.318 4.733*** 4.129*** -1.843* 
 (0.764) (0.710) (0.904) (1.076) 
Industry q 0.440*** 0.538*** 0.739*** 0.755*** 
 (0.128) (0.116) (0.180) (0.160) 
Total Assets 0.006*** 0.003** -0.004 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
ROA 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash-to-Asset -2.071*** -1.446*** -2.427*** -1.864*** 
 (0.302) (0.325) (0.665) (0.372) 
Constant -7.608*** -8.545*** -9.417*** -10.037*** 
 (0.256) (0.235) (0.354) (0.487) 
     
Observations 412,622 181,738 412,622 412,622 
Notes: ***, **, *, or ⦾ mark regression coefficients significant 1, 5, 10 or 15 percent level. Standard Errors are 
reported in the parentheses underneath the regression coefficients.
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Table 4.8 Buyouts in industries highly exposed to Brexit  
The Table displays the results of a logistic regression of the likelihood of a buyout in a given industry on Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU; columns 1, 2 and 3), Sterling 
Option-Implied Volatility (column 4, 5, and 6), and Brexit Uncertainty Index (BUI; column 7). The likelihood of an industry receiving PE investment is expressed as a function 
of the industry exposure to the external sector (IM+X). All regressions are supplemented with several controls for industry and target-specific economic fundamentals. In each 
year (t), the dependent variable assumes a value of 1, if at time t+1 a firm belonging to an industry with external sector exposure higher than the median for all industries is the 
target of a buyout, and zero otherwise. In columns 1, 4, and 7, we consider the likelihood of PE buyouts in industries highly exposed to the external sector over the whole period 
(pre- and post-Brexit Referendum). In columns 2, and 5, we analyse the likelihood of PE buyouts in industries highly exposed to the external sector just in the year of the Brexit 
referendum and after. Instead, in columns 3 and 6, we re-perform the logistic model analysing the years before the Referendum. Overall, this analysis enables us to compare 
the coefficients’ sign and significant before and after the Referendum, therefore, to assess potential differences in the transmission of uncertainty to the private equity industry. 
All independent variables are continuous and measured instead at time t. Further in-depth information on the variables included in this Table is reported in the Appendix A.4.2.1.   




to the EU 
Industry 
Exposure 
to the EU 
Industry 
Exposure 
to the EU 
Industry 
Exposure 
to the EU 
Industry 
Exposure 
to the EU 
Industry 
Exposure 
to the EU 
Industry Exposure 
to the EU 
        
Policy Uncertainty (EPU) -0.262** -0.248 ⦾ 0.899     
 (0.120) (1.179) (0.850)     
Sterling Opt-Impl. Volatility    -0.092 0.093 0.242 ⦾  
    (0.100) (0.442) (0.168)  
Brexit Uncertainty (BUI)       -0.119*** 
       (0.034) 
        
        Observations 408,036 163,050 261,615 408,036 163,050 261,615 408,036 
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: ***, **, *, or ⦾ mark regression coefficients significant 1, 5, 10 or 15 percent level. Standard Errors are reported in the parentheses underneath the regression coefficients.
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Table 4.9 Interim risk channel 
The Table displays the results of a logistic regression of the likelihood of a buyout of a target firm with interim 
period above the industry median on Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU; column 1), Sterling Option-Implied 
Volatility (column 2) and Brexit Uncertainty Index (BUI; column 4). All regressions are supplemented with 
several controls for industry and target-specific economic fundamentals, which for space reasons are not presented 
below. In each regression, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1, if at time t+1 a PE target firm has interim 
period greater than the industry median, and zero otherwise. All independent variables are continuous and 
measured instead at time t. Tests for this regression are performed exclusively on firms which at some point in 
time have been target of buyouts, as only those would have data on the buyout interim period. The considered 
period of analysis is 2010-2019. Further in-depth information on the variables included in this Table is reported 
in the Appendix A.4.2.1.   
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Interim risk Interim risk Interim risk 
    
Policy Uncertainty (EPU) -0.107   
 (0.201)   
Sterling Opt-Impl. Volatility  0.080  
  (0.161)  
Brexit Uncertainty (BUI)   -0.100** 
   (0.050) 
Investment Opportunity 0.003 0.028 0.041 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.059) 
Industry Shock -0.167 -0.164 -0.122 
 (0.186) (0.184) (0.168) 
TED Spread -0.500 -0.437  
 (0.440) (0.395)  
Industry Cumulative Returns -0.217 -0.112 -0.088 
 (0.471) (0.474) (0.490) 
Industry Cumulative STD Returns -3.493** -3.406** -4.068*** 
 (1.445) (1.472) (1.530) 
Industry q 0.208 0.211 0.262 
 (0.156) (0.155) (0.166) 
Total Assets 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.150*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
ROA 0.017* 0.017* 0.015* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Leverage 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash-to-Asset -0.168 -0.142 -0.346 
 (0.572) (0.566) (0.592) 
Constant -3.366*** -3.613*** -3.502*** 
 (0.560) (0.396) (0.420) 
    
Observations 6,888 6,888 6,888 
Notes: ***, **, *, or ⦾ mark regression coefficients significant 1, 5, 10 or 15 percent level. Standard Errors are 
reported in the parentheses underneath the regression coefficients.  
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Table 4.10 Moral hazard channel 
The Table displays the results of a logistic regression of the likelihood of year t displaying a level of Economic 
Policy Uncertainty (EPU) above (or below) the median (Panel A), Sterling Option-Implied Volatility above (or 
below) the median (Panel B), and Brexit Uncertainty Index (BUI)  above (or below) the median (Panel C). All 
regressions use as independent variables target-level information on the change in return on assets (ROA), total 
assets, operating income, cash-to-assets in the two years around the buyout – i.e. in the period ranging from one 
year before to after the buyout. In column 1, the dependent variable takes value of 1 if in year t the level of 
uncertainty is above the median for the whole period. In column 2, the dependent variable takes value of 1 if in a 
given year, the level of uncertainty is above the median for the whole period. In column 3, we test the significance 
of the difference between the logistic regression coefficients. The considered period of analysis is 2010-2019. 
Further in-depth information on the variables included in this Table is reported in the Appendix A.4.2.1.   
 
Panel A. Economic Policy Uncertainty  
 High EPU Low EPU High - Low 
    
Delta ROA 0.016*** 0.002 0.014** 
 (0.005) (0.005)  
Delta Total Assets 0.040 -0.036 0.004 
 (0.026) (0.046)  
Delta Oper. Income -0.009*** 0.002 -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.003)  
Delta Cash-to-Asset 0.049 -0.071 0.11 
 (0.044) (0.201)  
Constant -2.257*** -2.061*** -0.196 
 (0.051) (0.053)  
Panel B. Sterling Opt-Impl. Volatility 
 




High - Low 
    
Delta ROA 0.008 0.010** -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005)  
Delta Total Assets 0.022 0.006 0.016 
 (0.037) (0.033)  
Delta Oper. Income -0.008* -0.008 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.004)  
Delta Cash-to-Asset 0.026 0.136 -0.011 
 (0.043) (0.159)  
Constant -2.219*** -2.161*** 0.058 
 (0.061) (0.061)  
Panel C. Brexit Uncertainty Index 
 High BUI Low BUI High - Low 
    
Delta ROA 0.016*** 0.003 0.013** 
 (0.005) (0.005)  
Delta Total Assets 0.022 0.004 0.018 
 (0.030) (0.036)  
Delta Oper. Income -0.007* -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.005)  
Delta Cash-to-Asset 0.043 -0.060 0.103 
 (0.041) (0.280)  
Constant -2.185*** -2.254*** 0.069 
 (0.045) (0.062)  
Notes: ***, **, *, or ⦾ mark regression coefficients significant 1, 5, 10 or 15 percent level. Standard Errors are 





Figure 4.1 Buyout activity in the UK vs. rest of the world (RoW) 
(a) Natural logarithm of total buyout volume 
 
(b) Yearly moving average 
 
Notes. Figure 4.1 uses all deals with structure of leveraged-buyout, management buyout, and going private 
transactions. These are presented in Panel A as the natural logarithm of the total number of buyout deals and of 
the total buyout volume in mln of USD in the UK vs in the Rest of the World (RoW). In Panel B, we present 
instead the 12-months moving average of the total number of buyout deals and of the total buyout volume in mln 
of USD in the UK vs in the Rest of the World (RoW). Both Panels indicate a strong deviation of the two series 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.2 Brexit uncertainty and UK economic policy uncertainty 
  
Notes. Monthly data is used for this Figure. EPU and BUI represent the indices of Economic Policy Uncertainty 
and Brexit Uncertainty, respectively. The shaded area corresponds the period onwards from the Brexit 
referendum. 
 
Figure 4.3 Other measures of uncertainty in the UK 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
Uncertainty, its origin and spillovers, have been at the core of academic, practitioners and 
policy debates for quite some time. However, never before, as it is in recent years, this has been 
seen as a critical component of policy decisions of governments, central banks and 
policymakers in general as today. Recent uncertainty events like the Global Financial Crisis, 
the EMU Sovereign Debt Crisis, Brexit, and Covid-19 today made topics such as spillovers, 
spill backs and contagion become well-known concepts by most scholars. That is because most 
of the relevant literature recognised that financial markets worldwide have become more 
interconnected than ever. However, still, many government and central banks mandates are 
strictly defined in domestic terms. That brought significant uncertainty spillovers, causing the 
Chinese corporate debt crisis among many economic issues (that I examine in Chapter 2). On 
the bright side, it also led to the awareness that sound policies to reduce domestic countries’ 
vulnerability and contain the transmission of financial imbalances have never been more 
crucial. Ultimately, this brought about a stronger and more widely adopted banking regulation 
and targeted macro-prudential policies to contain and mitigate the specificity of many 
vulnerabilities built up because of this greater globalisation.  
Even though current research made progress in understanding the implications of global 
spillovers, much is still unknown about their transmission dynamics. The work of this thesis 
aims to contribute to that effort. In other words, by making a detailed analysis of recent 
important uncertainty events, this thesis brings forward the status quo to facilitate a better 
understanding of these phenomena and ultimately more straightforward incorporation of this 
knowledge into policy. 
Chapter 2 considers the impact of uncertainty on cross-border investment in China and 
the resulting build-up of vulnerabilities arising from an expansion of banks' capital availability 
similar to that observed during domestic easing monetary policies. As I show in that chapter, 
154 
 
the expansion caused greater risk-taking of banks and a resulting greater credit to firms with 
worse economic fundamentals. Banks' risk-taking appears as asymmetric across firms' industry 
and size and particularly affect firms operating in capital-intensive industries and smaller firms. 
Note that Chapter 4, analysing Brexit-related uncertainty reports similar findings and extend 
this work significantly by analysing the transmission channels of uncertainty to the private 
equity industry and the reasons for a stronger transmission to this category of firms. 
 These results suggest that spillovers from advanced economies caused significant credit 
growth and a less resilient corporate sector build-up. In the context of China, greater central 
government control over the banking sector significantly reduces concerns of corporate or 
banking sector defaults (because of the central government implicit bailout guarantee). 
However, the extensive use of implicit guarantees and the resulting increase in banks' risk-
taking pose significant threats to the corporate sector's financial stability and, therefore, to the 
whole system's stability. Private companies not enjoying the state-ownership are growing as a 
proportion of SOE in China and government intervention in case of these entities' bankruptcy 
might be less straightforward. The greater reliance of both entities’ categories (SOE and 
privately-owned enterprises) on foreign capital could lead China to drain its foreign reserves 
quickly. As it happened during the GFC, that may cause undesired consequences on the 
renminbi, among other adverse outcomes. Therefore, I recommend policymakers stricter 
supervision of banks during capital inflow surges and more targeted macroprudential policies 
to account for heterogeneities in leverage growth across firms with different sizes and 
industries.  
Chapter 3 assesses both the effect of uncertainty on foreign investment and the sources 
at the origin of these effects by discriminating between domestic and foreign country risk. The 
analysis performed in that Chapter shows that risk in the country of origin (rest of the world) 
matters and matter more than the risk in the host country (EA). Similar to the findings of 
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Chapter 2, the banking sector’s capital constraint (or banks' capital availability) of the origin 
country is the main driver for international investment. Analysing sovereign risk of origin and 
host countries, it appears that they both matter despite the origin one has a significantly more 
substantial effect on FDI than that of the domestic country. That is an interesting finding 
considering that poor financial discipline by host governments has been widely blamed as the 
primary factor likely to frighten off overseas investors.  
 The main takeaway of this study is that, again, a domestic focus might not always be 
the most effective assessment mechanism when dealing with uncertainty resolution. Jaime 
Caruana, in 2015, at the Sixth Annual Conference on "Monetary and financial shifts: challenges 
and possible outcomes", suggested that the game we (policymakers) are playing is global. Still, 
the rules that we employ to play it are way too often local. That inevitably leads to policy 
ineffectiveness, such as biased policy targets and recommendations. In line with this argument, 
I encourage policymakers in countries that seek to attract FDI to consider not only domestic 
risks. 
 On the contrary, to be mindful of the changing financing environment that MNEs may 
face in their home countries when deciding which countries to target in seeking FDI. 
Additionally, I suggest the importance of addressing the asymmetric behaviour of FDI within 
the core and periphery of the Euro Area. I believe that improving Euro Area convergence with 
respect to inward foreign investment could be a first step towards reducing its fragmentation 
and curtailing political and financial market tensions in the European Union. 
 Chapter 4 studies instead how different uncertainties affect the investor behaviour, why 
and for how long. In the Chapter, I consider the uncertainty stemming from the Brexit 
referendum and contrast it with other forms of uncertainty (e.g., macroeconomic, equity and 
currency). Brexit-related uncertainty has a significant negative effect that is distinctly different 
from other forms of uncertainty and consequently augments the other uncertainties PE 
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companies face. Moreover, uncertainty not only reduces PE activity but also delays PE 
buyouts. In terms of transmission channels, I provide evidence that Brexit-related uncertainty 
operates via a real-options and the interim risk channels but has no statistically measurable 
effect via the moral hazard channel. Notably, uncertainty particularly affects sectors where 
investments are relatively irreversible, sunk costs are high, and goods are durable.  
These results suggest that this particular uncertainty will continue to result in less PE 
activity and, as a corollary, could reduce investment and economic activity in the UK. To avoid 
the continued amplification of adverse long-run economic effects, I would urge UK 
policymakers to resolve such uncertainties as quickly as possible. 
This thesis presents multiple avenues for future research. On a broader level, we can 
ask ourselves whether these uncertain events and crises are "isolated tremors", arising from an 
unexpected build-up of idiosyncratic vulnerabilities or the result of a prolonged accumulation 
of risks arising from economic, financial, and socio-political spheres. And, most importantly, 
how can we measure these risks, assess their spillovers and include them in policy action? In 
this thesis, as in most of the relevant literature, I strongly support transmission channels that 
arise far beyond the domestic country of origin of uncertainty events and that are far from 
idiosyncratic.  
Still, more research is needed on uncertainty spillovers to ensure a quicker resolution 
and policy better targeted to mitigate its dramatic effects on the real economy. Recent evidence 
of more robust business cycle synchronisation, zero-interest rate monetary policies in advanced 
economies (before the GFC and basically ever since), global evidence of small bubbles (such 
as current housing bubbles in most countries' largest metropolitan cities) are a wake-up call for 
researchers in international finance. Ultimately, the most basic question that should come to 
mind is: are we living in a different and more financially stable economic environment than 
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before the GFC, or is this just the second season of the same TV series we were watching back 
then? 
Within the context of China, presented in Chapter 2, I would argue that there is still a 
lot we do not know because of the vast opacity of Chinese data. Additionally, the entrenchment 
of the central government in the banking and corporate sectors and the not fully liberalised 
financial markets and balance of payments make research on financial spillovers in China very 
challenging. Better publicly available data on Chinese firms, banks' positions and state 
ownerships stakes in the corporate and banking sector are needed to understand better the 
vulnerabilities and their transmission channels in emerging markets. As the Chinese 
government owns most of China's corporate debt, I urge future research to explore risks arising 
from this exposure and the elevated debt in non-government owned firms (which have 
substantially grown in recent years). I also argue that the consequences of excessive 
interconnections between sovereign and banking sectors are well-known after the substantial 
distress experienced by many European countries during and after the Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
Therefore, this awareness creates viable avenues for future research on the systemic risks 
arising from such interconnection, as well as on the sovereign risk arising from the large 
exposure of the Chinese central government to the documented large banking sector-fuelled 
corporate debt. Once again, it is worth highlighting that China's systemic importance for the 
global economy makes risks in China risks everywhere else. As a result, I strongly encourage 
future research on capital outflows from China and the real effects of such flows. For 
researchers on moral hazard or vice versa chartered value of government bailout guarantees, I 
argue that the Chinese context offers a unique opportunity to identify the effect of implicit 
government guarantees on risk or value creation and derive important policy implications. 
Despite the substantial contribution of Chapter 3 to the extant literature, its main 
limitation is to merely analyse the symptoms and causes of FDI loss (and potential government 
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misguide over its reasons) rather than the effect of the phenomenon. I welcome future research 
on sovereign and banking contagion dynamics, potentially worsening banking and sovereign 
sector imbalances in the origin countries and affecting EA FDI loss. Still, today, most literature 
on international capital flows (particularly on FDI flows) assesses country-specific risks in 
isolation, without considering cross-country contagion dynamics that are well-known to have 
a prominent effect in crisis times (see, e.g., Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013) and the consequent 
results on such flows. Lastly, future research is also needed on the real effects of FDI losses on 
the host country's economic and MNEs ecosystem. Many authors pointed to the advantages of 
FDI flows taking a country-level perspective (Carril-Caccia & Pavlova, 2018; Neto & Veiga, 
2013). However, to date, there is much less firm-level evidence on the real effects of an FDI 
increase or loss due to events such as a change in regulations, uncertainty and crises. A better 
understanding of firm-level changes in FDI and what determines such decisions can have 
important policy implications and help regulators find practical solutions to attract (or contain) 
this form of investment.   
 Concerning Brexit, Chapter 4, the main limitation of this study is that Brexit uncertainty 
still persists. However, the start of the Covid-19 pandemic brought a dramatic shift in press, 
academic and policymakers' attention away from Brexit. As a result, interestingly, Brexit 
uncertainty has dramatically decreased (since the publication of this chapter), and buyout 
activity in the UK has increased in the UK instead of being delayed (as predicted in this thesis). 
That, of course, might be due to undervalued UK assets and cheaper sources of alternative 
finance made available to PE investors. Baker et al. (2009) refer to this phenomenon as cross-
border capital arbitrage. Topics of future research on the Brexit uncertainty could try to 
decompose uncertainty from Brexit from that arising from the Covid-19 pandemic and compare 
these two sources of uncertainty and their effects on PE investment. Since Brexit uncertainty 
persists and regulation in many sectors is undue, much more research is required on the Brexit 
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topic. Potential avenues include: (i) the previously mentioned cross-border capital arbitrage, 
which could explain PE activity increase; (ii) Brexit spillovers on the UK economy and its 
more interconnected countries; (iii) Brexit effects on assets that are highly synchronised with 
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A.2.1. IMF definitions of cross-country financial transactions 
In this Appendix, we report the explanation of international cross-country financial transactions 
reported in the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. All the definitions are reported in 
the Balance of Payment Manual published by the IMF in 1993. 
 
1. Portfolio investments includes, in addition to equity securities and debt securities in 
the form of bonds and notes, money market instruments and financial derivatives such 
as options. […] Equity securities covers all instruments and records acknowledging, 
after the claims of all creditors have been met, claims to the residual values of 
incorporated enterprises. Shares, stocks, participation, or similar documents (such as 
American Depositary Receipts) usually denote ownership of equity. Preferred stock or 
shares, which also provide for participation in the distribution of the residual value on 
dissolution of an incorporated enterprise, are included. […] Debt securities cover (i) 
bonds, debentures, notes, etc.; (ii) money market or negotiable debt instruments; and 
(iii) financial derivatives or secondary instruments, such as options, that usually do not 
extend to actual delivery and are utilized for hedging of risks, investment, and trading 
purposes. […] Transactions in items classified as portfolio investment are entered at 
market prices.  
2. Direct investment is the category of international investment that reflects the objective 
of a resident entity in one economy obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident 
in another economy. (The resident entity is the direct investor and the enterprise is the 
direct investment enterprise.) The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term 
relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of 
influence by the investor on the management of the enterprise. Direct investment 
comprises not only the initial transaction establishing the relationship between the 
investor and the enterprise but also all subsequent transactions between them and 
among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated. […] Reflecting the 
difference noted previously, a direct investment enterprise is defined in this Manual as 
an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which a direct investor, who is resident 
in another economy, owns 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power 
(for an incorporated enterprise) or the equivalent (for an unincorporated enterprise). 
Direct investment enterprises comprise those entities that are subsidiaries (a 
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nonresident investor owns more than 50 percent), associates (an investor owns 50 
percent or less) and branches (wholly or jointly owned unincorporated enterprises) 
either directly or indirectly owned by the direct investor. 
3. Other investment is a residual category that includes all financial transactions not 
covered in direct investment, portfolio investment, or reserve assets […] the types 
reflect most of the financial instruments and channels utilized for the acquisition of 
assets and incurrence of liabilities—other than for direct investment, portfolio 
investment, and reserve assets. The instrument classification comprises trade credits, 
loans (including the use of Fund credit and loans from the Fund), currency and deposits 
(both transferable and other), and other assets and liabilities (for example, 
miscellaneous accounts receivable and payable). 
 
A.2.2. Chinese Industrial Classification 
In this Appendix, we report the Chinese industrial classification adopted in the paper. This 
classification follows the 2008 Chinese industrial classification available at the United Nations 
(Department of Economic and Social Affairs).  
  
Code Section Division Group Class 
A Agriculture, Forestry, Animal husbandry 
and Fishing 
5 18 38 
B Mining 6 15 33 
C Manufacture 30 169 482 
D Reduction and distribution of electricity, 
gas and water 
3 7 10 
E Construction 4 7 11 
F Transport, Storage and Post 9 24 37 
G Information transmission, computer 
services and software 
3 10 14 
H Whole sell and retail sell 2 18 93 
I Accommodation and Restaurants 2 7 7 
J Finance and Insurance 4 16 16 
K Real estate 1 4 4 
L Renting and lending, commercial service 2 11 27 
M Science research, technique service and 
geologic perambulation 
4 19 23 
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N Water conservancy, Environment 
resource, Management of public 
infrastructure 
3 8 17 
O Resident service and other service 2 12 16 
P Education 1 5 13 
Q Health, Social security and Welfare 3 11 17 
R Culture, Sports and Recreation 5 22 29 
S Commonality manage and social 
organizations 
5 12 24 
T International organizations 1 1 1 
Total 20 95 396 912 
Source: The Situation of China’s Industrial Classification (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 





Appendix A.2.3. Variable description 
In this Appendix, we provide a detailed description of all the variables adopted in our regressions, the calculations that we performed to compute 
them and the source of our data on each of these variables.  
Variables names Extended name Calculation Source 
Lev. ratio Firms-level change in leverage ratio ∆log(Debt\L1.Assets) Wind and own calculations 
CIF Capital inflows L1.[log(CIF\GDP)] IMF IFS and own calculations 
CIF_CA Capital inflows from the current account L1.[log(CAB\GDP)] IMF IFS and own calculations 
Profitability 
Firms accounting cash flows, used as indicator of firms’ 
profitability 
Cash Flows = Gross  Profit - 
Interest Expenses - Corporate 
taxes 
Wind and own calculations 
Z (1) Z-score, used as proxy for firms’ solvency z = 
𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −𝐸/𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴)
 
Wind and own calculations based on 
De Nicoló et al. (2006) 
Z (2) Z-score, used as proxy for firms’ solvency z = 
𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −𝐸/𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴)
 
Wind and own calculations based on 
Back and Leaven (2006) 
Z (3) Z-score, used as proxy for firms’ solvency z = 
𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −𝑀𝑉𝐸/𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴)
 
Wind and own calculations based on 
Leaven and Levine (2009) 




Wind and own calculations based on 
Huang and Mazouz (2018) 
ROA Return on Assets  Wind 
𝜎(ROA) Return on Assets volatility 𝜎(ROA) Wind and own calculations 
Sharpe Sharpe ratio Sharpe = 
ROA−Rf
𝜎(ROA)
 Wind and own calculations 
MPI Chinese Monetary Policy Index 
Detailed explanation in 
Appendices A.2.4 and A.2.5 
CEIC and own calculations, based on 




Residuals from Monetary Policy Index after controlling 
for banking sector credit and CIF 
VAR approach, detailed 
explanation in Appendices A.2.4 
and A.2.5 
CEIC and own calculations 
Bank Loans Chinese banks loans to the non-financial corporate sector  BIS 
Banks ROA Banking sector Return on Assets  CEIC 
Sov. Yields Chinese 10-year sovereign bond yields log (Sov. Yields) CEIC 
Mkt Cap Shanghai and Shenzhen aggregate market capitalisation 
Shanghai Equity Mkt Cap + 
Shenzhen Equity Mkt Cap 
CEIC and own calculation 
mkt vol 
Volatility in Shanghai and Shenzhen aggregate market 
capitalisation 
𝜎(Mkt Cap) CEIC and own calculation 
GDP p.c. Per capita Gross Domestic Product  CEIC 
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A.2.4. Summary statistics 
For a better characterisation of the variables adopted in our study (presented in Appendix 
A.2.3), we report below a standard summary statistics Table, including number of observations, 
mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values assumed by each variable our 
dataset. 
 
 Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable:      
Lev. ratio 93,419 0.010 0.635 -10.817 15.296 
Main explanatory 
variable: 
     
CIF 82,301 -4.435 0.437 -5.246 -3.502 
Core firm 
fundamentals: 
     
Profitability 97,284 1.12E+08 3.11E+09 -1.09E+11 1.51E+11 
Tobin's Q 97,325 3.046 20.413 -0.397 3480.877 
Z-score 94,099 117.941 1586.058 0.446 462209.900 
Additional firm 
fundamentals: 
     
ROA 97,330 0.028 0.140 -1.435 20.788 
𝜎(ROA) 94,119 0.032 0.134 0.000 11.246 
Sharpe 94,099 1.235 11.165 -2600.032 1276.796 
Equity 97,330 1.32E+10 7.04E+10 0 5.29E+12 
Financial maket 
fundamentals: 
     
MPI 97,330 6.997 1.629 3.890 12.060 
log(Bank ROA) 82,667 0.186 0.131 -0.105 0.358 
log(Mkt Cap) 97,330 16.933 0.702 14.966 17.884 
log(Mkt vol) 97,330 13.866 1.003 10.639 15.380 
Macroeconomic 
fundamentals: 
     
log(Sov. Yields) 92,115 1.260 0.136 1.015 1.508 







A.2.5. Chinese Monetary Policy Index (MPI) 
Following Giardin et al. (2017), we built our Chinese Monetary Policy Index (MPI) on four 
main steps. Firstly, we converted a change in any of the considered monetary policy 
instruments into a 27 basis point (bps) monthly change; this corresponds to the usual variation 
in regulated bank deposit and lending rates, paid or charged by PBoC. As the authors, we then 
assumed a conversion in multiples of 27 for variations in other monetary policy instruments. 
For instance, a 50 bps change in Required Reserves Ratio (RRR) corresponds to a 27 bps rate 
change. Regarding Open Market Operations (OMOs), we assumed a variation (withdrawal or 
injection) of CNY 200 billion as equivalent to 27bps, while a CNY 350 billion change as 
equivalent to 54bps and CNY 500 billion as 81 basis points. Secondly, we converted all the 
monthly changes into an aggregate change for all instruments. We perform the aggregation as 
follows: (i) using a simple arithmetic sum when at least one instrument variation has a different 
sign instead of the others; (ii) selecting the maximum monthly change, when all instruments 
changes have the same sign. Afterwards, we adjusted the aggregate change to account for the 
change in window guidance (a proxy for unobserved policy changes) for the Chinese New Year 
or one-off variations in PBoC monetary policy stance. Adjustments for the Chinese New Year 
are adopted as liquidity is often injected and withdrawn the following month. Eventually, we 
cumulated this into a monthly monetary policy index.  
 
Since our firm-level and capital flow data is quarterly, once we created our monetary policy 
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A.2.6. Construction of our monetary policy indicator 
To address potential endogeneity problems arising from the simultaneity of banks' lending 
(debt growth) and PBOC monetary policy. Using a reduced-form VAR model, we study the 
transformation of capital inflows into bank credit after PBOC monetary policy. 
 
𝑦𝑡 = ⁡𝛼 + ∑ 𝜙𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝
𝑝
1 + ℰ𝑡   [Equation 2.2] 
 
where: 𝐸(ℰ𝑡) = 0, 𝐸(ℰ𝑡ℰ𝑡
′) =  and 𝐸(ℰ𝑡ℰ𝑠
′) = 0 
 
In particular, in our VAR specification, 𝑦𝑡 is our variable of interest and is built as a K x 1, 
vector of variables; 𝜙𝑝 is our coefficient estimate matrix with K x P estimates – where p 
corresponds to the number of lags included in the VAR and K stands for the number of variables 
included in the VAR. Eventually, ℰ𝑡 is a K x 1 vector containing K serially uncorrelated white-
noise error terms. As specified in the statement underneath Equation 2.2 – 𝐸(ℰ𝑡) = 0, 𝐸(ℰ𝑡ℰ𝑡
′) 
=  and 𝐸(ℰ𝑡ℰ𝑠
′) = 0, in our model the error structure has the following characteristics: (i) it 
has expected value of zero; (ii) as standard when observing macro variables, error terms are 
correlated across the K different equations; and, (iii) error terms have zero expected correlation 
across time.  
 
In more detail, the K variables included in the VAR are the natural logarithm of capital inflows 
in China (‘CIF’), our monetary policy index (‘mpi’) and of total financial institutions credit in 
China (collected from CEIC).  
 
As standard in reduced-form VAR models, the specification results depend on the selected 
hierarchical order of the variables. In our case, we specify the hierarchy by considering the 
theoretical transmission that we hypothesised in our paper (coherent with international capital 
flow literature). As shown in Figure 2.3, we assume that global factors are the primary 
determinant of capital inflows, potentially affecting Chinese monetary policy. Therefore, on 
the one hand, the order of the variables comes as a natural consequence of our theorised 
specification. On the other hand, despite being a good proxy for Chinese monetary policy, our 
monetary policy measure – as all indexes – does not constitute an actual monetary policy 
measure. Indeed, for its construction, we arbitrarily assembled multiple monetary policy 
indicators to make it as close as possible to the actual Chinese monetary policy. Therefore, we 
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position capital inflows in China as the first variable in the VAR hierarchical specification for 
both these reasons. The order of the variables in the VAR is, therefore: [CIF MPI Credit]'. 
 
As standard, before executing the reduced-form VAR, we tested the stationarity of our 
variables using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Not surprisingly, the financial institution 
credit and monetary policy index are I(1) variables. Using the Johansen Cointegration test, we 
tested the cointegration of the variables in our model. Since we found that they are not 
cointegrated, we performed an unconstrained reduced-form VAR, replacing our' log (mpi)' and 
'log (total Chinese credit)' variables with their first difference. Unfortunately, because of the 
lack of stationarity and of cointegration of the analysed, the variables in our model do not allow 
us to study the long-term effects of capital inflow shocks.   
 
As pictured in the Figure below, a shock to international capital inflows significantly expands 
domestic banks' credit in the short term and leads PBOC to tighten its monetary policy. For 
instance, one standard deviation shock to the log of international capital flows leads to a 
significant increase (about 190 percent) of total bank credit growth, lasting for about 1 year, 
before the shock to credit growth dissipates. Similarly, one standard deviation growth in capital 
inflows also significantly affects the change in the monetary policy index (which increases by 
about 1 percent); however, the effect dyes out much faster and is not significant at 5 percent 
level since the second quarter following the shock.  
   
After the VAR estimation, eventually, we store the residuals of our equation having the log-
change of the Chinese monetary policy index ('mpi') as yt. In this way, we obtain a variable 
that we will use as a regressor in our baseline model, which accounts for the impact of capital 
inflows on domestic monetary policy in China. That, we think that reduces to the minimum 





Notes: In this Figure, we present the orthogonalised impulse-response functions derived from our reduced-form 
VAR. In the graphs, we show the response of the first difference of log(total credit) (‘D.log(total credit)’) – on 
the left-hand side – and of the log of Chinese monetary policy index (‘D.log(mpi)’) – on the right-hand side – to 
one standard deviation shock to the log of capital inflows in China.  
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A.3.0: Dataset Description  
A.3.0.1 Data  
Inward FDI: Annual data on foreign countries’ FDI holdings in EA countries is collected from 
the IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS). From this dataset, we collected 
’inward’ FDI positions in EA countries, cross-classified by economy of the immediate investor 
(see IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey Guide – 2015).  
 
Gravity Variables: Gravity variables of ’Geographical Distance’, ’Common Official 
Language’, ’Contiguity’, ’Common Religion’, ’Colony’, ’Time difference’ and ’Common 
Legal Origin’ are instead collected from the ’Comptes Harmonisés sur les Echanges et 
L’Economie Mondiale (CHELEM)’ database, developed by the CEPII Research Center. The 
’Gravity Dataset’ is a dyadic dataset, disclosing many features for the reported country pairs, 
such as: geographical distance (in kilometres) between the capitals of most of the countries in 
the world, whether or not the countries share the same official language, whether the countries 
share a geographical border, whether the countries share the same official religion or 
colonization history, the time difference between the countries, their legal origin and more (see 
Meyer and Zignago, 2011).  
 
Country Risk Variables: Country Risk variables have been gathered the World Bank Global 
Financial Development Database and from IMF Financial Soundness Indicators Database (with 
the exception of the 10-year Sovereign Bond Yields, for which we used IMF IFS, supplemented 
for a few missing observations with OECD Financial Statistics, Oesterreichische 
NationalBank, CEIC and Bloomberg). The World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database is an extensive dataset gathering information on the functioning of the financial 
system. Among the information presented in this database, it reports statistics on: financial 
depth, financial services access, efficiency and stability (resilience) of the financial system and 
of the institutions operating in it. Almost all our ’Country Risk’ variables have been collected 
from the Financial Stability Section of this database. Additionally, the IMF Financial 
Soundness Indicators Database is also a comprehensive dataset providing statistics on financial 
system resilience. In particular, it contains granular information on: financial intermediaries’ 
stability, as well as detailed statistics on other entities such as financial and non-financial 
corporations. From the latter database, we collected data on banks’ regulatory capital to risk-
weighted assets, that we then further supplemented using the World Bank Global Financial 




GDP per capita and GDP Growth: Annual data on GDP per capital has been obtained from 
World Bank Statistics. This database combines macro-economic data from the World Bank 
National Account database and from the OECD National Accounts data files.  
Average host country imports: Annual bilateral import of Euro Area countries (host) from 
origin countries have been collected from the International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade 
Statistics. This data has been then used to compute the average between 2009 and 2016.  
 
Foreign Exchange rate and Foreign Exchange volatility: Bilateral exchange rate of all 
origin countries national currencies against the euro, have been collected from S&P Global 
Database. In the case of Euro Area countries, we reported the value of the Euro defined in terms 
of the SDR. The SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to 
supplement its member countries’ official reserves, whose value is determined in terms of a 
basket of five major currencies (U.S. dollar, the euro, the Chinese renminbi, the Japanese yen, 
and the British pound sterling). Data for the SDR have been collected from the IMF Exchange 
rate data.  
 
Taxes: Annual data on domestic government tax revenues as a percentage of GDP are collected 
from World Bank Global Financial Development Database.  
 
A.3.0.2 – Countries 
In our analysis we included a broad range of countries (i.e., 112 countries). The countries that 
we considered are all those voluntarily participating in the IMF Coordinated Direct Investment 
Survey (CDIS), with the exception of tax heavens, small countries with large financial centres 
or war zones. Specifically, below we report the detailed composition of our dataset: 
 
Countries included in the dataset: Within the Euro Area (EA), we considered all countries 
with the exception of Lithuania, as it joined the EA in 2015, Malta and Luxembourg. With 
respect to non-Euro Area countries, we consider: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, 
Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, 
Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Cambodia, Canada, Central African 
Republic, Chile, China, P.R. Mainland, Colombia, Congo, Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Guinea- Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Republic 
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of, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Republic of Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liberia, Lithuania, Macedonia, FYR, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Republica Bolivariana 




A.3.0.3 – Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.7  
Summary statistics on foreign direct investment and key independent variables. 




N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Greece GRC 115 405.877 1,085.274 -1,633.905 5,358.714 
Ireland IRL 120 10,968.990 36,481.940 -23,034.350 154,667.400 
Italy ITA 120 17,134.910 27,606.310 7.640 124,198.700 
Portugal PRT 120 1,563.345 4,669.577 -8,047.017 24,486.880 





N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Austria AUT 120 5,389.935 8,987.756 -841.423 35,873.030 
Belgium BEL 120 20,817.410 46,705.070 -3,770.425 225,544.700 
Cyprus CYP 119 2,095.746 5,230.197 -5,192.275 27,625.580 
Estonia EST 120 85.241 281.451 -76.971 1,962.515 
Finland FIN 120 3,085.604 6,469.908 -1,011.345 31,934.490 
France FRA 120 34,176.300 50,160.460 45.023 178,235.400 
Germany DEU 120 27,228.140 47,179.820 87.096 242,784.100 
Latvia LVA 119 41.694 112.753 -40.353 649.823 
Netherlands NLD 120 55,631.900 64,693.200 0.000 248,562.200 
Slovak 
Republic 
SVK 120 79.657 383.796 -602.303 2,907.801 
Slovenia SVN 114 13.949 116.841 -246.902 1,140.897 




N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Greece GRC 120 10.959 5.244 5.174 22.498 
Ireland IRL 120 4.352 2.771 0.736 9.602 
Italy ITA 120 3.710 1.444 1.488 5.493 
Portugal PRT 120 5.755 2.921 2.423 10.548 





N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Austria AUT 120 2.184 1.195 0.377 3.937 
Belgium BEL 120 2.505 1.311 0.476 4.233 
Cyprus CYP 120 5.350 1.061 3.773 7.000 
Estonia EST 30 6.873 0.920 5.968 7.778 
Finland FIN 120 2.005 1.106 0.363 3.739 
France FRA 120 2.226 1.090 0.467 3.649 
Germany DEU 120 1.673 1.042 0.090 3.223 
Latvia LVA 120 5.064 4.029 0.534 12.358 
Netherlands NLD 120 2.000 1.108 0.292 3.687 
Slovak 
Republic 
SVK 120 3.029 1.567 0.543 4.707 
Slovenia SVN 120 3.865 1.644 1.149 5.812 




N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Greece GRC 120 24.055 11.623 7.000 36.647 
Ireland IRL 120 17.357 5.453 9.800 25.709 
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Italy ITA 120 14.334 3.371 9.400 18.064 
Portugal PRT 120 9.325 2.821 4.800 11.962 





N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Austria AUT 120 2.885 0.359 2.300 3.473 
Belgium BEL 120 3.578 0.476 2.799 4.245 
Cyprus CYP 120 27.329 18.361 4.500 48.676 
Estonia EST 120 2.745 1.766 0.870 5.375 
Finland FIN 60 0.550 0.050 0.500 0.600 
France FRA 120 4.112 0.227 3.759 4.495 
Germany DEU 105 2.773 0.442 1.980 3.300 
Latvia LVA 120 9.039 4.703 3.652 15.934 
Netherlands NLD 120 2.912 0.239 2.531 3.227 
Slovak 
Republic 
SVK 120 5.222 0.403 4.444 5.836 
Slovenia SVN 120 10.136 3.351 5.071 15.180 




N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Greece GRC 120 13.108 2.527 9.569 16.947 
Ireland IRL 120 19.988 4.480 12.780 26.941 
Italy ITA 120 13.295 1.018 11.650 14.789 
Portugal PRT 120 11.807 1.308 9.780 13.327 





N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Austria AUT 120 16.500 1.027 15.026 17.976 
Belgium BEL 120 18.389 0.637 17.262 19.305 
Cyprus CYP 120 13.351 2.908 7.343 16.943 
Estonia EST 120 24.721 5.969 18.607 35.653 
Finland FIN 120 17.455 3.463 14.188 23.337 
France FRA 120 14.804 2.054 12.324 17.752 
Germany DEU 120 17.423 1.413 14.820 19.160 
Latvia LVA 120 17.578 2.736 13.724 21.823 
Netherlands NLD 120 16.481 3.091 13.478 22.375 
Slovak 
Republic 
SVK 120 15.501 2.142 12.571 17.982 
Slovenia SVN 120 14.458 3.294 11.320 19.155 
Notes: Panel A discloses descriptive statistics on inward FDI stock received by EA countries between 
2009 and 2016. Panel B contains descriptive statistics on 10-year sovereign bond yields of EA countries. 
In Panel C we report descriptive statistics EA banks NPL ratio. Panel D shows descriptive statistics on 
Regulatory Capital held by EA banks as a portion of their Risk-Weighted assets. For all the Panels, we 




A.3.1 Additional analyses  
A.3.1.2 Correlation matrix 
 



















































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.8 Continued. Transposed 
 log(taxes) log(10SBY)orig log(10SBY)host log(RCRWA)orig log(RCRWA)host log(NPL)orig 
log(import)) -0.239 0.006 -0.273 0.014 -0.051 -0.008 
comm_lang 0.027 -0.02 -0.009 0.003 0.101 -0.013 
log(distance) 0.012 0.322 0.043 -0.045 -0.043 -0.22 
contig -0.05 -0.137 -0.053 -0.019 0.029 0.075 
comrelig -0.054 -0.078 -0.091 -0.006 0.0181 0.046 
colony -0.045 0.008 -0.012 -0.021 -0.022 0.004 
com_leg_orig 0.058 0.062 0.082 -0.051 -0.043 0.076 
corr (GDP) -0.086 -0.168 -0.191 -0.011 0.156 0.052 
log (FX) 0.008 0.263 -0.036 0.221 0.027 0.009 
log (vol FX) 0.007 0.501 -0.013 0.123 0.013 -0.026 
log(taxes) 1 -0.035 0.13 0.027 0.0627 -0.018 
log (10SBY)_orig  1 0.195 -0.007 -0.151 0.148 
log (10SBY)_host   1 -0.164 -0.596 0.101 
log (RCRWA)_orig    1 0.111 -0.095 
log (RCRWA)_host     1 -0.074 
log (NPL) orig      1 





A.3.1.3 Additional tests  
As additional tests, we performed: (i) Wooldridge test for serial correlation, (ii) Pesaran test 
for cross-sectional dependence and (iii) Fisher test on variable stationarity. As a result of 
evidence of serial correlation and cross-sectional dependence, we corrected our standard error 
structure using time fixed-effects and clustering of our standard errors at the host country level.  
 
A.3.2 Additional test results  
In this section, we present the results of other tests that we perform to robustify the validity of 
our theory.  
Table 3.9  
Estimation results on the impact of banking and sovereign risk on inward FDI in the EMU, accounting 
for origin countries’ economic growth. Regression results obtained by OLS. 
Country Risk 
 Banking Risk measure  Sovereign Risk measure 
 (1)  (2) 
 log (FDI)  log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.178*** (0.038)   
log (NPL ratio_host) 0.065 (0.047)   
log (Sovereign yields_orig)   -1.449*** (0.157) 
log (Sovereign yields_host)   -0.443*** (0.149) 
avg (log(import)) 0.353*** (0.060)  0.431*** (0.083) 
comm_lang 1.180** (0.425)  1.133** (0.466) 
log (distance) -0.992*** (0.102)  -0.562*** (0.104) 
contig 2.411*** (0.341)  1.669*** (0.368) 
comrelig 0.938*** (0.308)  0.704 (0.427) 
colony 0.357 (0.683)  0.595 (0.765) 
com_leg_orig -0.251 (0.231)  0.623 (0.395) 
corr (GDP) -0.045 (0.218)  -0.079 (0.300) 
log (vol FX) -1.178*** (0.081)  -0.936*** (0.087) 
log (taxes) 0.176 (0.313)  0.186 (0.426) 
L1 (GDP Growth_orig) 0.042 (0.043)  0.064 (0.045) 
Constant 12.845*** (1.462)  11.309*** (1.759) 
N 6,545  4,071 
Time FE Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.395  0.478 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the 
parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects 
are included but unreported. As proxy for economic growth, in this Table we adopt the first lag of GDP 




Estimation results on the impact of banking and sovereign risk on inward FDI in the EMU, accounting 
for origin countries’ financial sophistication40. Regression results obtained by OLS. 
Country Risk 
 Banking Risk measure  
Sovereign Risk 
measure 
 (1)  (2) 
 log (FDI)  log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.224*** (0.036)   
log (NPL ratio_host) 0.040 (0.043)   
log (Sovereign 
yields_orig) 
  -1.168*** (0.151) 
log (Sovereign 
yields_host) 
  -0.483** (0.174) 
avg(log(import)) 0.384*** (0.062)  0.561*** (0.097) 
comm_lang 1.418*** (0.438)  1.192* (0.617) 
log(distance) -1.118*** (0.087)  -1.085*** (0.106) 
contig 1.507*** (0.390)  0.412 (0.447) 
comrelig 1.003*** (0.284)  0.597 (0.450) 
colony 0.494 (0.619)  0.740 (0.617) 
com_leg_orig -0.131 (0.171)  0.504* (0.271) 
corr (GDP) 0.117 (0.176)  0.044 (0.292) 
log (vol FX) -1.008*** (0.051)  -0.879*** (0.089) 
log(taxes) 0.120 (0.341)  0.088 (0.510) 
log (MKTCAP/GDP orig) 0.346*** (0.042)  0.927*** (0.125) 
Constant 12.659*** (1.411)  11.436*** (1.850) 
N 9,636  6,098 
Time FE Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.440  0.494 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the 
parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects 
are included but unreported. As proxy for financial market sophistication, in this Table we adopt the 
logarithm of the ratio of origin countries’ equity market capitalisation-over-GDP; other variables are 
described in the ‘Data’ section.  
 
40 Note that, according to Davis et al. (2000) argument, origin countries financial sophistication should favour 
their FDI, once foreign countries’ conditions prove as preferable to those of their home country. On the contrary, 
countries with less developed financial markets could face higher costs (barriers to entry) in investing abroad. 




Estimation results on the impact of banking and sovereign risk on inward FDI in the EMU, controlling 
for origin countries’ Business Cycle (BC). Regression results obtained by OLS. 
                                              Country Risk 
 Banking Risk   Sovereign Risk  
 (1)  (2) 
 log (FDI)  log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.113*** (0.037)   
log (NPL ratio_host) 0.061 (0.040)   
log (Sovereign yields_orig)   -0.765*** (0.107) 
log (Sovereign yields_host)   -0.360*** (0.125) 
BC 0.103 (0.077)  -0.012 (0.134) 
avg (log(import)) 0.428*** (0.020)  0.484*** (0.032) 
comm_lang 1.453*** (0.369)  1.796*** (0.378) 
log (distance) -0.446*** (0.091)  -0.305*** (0.109) 
contig 1.503*** (0.374)  0.732* (0.385) 
comrelig 0.881*** (0.256)  0.598* (0.333) 
colony -0.118 (0.474)  0.186 (0.521) 
com_leg_orig -0.405** (0.159)  0.290 (0.224) 
corr (GDP) 0.254** (0.125)  0.143 (0.167) 
log (vol FX) -0.804*** (0.067)  -0.691*** (0.091) 
log (taxes) 0.275 (0.318)  0.196 (0.393) 
Constant 6.166*** (1.350)  6.377*** (1.579) 
N 9,406  5,911 
Time FE Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.496  0.535 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the 
parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects 
are included but unreported. Origin countries’ BC has been computed as the cyclical component of 
these countries’ GDP, obtained using a Hodrick-Prescott filtering process with smoothing factor of 100; 




















 non-GIIPS  GIIPS 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 log (FDI)  log (FDI)  log (FDI)  log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.201*** (0.063)    -0.207*** (0.078)   
log (NPL ratio_host) 0.086 (0.054)    0.085 (0.294)   
log (Sovereign 
yields_orig) 
  -1.471*** (0.172)    -1.302*** (0.206) 
log (Sovereign 
yields_host) 
  -0.428* (0.221)    -1.061*** (0.297) 
avg (log(import)) 0.400*** (0.051)  0.521*** (0.068)  0.460*** (0.100)  0.465*** (0.117) 
comm_lang -0.244 (0.808)  0.223 (1.355)  1.968*** (0.687)  2.083** (0.821) 
log(distance) -0.806*** (0.134)  -0.442*** (0.156)  -0.593*** (0.207)  -0.514** (0.208) 
contig 2.816*** (0.564)  2.260*** (0.627)  -0.522 (1.329)  -1.733 (1.074) 
comrelig 0.036 (0.444)  -0.688 (0.580)  -0.006 (0.453)  0.044 (0.646) 
colony 1.180 (0.736)  0.817 (0.888)  1.605 (1.071)  3.167** (1.246) 
com_leg_orig -0.186 (0.258)  0.598* (0.337)  -0.700*** (0.249)  -0.131 (0.406) 
corr (GDP) 0.096 (0.188)  0.411 (0.273)  0.179 (0.243)  -0.094 (0.302) 
log (vol FX) -0.997*** (0.105)  -0.806*** (0.143)  -1.116*** (0.156)  -1.013*** (0.176) 
log(taxes) 0.448 (0.504)  0.537 (0.599)  0.033 (0.821)  1.014 (0.889) 
Constant 9.810*** (2.088)  8.634*** (2.320)  9.138*** (3.220)  8.823*** (3.284) 
N 5,215  2,930  2,660  1,575 
Time FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.293  0.427  0.295  0.478 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered 





Estimation results on the impact of banking and sovereign risk on inward FDI in the EMU, controlling 
for the size and capital intensity of origin and host countries. Regression results obtained by OLS. 
                                              Country Risk 
 Banking Risk   Sovereign Risk  
 (1)  (2) 
 log (FDI)  log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.080** (0.040)   
log (NPL ratio_host) -0.014 (0.042)   
log (Sovereign yields_orig)   -1.107*** (0.118) 
log (Sovereign yields_host)   -0.684*** (0.124) 
ln_sumGDPg -0.038 (0.040)  -0.147*** (0.049) 
L1_log (diffGDPpc) 0.112*** (0.009)  0.077*** (0.010) 
avg (log(import)) 0.461*** (0.038)  0.507*** (0.046) 
comm_lang 1.438*** (0.407)  1.560*** (0.442) 
log (distance) -0.882*** (0.094)  -0.579*** (0.112) 
contig 2.052*** (0.387)  1.353*** (0.401) 
comrelig 1.224*** (0.275)  0.847** (0.353) 
colony 0.451 (0.475)  0.914* (0.534) 
com_leg_orig -0.109 (0.173)  0.749*** (0.226) 
corr (GDP) 0.128 (0.132)  -0.052 (0.175) 
log (vol FX) -0.808*** (0.082)  -0.740*** (0.101) 
log (taxes) 0.384 (0.344)  0.467 (0.410) 
Constant 9.788*** (1.430)  9.410*** (1.573) 
N 9,626  6,088 
Time FE Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.432  0.499 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the 
parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects 
are included but unreported. In this Table, we use the natural logarithm of the sum of GDP growth of 
origin and host country as proxy for size of the economies involved in the bilateral transaction. We 
exploit the first lag of the natural logarithm of the difference in origin and host countries GDP per capita 




A.4.1. Construction of the dataset on PE buyouts 
We create our dataset exploiting several data sources. First, we identify 2,050 targets acquired 
by PE buyout firms over the period 2008 to 2019 in the UK from S&P Market Intelligence.  
Second, using S&P Capital IQ and Market Intelligence, we classify PE transactions 
(deals) as buyouts. Deals considered in our paper are those that satisfy the following criteria: 
(i) the target firm is incorporated in the UK; (ii) the transaction is announced and completed 
between 2008 and 2019; (iii) the deal structure of the transaction – as reported on S&P Capital 
IQ and Market Intelligence – is reported as: “leveraged buyout”, “LBO”, “management 
buyout”, “MBO”, or “going private transaction”; (iv) the PE investor has reported interest in 
at least one of the following stages: bridge, buyout, early venture, emerging growth, growth 
capital, incubation, industry consolidation, late venture, mature, mezzanine/sub-debt, middle 
market, mid-venture, pipes, seed/start-up, or turnaround. This identification strategy is widely 
popular in the buyout literature and is consistent with widely known work such as Axelson et 
al. (2013) and Faccio and Hsu (2017). This next step produces a result of 1,869 buyouts targets. 
Finally, we match this data with accounting databases such as: Capital IQ, Compustat and 
Orbis, to obtain firm-level accounting controls for the previously defined PE targets. This 
reduces the useable sample to 833 UK target firms. When we match this with the available data 
on non-target UK firms from Orbis (data only available from 2010) this results in a final sample 
of UK PE targets of 765 firms over the period 2010 to 2019.  
 
A.4.2. Variables: Definition and construction  
A.4.2.1.1. Macro-economic and industry-level control variables 
1. Investment Opportunity Index: To compute this variable, we used a Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) and selected the first principal component of the following 
variables (all available at quarterly frequency): 
a) Agents survey on investment intentions: Survey of Bank of England’s Agents, 
performed for service and non-service sector. 
b) CBI survey on investment intentions: Survey of Confederation of British Industry, 
performed for manufacturing, financial services, business/consumer/professional 
services and distributive trade. 
c) General economic situation expectations (Survey of Bank of England) 
d) Personal financial situation expectations (Survey of Bank of England) 
e) Unemployment expectations (inverted) (Survey of Bank of England) 
f) One year-ahead GDP growth forecast at market rates (Statistic of Bank of England) 
197 
 
2. Industry Shock: To build this variable, we follow Harford (2005). We use the first 
principal component of economic shocks to targets’ industries operating performance. 
We calculate industry shocks to operating performance as the median of the absolute 
yearly change in: (i) net income-to-sales turnover; (ii) R&D expenditure-to-assets; (iii) 
capital expenditure-to-assets; (iv) ROA; (v) growth in sales turnover. As industries, we 
use Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification.  
3. TED Spread: Standard measure of market liquidity (or funding cost). For the UK, it is 
measured as the difference between the 3-month UK LIBOR and 3-month UK Treasury 
Bill yields. 
4. Industry Cumulative Returns: This variable is calculated as the industry annual median 
of monthly firm-level 36-months log-cumulative returns. In the transformation of the 
return variable into ln, i.e. to compute log-cumulative returns, the following 
approximation has been used: ln (ret1) = ln (1+ ret1) to avoid losing information on 
periods with returns having a negative sign. Data on equity prices has been collected 
from CRSP and industries have been defined following Fama and French (1997) 48-
industry definition. 
5. Industry Cumulative Standard Deviation (STD) of Returns: After calculating ‘Industry 
Cumulative Returns’, for each year, we compute the standard deviation of 36-months 
log-cumulative returns. 
6. Industry Tobin’s q: This variable is calculated as the industry annual median Tobin’s 
q, for each of Fama and French (1997) 48 industries. We calculate yearly firms’ Tobin’s 
q as (Total Assets + Book-Value of Equity – Market Value of Equity)-over-Total 
Assets. 
 
A.4.2.1.2. Firm-specific control variables 
1. Total Assets: It represents the Book Value of Assets of target portfolio firms, measured 
in million US dollars and scaled by 100. When constructing this variable, we exclude 
all firms having Book Value of Assets lower than 0. Data on this variable has been 
collected from Compustat, Orbis, and S&P Capital IQ. 
2. ROA: The Return on Asset have been collected from Compustat, Orbis, and S&P 
Capital IQ. In case of missing values, this variable has also been computed as Net 




3. Leverage: This variable is computed as Total Liabilities-to-Book-Value of Equity. Data 
on equity and liabilities have been collected from Compustat, Orbis, and S&P Capital 
IQ. 
4. Cash-to-Assets: This variable is computed as Cash and Equivalents-to-Total Assets. 
Data on these two variables have been collected from Compustat, Orbis, and S&P 
Capital IQ. 
 
Below, we report the total number of observations for each firm-level control variable: 
Table A1. Accounting variables yearly observations 
In this Table, we display the total number of firm-year observation reached after merging the original sample of 
private equity buyouts with our asset-based control group. All the variables included in this Table are target-
specific balance sheet and income statement variables adopted in our baseline regression models. 
 
Date Total Assets ROA Operating Revenues 
Total Liabilities 




2010 182,795 64,910 40,497 180,760 155,849 134,989 
2011 190,219 66,348 55,902 176,663 176,652 146,319 
2012 198,794 67,368 56,803 184,741 184,727 154,604 
2013 204,769 68,684 58,428 193,313 193,295 162,971 
2014 210,145 70,186 59,866 198,989 198,976 169,258 
2015 219,319 73,167 61,306 203,405 203,392 173,807 
2016 228,830 77,233 63,394 213,341 213,324 180,959 
2017 237,107 78,454 65,931 222,800 222,782 184,832 
2018 240,522 78,189 66,638 228,555 228,537 187,099 
2019 72,922 17,290 15,147 72,034 72,032 61,156 
 
 
A.4.2.1.3. Proxies for investment irreversibility, sunk costs, industry cyclicality, and 
concentration 
1. Capital Intensity: This variable is computed as the ratio of Net Property, Plant and 
Equipment (PPE)-to-Total Assets. Data on this variable has been collected from 
Compustat, Orbis, and S&P Capital IQ. Our proxy of high capital intensity is built using 
an indicator variable that, for each year, takes value of one if the target firm capital 
intensity ratio is greater than the industry median; zero otherwise. 
2. High Investment Sunk Costs: Following Bonaime et al. (2018), we first compute the 
following three ratios: Rent Expense-to-first lag of PPE; Depreciation Expense-to-first 
lag of PPE; and, Annual Sales of PPE-to-first lag of PPE. Our proxy for ‘high 
investment sunk cost’ takes value of one, if the industry average of all three ratios is 
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contemporaneously greater than the industry median (in a given year); zero otherwise. 
We define industries following Fama and French (1997) 48-industry definition. 
3. Industry Cyclicality: To define this variable, we follow the definition of cyclical 
industries given by Sharpe (1994), which found durable goods industries to be much 
more cyclical than non-durable goods ones. Therefore, as in Sharpe (1994), we classify 
durable goods industries based on their SIC code. We then use an indicator variable 
that takes value of one, if the industry is classified as durable goods industry in Sharpe 
(1994), zero otherwise. 
4. Industry Concentration: We follow a similar approach to that employed for the 
construction of the Herfindahl index. We assume that if markets are efficient and 
competitive sales should be similar across industries and not deviate from a certain 
optimum. Therefore, our indicator variable ‘Industry Concentration’ takes value of one 
if, in a given year, median sales of one industry exceed the median sales from all 
industries, and zero otherwise. 
5. Industry Exposure to the EU:  In a similar spirit to Bloom et al. (2019), we measure 
exposure based on industries exposure to the external sector (IM + X) of the Balance 
of Payment. Industry Import (IM), and Export (X) are available from the UK Office of 
National Statistics (ONS). Industry with high exposure to the EU are those that in a 
given year have Total External Sector (IM + X) higher than the UK median. 
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A.4.3. Construction of the control group  
As comparing PE firms with all British firms might create a bias as many firms have not the 
characteristics of ever being a PE target, we need create a control group which best represent 
our sample of private equity targets. To create a control group which is representative of our 
sample of private equity targets, we select just those firms whose total assets lies in a +/- one 
standard deviation range around the mean assets of our initial sample of our UK portfolio 
targets. This leads us to the section of a total of 290,022 British control firms, whose size we 
describe below. 
 
Table A2. Asset distribution of estimation sample 
In this Table, we show the asset characteristics of all firms considered in our study. This is inclusive of both PE 
portfolio targets and firms which are not target of buyout – constituting our control sample. 
 
Date 
Quartiles of firms’ total assets 
[0 - 0.25] [0.25 - 0.50] [0.50 - 0.75] [0.75 - 1] 
2010 55,085 44,963 40,340 42,407 
2011 55,571 46,907 43,186 44,555 
2012 57,759 49,343 45,219 46,473 
2013 54,717 49,955 49,150 50,947 
2014 52,149 52,108 52,159 53,729 
2015 53,276 54,993 55,188 55,862 
2016 56,391 61,820 55,783 54,836 
2017 50,442 58,969 64,191 63,505 
2018 45,694 57,971 69,392 67,465 







A.4.4. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
 
Table A3.  Descriptive statistics 
The Table presents the main descriptive statistics for all the independent variables of our baseline logistic 
regression. In Panel A, we present statistics on the adopted uncertainty measures. In Panel B, we display macro-
economic and industry level controls. Eventually, Panel C and D show statistics on firm-level variables computed 
on a sample of just target portfolio firms (Panel C) and a sample including both target and non-target firms (Panel 
D). We winsorized data on firm-level variables presented in Panel D at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In-depth 
information on the variables included in this Table is reported in Appendix A.4.2.1.   
 






Policy Uncertainty (EPU) 2,900,219 1.6 0.5 1.0 2.9 
Macro Uncertainty 2,900,219 0.1 0.8 -1.1 1.3 
Sterling Opt-Impl. Volatility 2,900,219 0.2 0.6 -0.8 1.2 
FTSE Opt-Impl. Volatility 2,900,219 1.5 0.3 1.1 2.1 
Brexit Uncertainty Index (BUI) 2,900,219 1.7 2.0 0.0 5.3 
Panel B. Macro-economic and industry-level controls 
Investment Opportunity 2,900,219 0.5 1.1 -1.1 2.4 
TED Spread 2,900,219 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 
Industry Shock 2,555,630 1.1 0.6 0.0 2.5 
Industry Cumulative Returns 2,447,711 0.1 0.2 -0.7 1.4 
Industry Cumulative STD 
Returns 
2,447,711 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.6 
Industry q 2,440,248 1.3 0.5 0.0 5.8 
Panel C. Firm-level controls for buyout targets only 
Total Assets 10,842 0.4 1.4 0.0 24.2 
ROA 10,842 3.3 10.1 -59.9 52.1 
Leverage 10,842 0.4 3.7 0.0 189.8 
Cash-to-Asset 10,842 0.1 0.5 -0.02 31.8 
Panel D. Firm-level controls for all British firms (both PE targets and control) 
Total Assets 1,985,422 9.6 20.3 0.0 137.4 
ROA 661,832 5.1 17.9 -62.2 95.0 
Leverage 1,849,684  18.2 3,276.7 0.0 35.4 





Table A4. Correlation matrix  
The Table presents the correlation between all independent variables of our baseline logistic regression. In the Table below, ‘EPU’ is Economic Policy Uncertainty; ‘macro 
unc’ is BoE Macro-economic Uncertainty; ‘sterl vol’ is Sterling Option-Implied Volatility; ‘FTSE vol’ is FTSE All-Share index option-implied volatility; ‘inv opp’ is our 
investment opportunity index; ‘ind shock’ corresponds to industry shocks; ‘TED’ is TED spread; ‘Ind cum_ret’ is FTSE All-Share index 36-months cumulative returns; ‘Ind 
cum_ret’ is the standard deviation of FTSE All-Share index 36-months cumulative returns; ‘q’ is Tobin’s q; ‘Assets’ is target-level firms’ book value of assets; ‘ROA’ represents 
target’s return on assets; ‘Lev’ is targets’ leverage; and, ‘Cash_asset’ is targets’ ratio of cash and equivalents-to-total assets. In-depth information on the variables included in 
this Table is reported in Appendix A.4.2.1.  
 
 EPU macro unc sterl vol FTSE vol inv opp ind shock TED Ind cum_ret Ind cum_STD q Assets ROA Lev Cash_asset 
EPU 1                           
macro unc 0.121*** 1             
sterl vol 0.399*** 0.721*** 1            
FTSE vol -0.194*** 0.813*** 0.734*** 1           
inv opp 0.016 -0.935*** -0.593*** -0.732*** 1          
ind shock -0.007 -0.029* -0.001 -0.087*** 0.037** 1         
TED -0.186*** 0.649*** 0.429*** 0.807*** -0.648*** -0.220*** 1        
Ind 
cum_ret 
-0.098*** -0.298*** -0.359*** -0.319*** 0.255*** -0.040*** -0.209*** 1       
Ind 
cum_STD 
-0.152*** 0.335*** 0.140*** 0.286*** -0.347*** 0.048*** 0.205*** 0.233*** 1      
q 0.031* -0.159*** -0.166*** -0.225*** 0.139*** 0.173*** -0.181*** 0.123*** -0.007 1     
Assets -0.017 0.033** 0.017 0.039** -0.030* -0.002 0.044*** -0.001 -0.027* -0.023 1    
ROA -0.081*** 0.048*** -0.018 0.060*** -0.031* 0.046*** 0.051*** 0.025* 0.066*** -0.006 -0.004 1   
Lev -0.024* 0.044*** 0.017 0.040*** -0.039** 0.024* 0.028* -0.0063 0.011 -0.009 0.089*** 0.079*** 1  
Cash_asset -0.113*** 0.166*** 0.055*** 0.166*** -0.145*** 0.039** 0.123*** 0.008 0.082*** -0.037** -0.0253* 0.216*** 0.018 1 







Table A5. VIF analysis  
The Table presents the VIF analysis for all independent variables of our baseline logistic regression.  
Panel A. Economic Policy Uncertainty 
Independent variables VIF 1/VIF 
Policy Uncertainty (EPU) 5.94 0.17 
Investment Opportunity 1.92 0.52 
Industry Shock 5.8 0.17 
TED Spread 7.75 0.13 
Industry Cumulative Returns 8.45 0.12 




Industry q 10.6 0.09 
Total Assets 1.48 0.67 
ROA 1.09 0.91 
Leverage 1 1.00 
Cash-to-Asset 1 
1.00 
Mean VIF 4.25 
 
Panel B. Sterling Option-Implied Volatility 
Sterling Opt-Impl. Volatility 1.16 0.86 
Investment Opportunity 1.87 0.54 
Industry Shock 5.78 0.17 
TED Spread 7.55 0.13 
Industry Cumulative Returns 8.41 0.12 
Industry Cumulative STD 
Returns 1.73 0.58 
Industry q 9.56 0.10 
Total Assets 1.47 0.68 
ROA 1.09 0.91 
Leverage 1 1.00 
Cash-to-Asset 
1 1.00 
Mean VIF 3.69 
 
Panel C. Brexit Uncertainty Index 
Brexit Uncertainty (BUI) 1.75 0.57 
Investment Opportunity 1.49 0.67 
Industry Shock 5.81 0.17 
Industry Cumulative Returns 5.94 0.17 
Industry Cumulative STD 
Returns 1.47 0.68 
Industry q 8.75 0.11 
Total Assets 1.45 0.69 
ROA 1.09 0.91 
Leverage 1 1.00 
Cash-to-Asset 
1 1.00 







A.4.5. Marginal Effects 
When using a logit model, it is useful and common practice to report marginal effects to 
interpret the magnitude of the regression coefficients that in a logistic distribution are scale 
dependent. The marginal effects reflect the change in probability of our categorical dependent 
variable assuming value of 1 (‘a buyout the following year’), given a unit change in our 
independent variables.  
 
Since logit model coefficients depend on the scale of each independent variable, it is standard 
practice to measure marginal effects at a specific value of the independent variables: the mean. 
Of course, in this framework, to assess the magnitude of marginal effects coefficients, it 
becomes crucial also reporting the unconditional probability of our event of interest (‘a buyout 






Table A6. Marginal effects: Baseline regressions 
Delta-method: at means (%)   
 dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx 
      
Policy Uncertainty (EPU) -0.0318**     
Macro Uncertainty  0.00250    
Sterling Impl. Volatility   -0.0203**   
FTSE Impl. Volatility    0.00808  
Brexit Uncertainty (BUI)     -0.0132*** 
Investment Opportunity 0.00253  -0.00898  -0.00169 
Industry Shock 0.0434*** 0.0442*** 0.0453*** 0.0440*** 0.0460*** 
TED Spread -0.1777 -0.0196 -0.124 -0.0186  
Industry Cumulative Returns -0.0944*** -0.0817** -0.0994*** -0.0804** -0.0648* 
Industry Cumulative STD Returns 0.0290 0.0497 0.0617 0.0472 -0.0486    
Industry q 0.0543*** 0.0553*** 0.0507*** 0.0559*** 0.0609*** 
Total Assets 0.000544*** 0.000563*** 0.000548*** 0.000563*** 0.000572*** 
ROA 0.000613** 0.000624** 0.000614** 0.000624** 0.000590** 
Leverage -1.47E-07 -1.30E-07 -1.22E-07 -1.30E-07 -1.48E-07 
Cash-to-Asset -0.195*** -0.197*** -0.196*** -0.197*** -0.194*** 
Observations 412,622 412,622 412,622 412,622 412,622 
Notes: ***, **, or * mark regression coefficients significant 1, 5, or 10 percent level. 
 
Frequency Table (2010-2019) 
Likelihood 
L(M)BOs Freq. Percent (%) 
No Buyout at t+1 0 2,609,421 99.97 
Buyout at t+1 1 776 0.03 






A.4.6. Additional results  
A.4.6.1. Baseline Regressions for Brexit period (2016 to 2019) 
To further explore the impact of the referendum, in this Appendix, we re-estimate the baseline 
model contraposing the impact of uncertainty before the Brexit referendum (2010-2015) and 
after (2016-2019).  
In Table A7, reported below, we observe that as for the whole period, in the years 
following the referendum results greater policy uncertainty and FX uncertainty had a negative 
effect on PE buyout activity. We find similar, albeit less significant results, using the Bank of 
England index of macroeconomic uncertainty and the FTSE Option Implied Volatility index.  
From Table A7 we can observe that, after the Brexit referendum, uncertainty (e.g. EPU) has a 
stronger impact on reducing the likelihood future buyouts than what we found in our baseline 
regression models (see Table 4.2).  
Examining results for the period before the Brexit referendum (2010-2015), we observe 
that the coefficients of our core uncertainty variables are larger in both absolute magnitude and 
significance in the period following the referendum (2016-2019). Of course, newspaper 
coverage of Brexit and arguably, its related uncertainty started well before the referendum. 
This also implies that Brexit uncertainty (and although our BUI commences mid-2015; see 
Figure 2) may have manifested much earlier than the referendum date. Therefore, in columns 
5-8 of Table A7, we also disclose the results of our baseline regressions performed on an earlier 
‘pre-Brexit period’ that excludes 2015 (i.e., from 2010-2014). Overall, we observe that the 
magnitude of the coefficients has again reduced. Moreover, none of our applicable measures 
of uncertainty has a significant impact on the likelihood of PE buyouts in the UK between 2010 
and 2014. This is in line with the previously identified enhanced transmission of Brexit 




Table A7. Uncertainty and PE buyout activity during Brexit period  
The Table displays the results of our baseline logistic regression of the likelihood of a buyout (‘Buyout t+1’) on Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU; column 1, 5 and 9), Macro-
economic Uncertainty (column 2, 6 and 10), Sterling Option-implied Volatility index (column 3, 7 and 11), and FTSE All-Share Option-implied Volatility index (column 4, 8 
and 12) during the pre-Brexit (2010-2015) vs Brexit (2016-2019) periods. All regressions are supplemented with several controls for industry and target-specific economic 
fundamentals. In each regression, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1, if at time t+1 a certain target firm is the object of a buyout, and zero otherwise. All independent 
variables are continuous and measured instead at time t. Further in-depth information on the variables included in this Table is reported in Appendix A.4.2.1.  


























                 
Policy Uncertainty (EPU) -1.017**    -0.434    
-
1.314***    
 (0.436)    (0.607)    (0.220)    
Macro Uncertainty  0.052    -0.068    -0.075 ⦾   
  (0.061)    (0.244)    (0.194)   
Sterling Opt-Impl. 
Volatility   -0.147⦾    0.026    
-
3.307***  
   (0.093)    (0.123)    (0.590)  
FTSE Opt-Impl. 
Volatility    -0.178    0.018    
-0.982 
** 
    (0.193)    (0.310)    (0.470) 
 
           
 
Observations 261,615 261,615 261,615 261,615 214,549 214,549 
214,54
9 214,549 151,007 151,007 151,007 151,007 
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table A8. PE waves and uncertainty 
The Table displays the results of an industry-level logistic regression of the likelihood of a PE buyout wave 
(‘Wave t+1’) on Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU; column 1), Sterling Option-Implied Volatility (column 2), 
and Brexit Uncertainty Index (BUI; column 3). All regressions are supplemented with several controls for 
industry-specific economic fundamentals. In each regression, the dependent variable assumes a value of 1, if at 
time t+1 a certain industry experiences buyout wave, and zero otherwise. We identify industry-level waves 
similarly to Harford (2005). For each year and industry, we count the number of buyout deals and then divide 
time t industry deals by the total volume of deals within that industry (in the whole period of analysis). Eventually, 
for each year, we scale the above ratio by the median of all industries' deals. We consider the industry as 
experiencing a ‘wave’ if, after considering each industry-year 'deal ratios', the ratio assumes a value lying in the 
top 5 percentile over the 10 years of analysis. All independent variables are continuous and measured instead at 
time t. Further in-depth information on the variables included in this Table is reported in Appendix A.4.2.1. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Wave t+1 Wave t+1 Wave t+1 
      
Policy Uncertainty (EPU) -3.732***   
 (1.155)   
Sterling Opt-Impl. Volatility  -1.112***  
  (0.126)  
Brexit Uncertainty (BUI)   -0.292 
   (0.236) 
Investment Opportunity -0.158 1.208*** 0.153 
 (0.296) (0.055) (0.282) 
Industry Shock -1.434* 0.180 -1.394* 
 (0.757) (0.204) (0.720) 
TED Spread -3.870** -37.862*** -2.177* 
 (1.973) (0.907) (1.228) 
Industry Cumulative Returns -3.512** -0.597 -3.337* 
 (1.461) (0.798) (1.714) 
Industry Cumulative STD Returns -1.759 -4.534 -0.748 
 (3.863) (2.878) (3.212) 
Industry q 0.528** -0.150* 0.508** 
 (0.265) (0.089) (0.231) 
Constant 3.199 4.629*** -2.126* 
 (2.220) (0.386) (1.279) 
    
Observations 361 361 361 
Notes: ***, **, *, or ⦾ mark regression coefficients significant 1, 5, 10 or 15 percent level. Standard Errors are 
reported in the parentheses underneath the regression coefficients. 
 
 
